Automotive Mechatronic Safety Argument Framework by Rivett, Roger
  
 
 
Automotive Mechatronic 
Safety Argument 
Framework 
 
Roger S Rivett 
 Doctor of Engineering 
University of York 
Computer Science 
June 2018 
  
  
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Reg & Kath - they would have been so proud. 
 
  
3 
 
Abstract 
A modern vehicle uses mechanical components under software control, referred to as mechatronic 
systems, to deliver its features. The software for these, and its supporting hardware, are typically 
developed according to the functional safety standard ISO 26262:2011. This standard requires that 
a safety argument is created that demonstrates that the safety requirements for an item are complete 
and satisfied by evidence. However, this argument only addresses the software and electronic 
hardware aspects of the mechatronic system, although safety requirements derived for these can 
also be allocated to the mechanical part of the mechatronic system. The safety requirements 
allocated to hardware and software also have a value of integrity assigned to them based on an 
assessment of the unmitigated risk. The concept of risk and integrity is expressed differently in the 
development of the mechanical components. 
In this thesis, we address the challenge of extending the safety argument required by ISO 26262 to 
include the mechanical components being controlled, so creating a safety argument pattern that 
encompasses the complete mechatronic system. The approach is based on a generic model for 
engineering which can be applied to the development of the hardware, software and mechanical 
components. From this, a safety argument pattern has been derived which consequently can be 
applied to all three engineering disciplines of the mechatronic system. The harmonisation of the 
concept of integrity is addressed through the use of special characteristics. The result is a 
model-based assurance approach which allows an argument to be constructed for the mitigation of 
risk associated with a mechatronic system that encompasses the three engineering disciplines of the 
system. This approach is evaluated through interview-based case studies and the retrospective 
application of the approach to an existing four corner air suspension system. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Modern Vehicles 
A modern premium passenger vehicle is a very complex machine employing many different 
technologies. It is potentially used all over the world in different environments by drivers who have 
only minimum training, [1]. In this section we give an overview of current technology and discuss 
the future trends. 
1.1.1 Current Technology Overview 
A vehicle may have up to 100 electronic control units used in its design. Each control unit will 
consist of hardware components (microprocessor, other VLSI components, hundreds of resistors 
and capacitors, 5–10 output drive devices) all surface-mounted on a multi-layer printed-circuit-
board with through-hole plating. The microprocessor will typically be running anything from 32k 
bytes to many mega-bytes of executable code written in the C language or generated from 
executable models. Each control unit may be connected to sensors to read physical values related 
to the vehicle, the environment or driver input. Each control unit may be connected to actuators to 
control physical attributes of the vehicle or provide information to the driver. There are typically 
50-100 sensors and actuators on the vehicle. Control units share information across multiple 
communication networks linked to each other by gateways and may be able to communicate 
wirelessly with devices external to the vehicle which also provide inputs to them. An increasing 
number of customer features no longer have their unique inputs and outputs but rather are functions 
that process data from the network, and put new data onto the network, making use of inputs and 
outputs associated with other features. 
The physical attributes of the vehicle may be controlled by the direct conversion of electrical energy 
into mechanical force or movement, or by the conversion of electrical energy into pneumatic or 
hydraulic pressure, which in turn produces mechanical force or movement. So, the technologies 
involved include mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, electromagnetic, electrical, electronic, and 
software. Different control units may be able to affect the same physical attributes of the vehicle 
through different actuators. 
The vehicle may be used by a wide variety of different people with different levels of skill, training, 
experience and temperament. The drivers of passenger vehicles are self-selecting; the prerequisites 
for being allowed to drive vary from country to country and range from merely driving for a short 
distance to having a specified number of hours’ practice, in daytime, night time and on motorways, 
supplemented by a theoretical test and a practical test. Unlike crews of aircraft, ships and trains, 
which are required to have training on an on-going basis, drivers of passenger vehicles are not tested 
again unless they have broken the law or are advancing in years. Therefore, the skill level of the 
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drivers of a mass-produced vehicle cannot be known with certainty and it must be assumed that 
there is a broad spread of ability. 
The primary controls of the vehicle, i.e. steering, accelerator and brakes, have become standard 
since first used on the 1916 Cadillac Type 53, but there are many more secondary controls with 
little commonisation. There is now a great impetus to add many more controls and also the 
availability of new technology that allows the use of new innovative controls, e.g. gesture 
recognition. There is an awareness of the need for good intuitive controls and of the adverse effects 
of this not being the case, and a growing concern about driver overload and distraction. There is 
very little regulation to constrain what vehicle manufacturers put into the market. The user-base is 
quite critical when choosing what to purchase and they are coming to judge Human Machine 
Interface by the standards of their smart phones and video games. Drivers may use the same vehicle 
over extended periods of time and become familiar with the controls, but some vehicles may be 
used once for only short journeys, e.g. the use of a hire car for a ‘there and back’ journey. While 
drivers should read the handbook for the controls before starting the journey, few people do this in 
practice. The dynamic performance and handling response of vehicles differ significantly from 
vehicle type to vehicle type; the driver should drive conservatively and become familiar with the 
behaviour and dynamic response before driving more spiritedly. 
The vehicle is deployed into different countries around the world representing a diverse 
environment with variations in geography, climate, road surface quality, road layout, road types, 
junction construction, traffic density, types and numbers of other road users, traffic regulations and 
cultural approaches to driving. Each country has the right to control the sale of vehicles in their own 
country and are not subject to any wider constraints. Consequently, there is a wide variation in the 
detail of how regulations are written and what different countries require, although there is 
commonality in the major established markets, [2]. 
Although the vehicle has a recommended service schedule specified for its lifetime of typically ten 
years, it cannot be guaranteed that this service schedule is adhered to, especially once the warranty 
period has elapsed and the vehicle may be on its second or third owner. 
1.1.2 Future Trends 
The fact that modern premium vehicles are increasingly using software-based technology, [1] 
means that it is possible to introduce many new features to the vehicle, some of which are starting 
to redefine the nature of the vehicle, e.g. advanced driving assistance features such as lane keep 
assist. Vehicle manufacturers are introducing this technology because they want to both keep up 
with what competitors are doing and, for premium brands, be the first to market with new features 
that they hope will appeal to customers. Another reason for the use of more technology is the 
perception that this will help reduce death and injury on the roads. The industry and other interested 
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parties are promoting an ambitious future for the automobile. This is driven both by the 
opportunities that it creates for business and also by a generally held belief that the driver is the 
main cause of accidents, and that use of more technology may help reduce the number of accidents 
on the road, [3]. 
At the time of writing, there is an increasing number of new Advanced Driver Assistance Systems 
(ADAS) being fitted to vehicles, [4], [5]. Some of these provide additional information to the driver, 
e.g. parking aid, blind spot warning. Others provide positive assistance, e.g. adaptive cruise control, 
lane keep assist, or operate autonomously, e.g. collision avoidance by braking. Many believe that 
the final outcome of this trend will be driverless cars, [6], and there are already prototypes of 
driverless cars being used on the public roads in a number of countries. 
Another area of rapid development is vehicle-to-vehicle communication networks (V2V) and 
vehicle-to-infrastructure communication (V2I) known collectively as V2X. This has the potential 
to provide vehicles with an awareness of other vehicles in their local vicinity in an urban setting. 
This is seen as necessary for autonomous vehicles and also opens up the possibility of vehicles 
being centrally controlled in a managed traffic zone, [7]. The vehicle is becoming more connected 
externally to the internet and the cloud.  
1.2 Rise of Automotive Mechatronic Systems 
While road vehicles have traditionally been primarily mechanical machines, recently, particularly 
since the 1970s, there has been increasing use of software-based electronic control, [8]. Starting 
with engine management systems and anti-lock braking, electronic control has progressively been 
added so that for premium vehicles virtually every mechanical function is software controlled. The 
combination of the mechanical components and their software control is referred to as a 
mechatronic system, [8]. In addition to those already mentioned, typical mechatronic systems fitted 
to a modern premium vehicle include steering, transmission, differentials, damping, suspension, 
roll control, rear spoiler, powered tailgate, powered seats and deployable door handles and tow-bar. 
Most of these mechatronic systems are safety-related in that some failures, under certain conditions, 
could lead to harm to people. 
A mechatronic system is composed of a mechanical system and its software control, referred to as 
an E/E system. Both of these have their own and different approaches to design. Mechatronic 
engineering has grown out of mechanical engineering and consequently has based its approach 
more on mechanical design than E/E system design. There is no unified approach to design that 
reconciles both the mechanical/mechatronic approach and that of an E/E system. 
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1.3 Achieving and Assuring Safety 
As mentioned above, the failure of a mechatronic system has the potential to cause harm. Some 
systems affect the driver’s ability to control the motion of the vehicle, and failures of these systems 
could lead to an accident. Other mechatronic systems, such as the powered tailgate, have the ability 
to harm people under failure conditions through direct contact. 
When a serious issue arises there is a search for the root cause; often there is not a single cause but 
an interplay between different aspects of the vehicle. The reports of those who experienced the issue 
may also lack clarity. Investigations into the issue that look at different technologies, which are 
actually closely linked, may suffer from not understanding the interactions. An example of the 
difficulty of establishing the root in such circumstances is the recall of Toyota vehicles that began 
in 2009, [9]. A broader approach to vehicle assurance has the potential to prevent unforeseen 
interactions and assist the investigation of any issues that do arise. This is what we explore. 
1.3.1 The Mechanical Approach to Reducing the Potential for Harm 
In purely mechanical systems, the functionality is constrained by geometry and the continuous 
nature of the physical properties of materials. The systems tend to have a small number of functions, 
for which the physics is well-established, and there are only a limited set of modes of operation. 
For these mechanical systems it has generally been the case that a system that does not fail is also 
a safe system, e.g. “If one is examining the hydraulic system of an aircraft, the reliability of that 
system is more or less complementary to the safety. As reliability increases safety also increases” 
[10]. For these mechanical systems, the quality techniques, whether based on reliability, robustness 
or the use of safety factors, were perceived to be sufficient to also address the safety issues.  
1.3.2 The E/E System Approach to Reducing the Potential for Harm 
This is in stark contrast to purely mechanical systems; the software-based electronic control systems 
typically have many modes of operation and the control algorithm is not constrained by physics and 
geometry. For these types of systems the role of non-stochastic systematic failures is at least as 
important as random failures and an approach to avoiding harm based purely on component 
reliability was seen to be insufficient, [11]. A new approach was developed from the 1970s onwards 
which was termed functional safety and this was formalised in standards such as IEC 61508 
Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related Systems, [12]. 
This was a generic standard and different industrial sectors were encouraged to produce a sector- 
specific version of it.  In 2011 a version for the automotive industry was published, ISO 26262: 
Road vehicles – Functional safety, [13]. It is now the norm for the software, and its supporting 
hardware, to be developed according to this standard. While in its introduction ISO 26262 states 
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that it seeks to address the trend of increasing mechatronic implementation its scope is restricted to 
the software control provided by the E/E system part of the mechatronic system. 
1.3.3 The Role of the Safety Case 
The application of ISO 26262 is intended to produce an E/E system whose malfunction does not 
represent unreasonable risk to the vehicle occupants or other road users. The standard requires the 
development of a safety case which it defines as an “argument that the safety requirements for an 
item are complete and satisfied by evidence compiled from work products of the safety activities 
during development”. The purpose of the safety case is to provide an argument for the absence of 
unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by malfunctioning behaviour of E/E systems. 
But, as noted above, the E/E system is only one part of the mechatronic system and so there is not 
a justification that the whole mechatronic system avoids unreasonable risk. 
The standard permits functional safety requirements to be assigned to the mechanical aspects of the 
mechatronic system, which it refers to as other technologies, however these are considered to be 
outside the scope of the standard. Therefore, the safety argument only has to state that such 
requirements have been allocated; it does not have to justify that they have been achieved. 
This is in contrast to the E/E system where the safety argument has to show the following: 
 Safety requirements have been progressively derived, and are traceable, from the concept 
level down to the hardware and software 
 Each safety requirement has been assigned the correct integrity value in the form of an 
Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) based on an assessment of the unmitigated risk 
 Safety requirements at all levels have been verified as being met in the physical components 
 The development of the system, hardware and software has been in accordance with the 
integrity requirements of the requirements being processed 
 Analysis of the design has been carried out to establish that the safety requirements are not 
undermined by systematic or random faults 
 The planning and project management was sufficient to ensure that the above were 
correctly carried out according to the standard 
This provides the potential to have a strong safety argument for the E/E aspect of the mechatronic 
system but not the whole mechatronic system. We see this as a weakness, especially in a context 
where more and more mechatronic systems, of increasing complexity, are responsible for the safe 
control of the vehicle, either by a human driver or under direct software control. This is not to say 
that the development of mechanical components is in any way lacking but having a complete safety 
case has the potential to increase the safety assurance for the whole vehicle. 
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The potential benefit is not just having a complete argument; the creation of the argument requires 
the exchange of information and the acknowledgment of the different aspects so contributing to 
making a better and safer product. It is already the case that mechanical issues are sometimes 
managed by software, for example a software diagnostic routine may detect mechanical wear before 
the component fails and then take actions to mitigate the risk associated with the failure. Also, 
deriving safety requirements top-down has the potential to miss interactions between elements, 
particularly between mechanical components and E/E systems. Again, a complete argument has the 
potential to help focus attention on these interactions. 
It should be noted that it is current practice to develop a mechanical system under E/E system control 
as a mechatronic system, but this is achieved informally rather than with defined mechatronic 
documents.  
1.4 Thesis Hypothesis 
Given the above, the question arises as to whether it is feasible to have a uniform approach to 
justifying that an automotive system, consisting of a mechanical machine controlled by software 
(i.e. a mechatronic system), is fit to be put into production from a “functional safety” perspective. 
This leads to the hypothesis proposed in this thesis that: 
A risk-based safety argument for a complete mechatronic system can be  
constructed that enables the explicit and systematic derivation of 
 safety requirements, with assigned integrity values, and that utilises evidence  
already produced by the established development practices for  
E/E systems and mechanical components. 
The following explains the key terms used in the thesis hypothesis: 
 Risk-based safety argument: one that justifies that risk has been reduced to an acceptable 
level 
 Mechatronic system: a mechanical assembly under software control that relates the values 
measured by sensors to the behaviour of actuators, affecting the mechanical assembly, 
according to some stated requirements 
 Explicit and systematic derivation of safety requirements: requirements that are 
traceable from the risk assessment to the lowest levels of design and which are derived as 
part of the co-evolution of the different technologies 
 Integrity value: an indication of the stringency with which risk reduction measures are to 
be carried out 
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To investigate this hypothesis four thesis objectives were defined: 
 TO1: To establish a design representation upon which a safety argument can be based 
 TO2: To establish a safety argument pattern based on the design representation  
 TO3: To establish a linkage of functional safety integrity to mechanical development 
 TO4: To establish a means of providing evidence to support claims related to mechanical 
development 
Thesis objective 1 is necessary to provide a foundation for the argument such that it can cope with 
the multiple levels of design and the co-evolution of the different technologies. The current work 
on automotive safety cases is based around a generic product requirements decomposition through 
levels of design abstraction. For an E/E system these are Safety Goals, Functional Safety Concept, 
Technical Safety Concept, Hardware Safety Requirements and Software Safety Requirements. We 
require an equivalent for the mechatronic system if we are to follow the same approach, which we 
intend to do, so as to build on existing knowledge and best practice. An argument based on levels 
of design abstraction will necessarily include all requirements, both nominal functionality and 
safety. The safety argument will be a partial instantiation of the design argument covering only 
safety requirements. The existing literature is reviewed to establish if a suitable description for a 
mechatronic system already exists. From the result of the literature review we document a product 
requirements decomposition scheme based on a generic view of design through levels of design 
abstraction. 
Thesis objective 2 will allow an argument to be constructed for a system documented as a product 
requirements decomposition through levels of design abstraction for a mechatronic system. 
Thesis objective 3 is necessary as the concept of integrity, as an indication of the stringency with 
which risk reduction measures are to be carried out, is not currently part of the mechanical 
engineering discipline. 
Thesis objective 4 is necessary as it is not currently part of the mechanical engineering discipline. 
It provides evidence to support claims for a risk-based safety argument. 
The generic mechatronic safety argument pattern is first evaluated by applying it to a generic E/E 
system definition; this allows evaluation against the current generic E/E system documentation. The 
generic mechatronic safety argument pattern is then evaluated by applying it to a generic 
mechatronic system definition; this extends the evaluation beyond the scope of existing 
documentation. Finally, the generic mechatronic safety argument pattern is evaluated by applying 
it to an existing mechatronic system, using extant design documentation.  
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1.5 Scope of work 
The subject of thesis is restricted to automotive mechatronic systems as defined above. It only 
considers those aspects of mechanical development that are necessary for the safety argument and 
it does not address the creation of a complete safety case.  
We are seeking to address a large problem space with no off-the-shelf solutions and a dearth of 
material directly related to our hypothesis on which we can build. We have to bridge two diverse 
worlds and, as such, the solution has to be generic and will have to gain the approval of both sides 
by being technically sound and not too onerous. 
While this thesis addresses the technical aspects of product development necessary for a safety 
argument, it does not address the project management and planning for developing a complete 
mechatronic system; nor does it consider the governance of engineering activities, although these 
aspects are very important in the delivery of a safe system. The thesis only considers product 
development and does not include the operational, maintenance and decommissioning phases of the 
product lifecycle. 
1.6 Contributions 
1. A model-based approach to representing the different divisions of work necessary to create 
a multi-technology system, that honours the co-evolution of safety requirements, and which 
provides the basis for a complete risk-based safety argument for a mechatronic system 
2. A case study on the practical application of DFMEA in an automotive OEM which assesses 
the extent to which, as practised, it does, or could, produce the evidence necessary to 
support the mechatronic system safety argument 
3. The creation of a mechatronic system safety argument pattern, and its evaluation, by the 
application of the model-based approach 
By taking a model-based approach, the argument pattern is not arbitrary but is based on an 
underlying understanding of the engineering task. Having a model that can represent the actual 
division of work between technologies and organisations facilitates its practical application. 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organised as follows: 
 Chapter 2 reviews related literature on a wide range of systems development including 
systems engineering, mechanical engineering, electronic/software engineering and 
mechatronic engineering. It reviews the societal understanding of risk and the safety 
standards and regulations of a number of industrial sectors. It looks at current quality and 
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safety practices in the automotive industry. It looks at the background and current practice 
regarding safety arguments. 
 Chapter 3 presents a new approach for dividing the development of a system into chunks, 
referred to as Partes, with each Pars being defined by a generic ontology and having a 
generic safety argument pattern, based on the ontology. The application of this approach to 
a classic E/E system developed according to ISO 26262 is presented. 
 Chapter 4 presents the application of the approach from chapter 3 to a mechatronic system. 
 Chapter 5 presents a case study of the industrial practice of DFMEA. 
 Chapter 6 presents a means by which an integrity value can be fed into the mechanical 
design process by the use of special characteristics. This is achieved by distinguishing 
between the means used to indicate the unmitigated risk and those used to indicate the 
integrity values associated with safety requirements. 
 Chapter 7 presents the evaluation of the ideas and a second case study on the Pars 
approach to partitioning the development of a mechatronic system. 
 Chapter 8 presents a summary of the main conclusions of this research and identifies 
several areas for further work. 
 Appendix A presents a fuller exposition of the DFMEA. 
 Appendix B presents a fuller exposition of ISO 26262. 
 Appendix C shows how the generic safety argument pattern for a Pars can be used to 
express the safety argument for an existing system. 
 Appendix D presents a case study evaluating the practicality of the Pars approach. 
 Appendix E lists the Pars approach evaluation case study questions. 
 Appendix F lists the DFMEA usage case study questions. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
As described in Chapter 1, mechatronic systems may be complex and their creation may involve 
many different engineering disciplines. These disciplines have their own theoretical bases, 
established processes, practices and methods and their own approach to risk management. 
This chapter presents a review of related literature covering the topics of systems engineering, risk, 
product assurance and safety arguments. It starts with a review of general systems engineering and 
in particular the role of architectures and the derivation of requirements. It then reviews the 
literature on mechatronic systems, mechanical design and E/E system design. The sociological view 
of risk is reviewed before looking at how risk is addressed in different industry sectors through the 
use of regulations and standards. It then looks at how product assurance is practiced in industry 
with regard to both quality and safety. Lastly, it reviews the literature on safety cases. 
2.1 Systems Engineering 
Modern systems engineering encompasses many different domains including management, 
engineering, technical, social, human and political/legal, [14]. There is the commercial business 
case that considers the cost of development, manufacture, operation and service and the anticipated 
return on investment. There are also technical aspects including the gathering of requirements, the 
detailed design of the parts and the creation of operating and maintenance instructions. The 
discipline of systems engineering does not have a specific beginning, but most authors see it as 
being formally developed since the 1940s when the term was first used at Bell Telephone 
Laboratories. The need to take this new approach was driven by the increasing complexity of the 
machines using new technologies and particularly computer control, [15], [14]. 
The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE), which is a non-profit membership 
organization with the world’s largest professional network of systems engineers, defines systems 
engineering as: “an engineering discipline whose responsibility is creating and executing an 
interdisciplinary process to ensure that the customer and stakeholder's needs are satisfied in a high 
quality, trustworthy, cost efficient and schedule compliant manner throughout a system's entire life 
cycle. This process is usually comprised of the following seven tasks: state the problem, investigate 
alternatives, model the system, integrate, launch the system, assess performance, and re-evaluate.”, 
[16]. 
NASA defines systems engineering as: “a methodical, disciplined approach for the design, 
realization, technical management, operations, and retirement of a system.” and a system as: “a 
construct or collection of different elements that together produce results not obtainable by the 
elements alone. The elements, or parts, can include people, hardware, software, facilities, policies, 
and documents.”, [17]. 
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One significant aspect of the systems engineering approach is the consideration of all the 
stakeholders; typically, these include end users, operators, maintainers, suppliers, acquirers, 
owners, regulatory agencies and manufacturers. ISO 15288, [18], is a standard that provides a 
framework to improve communication and co-operation among such disciplines. The standard 
assumes that an organisation operates according to a defined system life cycle model. It does not 
prescribe a particular model but acknowledges that the following are typical life cycle stages: 
concept, development, production, utilisation, support and retirement. It defines a set of life cycle 
processes that can be used within any system life cycle model. The processes are presented in four 
groups: Agreement Processes, Organizational Project-Enabling Processes, Technical Management 
Processes and Technical Processes. The Technical Processes are shown in Table 1. 
Business or Mission Analysis Process 
Stakeholder Needs & Requirements Definition Process 
System Requirements Definition Process 
Architectural Definition Process 
Design Definition Process 
System Analysis Process 
Implementation Process 
Integration Process 
Verification Process 
Transition Process 
Validation Process 
Operation Process 
Maintenance Process 
Disposal Process 
Table 1: ISO 15288 - Figure 4 System life cycle processes [18] 
An example of a typical system life cycle, taken from Stevens et al, [19], is shown in Figure 1. 
2.1.1 Architecture 
A key aspect of the technical process is the architecture design. ISO 15288, in common with ISO 
42010, [20], defines a system architecture as: “fundamental concepts or properties of a system in 
its environment embodied in its elements, relationships, and in the principles of its design and 
evolution”. This is important because a system is a construction or collection of elements to produce 
results, [17], and the architecture defines the arrangement of these elements such that the desired 
result is obtained. According to ISO 15288, the system architecture defines the boundaries of the 
system and those interfaces to external entities which are necessary to support essential architectural 
decisions. It also defines the elements of the architecture and their relationships. The architecture is 
based on those stakeholder requirements which drive the architecture definition. The remaining 
requirements are addressed in the design of the system elements. 
The ISO 42010 standard provides a core ontology for the description of architectures. It defines the 
key concepts related systems and their architectures as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 1:  Example of typical system life cycle [19] 
 
Figure 2: ISO 42010 [20] - Figure 1 Context of architecture description 
It defines the conceptual model of an architecture description as shown in Figure 3 
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Figure 3: ISO 42010 Systems [20] - Figure 2 Conceptual model of an architecture description 
Zachman, [21], has also identified the need to use an architecture framework for defining and 
controlling the interfaces and the integration of all of the components of the system. First defined 
in 1987, [22], version 3 was released in 2011. The Zackman framework is based on a 6 x 6 matrix. 
The six columns are entitled: what, how, where, who, when, and why. The six rows represent the 
enterprise at different levels of abstraction, e.g. business level to technical level. The Zachman 
framework is used principally for the development of enterprise systems. 
Work has been carried out on defining automotive architecture frameworks, Dajsuren et al, [23], 
and Broy et al, [24]. Both are based on ISO 42010, [20]. Dajsuren et al define an Automotive 
Architecture Framework designed to describe the entire vehicle system across all functional and 
engineering domains. They define an automotive version of Figure 3 and formally define 
correspondence rules between functional and software views. The scope of their work is wider than 
a mechatronic system, which is not explicitly mentioned. They do not address the allocation of 
software to hardware compute components. Similarly, Broy et al define a Meta Architecture 
Framework to describe the whole vehicle. Again, their model is high level using abstraction levels 
of function, logical and technical elements and a generic system decomposition of System levels 0, 
1, 2. 
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2.1.2 Requirements 
All the literature concerning systems engineering stresses the need to understand the requirements 
of the different stakeholders, particularly those of the user and the customer. The ISO 15288 process 
requires stakeholders to be identified and their needs and priorities documented as requirements. 
As most modern-day systems are controlled by software, much of the material on requirements 
elicitation and expression is written from the software perspective. The use case approach became 
a mainstay of software development with the publication of Jacobson’s book in 1992, [25]. Use 
cases are included in the OMG UML specification, [26], and also the OMG SysML specification, 
[27], where they are defined as a specification of behaviour. In UML/SysML, use cases capture the 
requirements of systems by recording the interactions between the system and the actors external 
to the system; these include both human users and systems that may interact with a subject. The 
human users represent some of the stakeholders of the system. As Fowler notes, [28], use cases can 
be used to capture user goals and user interactions with the system. The use case approach can also 
be extended to document negative scenarios, referred to as misuse cases, [29]. The term scenario is 
also used. Fowler, [28], describes a scenario as a single path through a use case as determined by a 
particular combination of conditions. Other writers consider a scenario to be a more informal story-
based description of the way that users interact with the system, focusing on particular instances 
rather than abstract description, [30]. 
Both Jackson and Parnas consider a more formal way of relating the behaviour in the environment 
and the requirements of the software. In his 1996 paper, Jackson, [31], draws a sharp distinction 
between the environment, or world, and the machine and takes the view that requirements describe 
the world as it will become as a result of the machine. The gap between the world as it is now and 
how it could be in the future is referred to as the problem. His problem frame scheme is based on 
defining actions that are controlled by the world, controlled by the machine or shared by the world 
and the machine. This provides a means of structuring the analysis of the problem in the world by 
capturing the characteristics and interconnections of the parts of the world it is concerned with, and 
the concerns and difficulties that are likely to arise in discovering its solution. Problem frames do 
not aim to capture classes of problems of realistic size and complexity but rather provide a means 
of splitting these into sub-problems, [32]. In his 2002 paper, [33], Jackson considers the links 
between the problem domain, environment, and the solution domain; for him, this is the software 
architecture. 
Parnas, [34], is motivated by the need to have adequate software documentation. He defines a 
relation NAT to describe the environment, i.e. the world outside the system to be developed, 
including previously installed systems, without making any assumptions about the system. The NAT 
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relation is an ordered pair of values in the environment that can be monitored, and values that can 
be controlled. The relation constrains what values the quantities can take. In Jackson’s terms, this 
represents the world as it is. The requirements for the system to be developed are described by the 
relation REQ which is another ordered pair of values in the environment that can be monitored and 
values that can be controlled. To be valid, the domain of REQ must be a subset of the domain of 
NAT. Parnas assumes that the system will comprise input devices, software running on a processor 
and output devices. The input devices monitor variables in the environment and present 
representations of their values to the software. The output devices take values produced by the 
software and update the controlled variables in the environment. The behaviour of the input devices 
is described by the relation IN, which is an ordered pair of the values of the monitored quantities 
and the processor input register values. The behaviour of the processor output devices is described 
by the relation OUT, which is an ordered pair of output register values and controlled quantities. 
The Software Requirements Document describes the relations NAT, REQ, IN, and OUT. The input-
output behaviour of the system is described by the relation SOF, which is an ordered pair of input 
register values and output register values. If the relations NAT, IN, OUT, and SOF are valid for a 
defined range of values, then this implies that the REQ relation is also valid. 
There are also requirements-capture techniques, under the banner of goal-oriented, used in 
particular for acquiring organisational and business requirements. The two major techniques are 
KAOS, [35] and the i* [36]. 
Many authors recognise that capturing the system requirements and defining a system architecture 
are not performed just once during the development of the system, but rather that there is a 
continuous back and forth between requirements and the architecture as the system development 
progresses and the system solution emerges. This is illustrated by Figure 4 taken from Stevens et 
al, [19]. 
Nuseibeh, [37], working with the problem frame paradigm, describes an adaptation of the spiral 
lifecycle model informally referred to as the Twin Peaks model to emphasize the equal status given 
to requirements and architectures. The model develops requirements and architectural 
specifications concurrently, while maintaining a separation of the problem structure and 
specification from the solution structure and specification. It is an iterative process that produces 
progressively more detailed requirements and design specifications, see Figure 5. 
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Figure 4: System evolution during the life cycle [19] 
 
Figure 5: Twin Peaks Model taken from [33] unmodified 
In [33], the problem frame approach is developed to allow architectural design concerns to be 
incorporated during problem analysis. The paper acknowledges that, when working within an 
established engineering area, many of the software services that will be required of the machine 
already exist, and it is inefficient not to recognise this in the analysis. The approach taken is to 
annotate the machine domain with the existing services. This way they appear in the problem frame 
while also appearing within the machine, and hence the solution domain. 
2.1.3 Mechatronic Systems 
At the beginning of the twentieth century mechanical devices started to include electrical 
components and then in the 1940s, during World War II, electronic control systems. These 
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electronic systems have matured from very simple functions and logic to the incorporation of 
computers and complex logic, [38]. Systems that have mechanical, electronic, and software 
components are often called mechatronic systems. 
Since 1971, the number of systems that can be included under the umbrella term of mechatronic 
has been growing rapidly, driven by the availability of increasingly powerful microcontrollers, [39]. 
As an example, during this time the automobile has evolved from a primarily mechanical machine 
to one that can be viewed as a collection of mechatronic systems, with such systems controlling the 
engine, brakes, steering, locking and doors, windows and lights, [39]. The Advanced Driver 
Assistance Systems (ADAS) are all achieved through mechatronic systems, as will be the 
autonomous vehicle.  
The term mechatronics was first coined by the Yasakawa Electric Company which, in their 1971 
trademark application, defined it in the following terms: “The word mechatronics is composed of 
‘mecha’ from mechanism and the ‘tronics’ from electronics. In other words, technologies and 
developed products will be incorporating electronics more and more intimately and organically 
into mechanisms, making it impossible to tell where one ends and the other begins”. Since then, 
other variations of this definition have been proposed, but all capture the sense of electronic control 
of mechanical systems, where electronic control is understood to include software control, [39]. 
While a mechatronic system consists of a mechanical machine under electronic control, the 
engineering discipline of mechatronics embraces all the subject matter necessary to specify and 
develop such systems. This includes the modelling and simulation of the mechanical machine, the 
sensors and the actuators, and also the development of the control system. For example, the French 
standard NF E 01-010 defines mechatronics as an “approach aiming at the synergistic integration 
of mechanics, electronics, control theory, and computer science within product design and 
manufacturing, in order to improve and/or optimize its functionality", [40]. While Isermann, in 
[39], defines mechatronics as an interdisciplinary field, in which the following disciplines act 
together: 
 mechanical systems (mechanical elements, machines, precision mechanics) 
 electronic systems (microelectronics, power electronics, sensor and actuator technology) 
 information technology (systems theory, automation, software engineering, artificial 
intelligence) 
Bradley, [41], suggests that mechatronics now has to be seen as encompassing a holistic view of 
system design and development and not just the integration of electronics with mechanical 
engineering and software.  
Mechatronic systems presuppose a basic system design as shown in Figure 6, [42], [43]. 
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Figure 6: Generic Mechatronic System Design taken from [42] unmodified 
A mechatronics design process suggested by Shetty and Kolk, [42], is shown in Figure 7. This 
clearly shows the prominent role played by modelling and simulation in the development of a 
mechatronic system. What is noticeable is that design of the electronic hardware and the software 
that drives the hardware and the sensors and actuators is not mentioned. Nor is the translation of 
the control model into the embedded software to be run on the target hardware mentioned. 
 
Figure 7: Mechatronic Design Process taken from [42] unmodified 
 Given the presupposed system design, much of the established literature on mechatronic systems, 
[42], [39], [44], majors on three key topics: understanding the control requirements of the plant or 
process by modelling both the plant/process to be controlled and also the actuators that enable the 
control to be enacted; understanding how parameters of the plant can be measured by sensors and 
the data transferred to the control processor; the design of a software control system to meet the 
control requirements of the plant/process given the limitations of the sensors, actuators and control 
processing unit. These activities are largely confined to the ISO 15288 technical processes for 
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Stakeholder Needs & Requirements Definition, System Requirements Definition, Architectural 
Definition, Design Definition and System Analysis. 
Noting that, unlike traditional design processes, a mechatronic design process integrates multiple 
engineering disciplines, Follmer et al, [45], seek to address a perceived lack of a mechatronic 
concept design process by the use of SysML for creating system-level models. Their goal is to 
represent the overall system in a way that gives equal weight to all engineering disciplines involved, 
especially the non-material components (e.g. software components). The mechatronic systems are 
systems-of-systems and the system-level models illustrate the dependencies between the sub-
systems which themselves may consist of solutions from different engineering disciplines. 
Johar and Stetter, [46], also seek to provide a description of the mechatronic life cycle which gives 
equal weight to the different engineering disciplines involved. They base a version of the systems 
V life cycle on VDI 2206, [47] and the design methodology of Pahl and Beitz [48]. In their example, 
they use UML use case diagrams to model the overall system from which a requirement list is 
created. The requirement list is further refined using more use case diagrams to give more details. 
The concept design is supported by a class diagram. The design embodiment now follows and the 
systems V life cycle, Figure 8, shows how the system is divided into three engineering domains. A 
UML class diagram is created for each engineering domain as a reference for the creation of the 
respective requirement analysis. 
 
Figure 8: Mechatronic system V life cycle taken from [46] unmodified 
Sell and Tamre, [49] also seek to use SysML to provide a common language which can unite the 
different engineering disciplines involved in creating a mechatronic system They also base their 
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approach on the V-model from VDI 2206, [47]. Mhenni et al, [50], also use SysML in their 
proposed mechatronic system design methodology. It consists of two phases: a black box analysis 
with an external point of view that provides a comprehensive and consistent set of requirements, 
and a white box analysis that progressively leads to the internal architecture and behaviour of the 
system. 
2.1.4 Mechanical Design 
Efforts to produce a systematic design process date from at least the 1920, [51]. At this time the 
emphasis was on mechanical engineering. An influential mechanical design method is Systematic 
Approach, described by Pahl and Beitz in their book Konstruktionslehre, published in German in 
1977 and translated into English in 1988 as Engineering Design - A Systematic Approach. The third 
edition was published in English in 2007 [48]. Their overall approach is shown in Figure 9. 
 The requirements list is based on the market analysis and consumer-specific technical performance 
requirements and includes geometry, kinematics, forces, energy, material, signals, safety 
ergonomics, production, quality control, assembly, transport, operation, maintenance, recycling, 
costs and schedules. The concept of an architecture is not used, however in a chapter on mechatronic 
systems the authors borrow the generic mechatronic system design from Isermann, [43]. 
Verification is not a separate step in the process but rather an intrinsic part of embodiment design. 
There is no concept of validation. An ontology of the concepts behind their systematic approach is 
shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 9: Steps in the planning and design process taken from [48] 
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Figure 10: Ontology of Pahl & Beitz Systematic Design 
In systematic design, the overall function is seen as a flow by which energy, material and/or signals 
(information) undergo a conversion. The sub-functions that realise the overall function are fulfilled 
by a physical process realised by physical effect. The physical effect is achieved by a working 
principle exploiting the geometry and material properties of a physical structure.  
The design process proposed by Ullman, [38], is shown in Figure 11. Ullman emphasises the need 
to understand the customer requirements and describes the Quality Function Deployment method 
as a means of achieving this. For Ullman, the architecture is the form of the product, i.e. its shape, 
its colour, its texture and other factors relating to its structure. Verification is not mentioned and 
there is a single mention of concept validation by consumers under project planning. 
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Figure 11: Mechanical design process taken from [38] 
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An ontology of the concepts used by Ullman is shown in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: Ontology of Ullman concepts 
Again, we see that a function is defined as a flow of energy, material and/or information and the 
flow is achieved via a physical form realised as components and assemblies. Kossiakoff et al, [14], 
also view systems as essentially operating on three basic media: information, material and energy. 
2.1.5 E/E System Design 
E/E system (electrical and/or electronic system) is a term used within the automotive industry to 
refer to electronic control units. It is defined in the automotive functional safety standard ISO 
26262, [13], as a “system that consists of electrical and/or electronic elements, including 
programmable electronic elements”. System is defined as a “set of elements that relates at least a 
sensor, a controller and an actuator with one another” and an element is defined as a “system or 
part of a system including components, hardware, software, hardware parts, and software units”. 
There is little literature specifically on the development of E/E systems as such, while there is a 
large corpus of material of software development and hardware development. Some mention of 
software development is made in system engineering literature where the classic software V life 
cycle is presented with process steps of software requirements, architecture design and detailed 
design, together with their corresponding verification steps, [19], [14]. The development of 
Flow
(P177)
Energy
(P177)
Material
(P177)
Information
(P177)
Function
(P177)
Object
(P177)
state
assembly
(P117)
component
(P117)
Overall Function
(P181)
Sub-function
(P184)
product
(P159)
environment
(P159)
Concept
(204)
Temporal & logical 
order
(P186)
Form
(246)
constraints
configuration
connections
1 1
is a
40 
 
electronic hardware is not included in this material. The best treatment is actually in the functional 
safety standards, and here we use ISO 26262, [13], as a reference. 
Hardware 
Requirements for electronic hardware typically concern the relationship between digital and 
analogue inputs and digital and analogue outputs, the performance (e.g. speed resolution, capacity) 
and the environmental conditions it has to work in (e.g. EMC, temperature, humidity). 
ISO 26262 describes a hardware life cycle that starts with the specification of hardware safety 
requirements based on the system design and the hardware-software interface definition. This is 
followed by the production of a hardware design architecture and then the detailed design. The 
detailed design is verified, then all the hardware is integrated and the whole design is verified. 
Hardware-software integration and testing is considered to be part of system design. 
Software 
Kossiakoff et al, [14], referring to software intensive systems where the majority of the functionality 
is in software, state that the life cycle model for the software development is very similar to that of 
the systems development. ISO 26262 describes a software life cycle that starts with the specification 
of software safety requirements based on the system design and the hardware-software interface 
definition. This is followed by the production of a software design architecture and then the software 
unit design and implementation. Software unit verification is followed by software integration and 
verification. Hardware-software integration and testing is considered to be part of system design. 
As the software requirements are cascaded from the system design the literature on requirements 
reviewed above is only relevant at the system level. 
2.1.6 Systems Engineering Discussion 
Clearly, mechatronic engineering fits in well with the system engineering approach as both systems 
engineering and mechanical literature make references to mechatronic systems. 
The requirement literature reviewed concentrated on requirements coming from people or systems 
in the environment. An emphasis on software requirements tends focus on problems and solutions 
in the discrete domain, whereas mechatronic problems have a large continuous domain aspect to 
them. The requirements for controlling a real-time mechanical system also come from the nature of 
the actuator interfacing with the mechanical system and the mechanical system interacting with its 
external environment. Hence the prominence of modelling in mechatronic engineering to determine 
these types of requirements. 
Both Jackson, [33] and Parnas, [34],  only address software requirements; mechatronic systems use 
many different technologies including hardware and software. Therefore, it is more appropriate to 
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focus on system requirements. While some principles of Jackson and Parnas may be valid at the 
system level, the detail of the exposition does fit well at the system level. In the system design 
paradigm, software requirements, like other technological requirements are principally derived 
from the system design and supplemented by requirements specific to the technology chosen to 
implement the design. 
Defining a system and then capturing requirements for it always involves deciding where the 
boundary lies between the system and the external world, or environment. Different authors draw 
the boundary in different places. This topic was discussed by MISRA in [52], which identified three 
different boundaries: the boundary of the target of evaluation, the zone of responsibility and the 
system boundary. Where the boundary is placed can be influenced by a number of factors including 
technology, scope of responsibility or interaction with other systems. With the tendency for systems 
to be connected together to form largescale complex IT systems, it becomes increasingly difficult 
to decide where the boundary should be. Where the boundary is drawn determines who the 
stakeholders are. ISO 15288, [18], notes that a stakeholder’s perception of a system boundary 
depends on their interests and responsibilities, and gives guidance that the boundaries should 
encapsulate meaningful needs and practical solutions. Kossiakoff et al, [14], also stress the need to 
precisely define the boundary. They suggest that the following be taken into account in defining the 
boundary: development control, operational control functional allocation and unity of purpose. 
Differences seen in the literature in the construction of use cases and scenarios are caused by the 
different boundaries chosen. 
It is noted that, although the concept of an architecture features heavily in Systems Engineering and 
in E/E systems as a description of the design, it is not used this way in mechanical engineering 
where, if used at all, it refers to the physical form of the solution. 
The concept of the design evolving through levels of abstraction as requirements and architectures 
and refined through an iterative process that produces progressively more detailed requirements and 
design specifications, [37], can be applied to a mechatronic system. Mechanical design does not 
have the sense of cascading and refining requirements; rather, it is the design concepts and 
implementation that are refined. It is perhaps for this reason that the concepts of verification and 
validation do not feature heavily in mechanical design processes and these are considered to be an 
integral part of the design embodiment. 
The work on automotive architectures, [23], [24], while instructive, does not provide the basis we 
are looking for so that an argument can be applied at the highest level of abstraction down to the 
lowest. 
The overall summary is that systems engineering emphasises the cradle-to-grave nature of 
development, while mechatronics emphasises the modelling of the plant, the sensors and actuators 
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and the software control. The mechanical literature emphases the derivation of form to provide 
function, while embedded control emphases joint development of hardware and software. There is 
no standard hardware development process and the concept an E/E system development has arisen 
from the functional safety standards. The challenge of a unifying principle from which a common 
safety argument can be derived remains. 
2.2 Risk 
Risk is a human construct, not a property of the world; before consciousness there is no concept of 
risk. As Hansson says, “risks do not simply 'exist': they are taken, run, or imposed”, [53]. In the 
1960s and 1970s attempts were made to determine a level of 'acceptable risk', but it soon became 
clear that this cannot be done, since the acceptability of a risk-generating activity depends not only 
on the risk but also on the associated benefits, Bicevskis, [54] and Rowe, [55]. As we will see, risk 
is partly a cultural construction as well as an individual construction in that different societies worry 
about different risks at different times. We are interested in the nature of the relationship between 
risk, as perceived and managed at the societal level, and the engineering approaches to failure, 
uncertainty and risk associated with our man-made mechatronic systems.  
We take a top-down approach and first look at general public perceptions of risk as documented by 
sociologists and other commentators. As it is the public who are ultimately exposed to the risk posed 
by the product, we are interested to see if there is a firm basis for the definition of risk that is 
accepted by the public. If such a thing exists it can be thought of a top-level customer requirement. 
We then look at how societal agencies seek to manage risk and what they base their criteria on. We 
are interested in this because the outcome of societal agencies is legislation and standards which 
engineering work has to comply with. Lastly, we look at the engineering practice and the theory 
underlying this.  
2.2.1 Sociological View of risk 
The Risk Society 
There have been many books published recently commenting on the public perception of risk. 
Gardner, [56], comments that: “We are the healthiest, wealthiest, and longest-lived people in 
history. And we are increasingly afraid. This is one of the great paradoxes of our time”. He suggests 
that the reason that modern societies are so unnecessarily frightened is due to a number of factors. 
For example, we do not know our history; things were much worse for our ancestors but we become 
habituated to the present circumstances. It is in the interest of many people for us to be so, e.g. 
people with something to sell to protect us, politicians who want to create a role for themselves as 
our protectors, people who desire funding and/or a public profile and the media who need attention-
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grabbing stories. Also, our cultural upbringing sensitises us to some risks and desensitises us to 
others; in this he quotes the work of Daniel Kahneman. 
Kahneman, a psychologist, in his 2012 book Thinking, Fast and Slow, [57], describes two 
approaches that the human brain uses for making decisions which he refers to as System 1 which 
“operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control” and 
System 2 which “allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including 
complex computation”. He also accepts that we are unnecessarily afraid and explains this as the 
effect of System 1 thinking which is adversely influenced by the points that Gardiner highlighted. 
While experts formulate risk in objective probabilistic terms, [58], Kahneman notes that this is not 
how the general public perceive risk and quotes Paul Slovic, [59]: “’Risk’ does not exist ‘out there’, 
independent of our minds and cultures, waiting to be measured. Human beings have invented the 
concept of ‘risk’ to help them understand and cope with the dangers and uncertainties of life. 
Although these dangers are real, there is no such thing as ‘real risk’ or ‘objective risk’”. These 
different approaches to risk are also recognised by Blastland and Spiegelhalter in their populist 
book The NORM Chronicles, [60], where they describe two faces of risk: “one impassive, formal, 
calculating, the other full of human hopes and fears”. They conclude that these two faces of risk 
are incompatible; for people, there is no such thing as probability. 
We see from the above that there is no absolute concept of risk as perceived by the general public, 
but rather the perception is contextual, not necessarily consistent with regard to different sources 
and subject to change over time. 
Sociologists have written much about the relationship between the modern world and the perception 
of risk, and the term risk society was coined in the 1980s to capture the change that was perceived 
to have occurred during the last century. The sociologist Ulrich Beck, in his book Risk Society: 
Towards a New Modernity, [61], defines the risk society as: “a systematic way of dealing with 
hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself”. 
Gardner, [56], comments that sociologists broadly agree that people living today in modern 
countries worry more than those who lived in previous generations, with some saying that we live 
in a culture of fear. He notes that Beck, [18], was one of the first to understand that modern countries 
were becoming nations of worriers. Beck coined the term risk society to articulate this heightened 
concern about risk, particularly that caused by modern technology. Beck, [61], himself commented 
that: “We are more afraid than ever because we are at more risk than ever. Technology is 
outstripping our ability to control it”. Gardner, [56],  challenges Beck’s view that we are more at 
risk than ever by quoting several figures including life expectancy and quality of life. 
The foundation of Beck’s sociological work has been challenged by other sociologists, for example 
Elliott, [62], who argues that Beck’s work contains several sociological weaknesses: “a dependence 
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upon objectivistic and instrumental models of the social construction of risk and uncertainty in 
social relations, and a failure to adequately define the relations between institutional dynamism on 
the one hand and self-referentiality and critical reflection on the other”. Other criticisms of Beck’s 
work by sociologists are mentioned in Zinn's review of risk and sociology, [63]. 
Adams, [64], acknowledges that at a time when people in the wealthier nations are enjoying greater 
wealth, health and longevity, they are increasingly anxious about risk and find it difficult to trust 
government, industry and science; at the same time people are increasingly allowing those 
professionals who specialise in risk to control their lives. 
Although this latter point is challenged by Otway and Von Winterfeldt, [65], Adams sees a number 
of different ways in which individuals can respond to this. One way, called egalitarian, is to move 
to a small-scale sustainability model; another way, called hierarchist, is to trust in more effective 
management; the last way, called individualist, and expected to be the most common, is to 
concentrate on the benefits and trust market forces to contain them. This last response is also known 
as resigned fatalism. 
Commenting on Beck, Jarvis, [66], notes that the real issue is about how we perceive, manage, 
compensate and mitigate risk, rather than any increase in the number of risks. He thinks that Beck 
has identified “a global society ill at ease” and exposed a number of paradoxes. On the one hand, 
people are aware of the success of science and technology and their inroads into every aspect of 
everyday life, and the benefits to collective welfare that result. At the same time, people still face 
the dangers of everyday life, including the negative impact of exposure to the outcomes (products) 
of scientific progress. Aven, [26], has also looked at criticisms of Beck’s work and has come to the 
conclusion that his views on risk and risk analysis should not be dismissed. 
An earlier sociological study of risk was made by Douglas & Wildavsky, [67], who thought that 
what people choose to fear depended on the culture they were in and the groups that they interacted 
with socially; their principal example was the rise of the environmental movement. This has in turn 
been criticised. Elliott, [62], in a review of Douglas and Wildavsky, admits that they: “make a 
provocative and … original point when they call attention to risk selection as a social process.” 
However, he maintains that this is not an entirely successful explanation of risk. 
State Response 
The risk society approach to understanding modern attitudes towards risk has been criticised by 
Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin in The Government of Risk, [68]. They understand Beck to believe 
that the significance of risk to everyday life differs between historical periods. Examples of risks of 
concern to the current period include genetically modified organisms, reproductive technology and 
computer failures which potentially have wide-scale impact. Whatever the accuracy of the idea that 
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the current period of time is a risk society in contrast to earlier periods, they claim it cannot be 
denied that there is currently a considerable amount of discussion and literature on risk, hazard and 
blame and that this needs an explanation. They are of the view that: “society-wide generalisations 
about risk regulation have little power to explain why risk regulation regimes differ from one 
another. The same point seems to apply to the analysis of regulatory dynamics. … to predict or 
explain them in detail we need to pay close attention to differences in historical context and the way 
institutional filters work”. 
Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin, [68], also note that we live in a regulatory state, by which is meant 
that the government’s role as regulator increases while its role as direct employer decreases. They 
refer to Majone, [69], who asserts that the regulatory state, rather than public ownership, planning 
or centralised administration, has arisen as a result of conditions created by privatisation and 
deregulation. They analyse nine risk regulation regimes, one of which is local road risks, and their 
analysis is in line with the description of automotive regulation given below. Their analysis of these 
nine regimes showed that proposed explanations for how the state conducts risk regulation on behalf 
of their citizens all fail to adequately explain what happens in practice; there are striking variations 
in risk regulation in different domains and between different nations, for example, what is chosen 
for regulation and the way that the regulation works. This view is supported by Marcus, [70]. They 
believe that the changes that the risk society seeks to explain can be accounted for by fairly 
conventional shaping factors, e.g. market processes, pressure groups, historical institutionalism. 
Bartle and Vass, [71], highlight the distinction between scientific and social concepts of risk and 
the differences between public and expert opinions of risk. They are of the view that the adoption 
of a risk as a public risk by the state should not be presumed but rather has to be argued for and 
justified. They also acknowledge that it is sometimes in the interests of some to keep the public 
frightened. 
Coming from the scientific world, Lewis, [72], looked at technological risk as handled by the many 
US regulatory regimes. He raises many of the concerns addressed by Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin, 
[68], and particularly highlights the fact that regimes are intimately bound up with politics, have 
rules which are mutually contradictory and have boundaries which overlap with other regimes. 
Otway and Winterfeldt, [65], note that historically social opposition to technologies was different 
in each case, and reflected a complex mix of concerns related to: “morals, religion, political 
ideologies, power, economics, physical safety and psychological wellbeing”. In contrast, debates 
today tend to focus on a single issue e.g. risks to public health and safety and to the environment; 
risk is so significantly at the forefront, that: “the complex problem of social acceptability is often 
reduced to a mathematical-numerical problem of defining ‘acceptable risk’”. This change has come 
about to some extent because experts wish to counter negative effects due to enhanced media 
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coverage of worst case scenarios, and examples where experts have covered up embarrassing 
results, plus the involvement of new environmental organisations, public interest groups and 
political parties. Consequently, industry and others demanded predetermined criteria by which to 
judge the acceptability of risks and quantitative risk acceptance criteria were sought. However they 
criticise the “... implicit assumption … that social preferences can be expressed in engineering 
terms and used in the regulatory process to reduce uncertainty, ambiguity and delay - in essence 
an attempt to model social and political behaviours with the technical tools and the philosophy of 
the natural sciences.” They further note that this modelling approach has been inadequate, as when 
a numerical approach indicated that the risk was acceptable while in fact there was serious and 
continuing public opposition. 
Otway and Winterfeldt, [65], make many points about how the general population perceive risk in 
a different way to the experts, based solely on physically measurable parameters, and argue that the 
risk concept is too narrow to support understanding of the social acceptability of technologies. In 
particular, they point out that "’acceptable risk’ as a generalizable number or mathematical 
relationship cannot exist.”. They believe that: “The acceptance of risks is implicitly determined by 
the acceptance of technologies which, in turn, depends upon the information people have been 
exposed to, what information they have chosen to believe, the values they hold, the social 
experiences to which they have had access, the dynamics of stakeholder groups, the vagaries of the 
political process, and the historical moment in which it is all happening”. They are in complete 
agreement that the risks of technology are real and must be managed effectively to ensure public 
safety, however they argue that it is not sufficient to focus on a single mathematical definition of 
acceptable risk. There are other softer kinds of information which are relevant, and these are held 
by those people whose lives are affected by the technologies. 
Marcus, [70], notes that governments and regulators would like certainty but highlights the 
difficulty of achieving this by quoting from Weinberg, [73], “Scientists in their capacity as advisers 
on problems of technological innovation face particularly troubling dilemmas, as the decisions they 
make depend on answers to questions which can be asked of science and yet which cannot be 
answered by science”. He makes the point that in a complex machine it is impossible to identify 
every possible type of failure; likewise, to build full-scale prototypes to test them under every 
conceivable circumstance is extremely costly and impractical. This situation means that judgements 
that have to be relied upon will never carry the weight of a scientific answer, because the underlying 
issues are on or beyond the limits of what can be scientifically known. 
Otway & Wintersfeldt, [65], see that there is a: “perpetual cycle of regulation and deregulation 
whereby governments that promote deregulation bring about a return to a risk environment.”. This 
is brought about because as state intervention is increased due to a systemic crisis or major disaster 
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the: “… regulatory control systems tend to produce a political reaction that calls for the dominance 
of the free market, the reduction of state intervention, a return to liberal values, and the restoration 
of individual freedoms”. 
Quantitative Risk Assessment 
The rise of a quantitative approach to acceptable risk, generally referred to as Quantitative Risk 
Assessment or Probabilistic Risk Assessment, is described by Covello and Mumpower in [74]. They 
describe how probability has been used to establish causality relating to ill health (epidemiology) 
from the sixteenth century onwards, while it has only been used to predict failure rates for man-
made artefacts since World War II. The American Atomic Energy Commission first looked at 
quantitative risk assessment for radioactive release in 1957. In 1975 the first modern quantitative 
risk assessment for reactor safety was published. Although much criticised at the time, the approach 
became the norm after the Three Mile Island incident in 1979, [58]. NASA started looking at the 
use of numerical values for the probability of mission failure and death or injury per mission in 
1969 and Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) became standard practice after the loss of the 
Challenger Space Shuttle in 1986, [58]. The use of QRA for chemical plants was pioneered by the 
Dutch and dates from the Post Seveso EEC Directive of 1982, which required each member state 
to develop a risk management methodology, [58]. The use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
has been strongly criticised by Leveson, [75]. 
Renn, [76], says that risk can be framed in different ways depending on the perspective taken: 
technical assessment of risk; economic, psychological, and sociological assessment of risk; public 
perception of risk; risk used as a trade-off criteria; and risk used to design resilient strategies for 
coping with remaining uncertainties. He also notes that while technical assessment may provide the 
best estimate for the probability of an event, public perception should be the basis for deciding 
acceptable or tolerable risk.  
Aven, [77], comments that there are a number of prevailing perspectives on risk: engineering 
approaches; economic, decision-oriented perspectives; social science perspectives; and 
anthropology perspectives. He recognises the difficulty, when making a decision related to risk 
acceptability, of assessing the public’s view, [78], and also the problems of letting professionals 
make the decision, [79]. 
Grafjodi, [80], notes that the public perception of risk depends on other culture norms, the frequency 
or rarity that individuals witness or are involved in accidents and the degree to which exposure to 
the risk is voluntary. There is also the natural aversion of people to severe consequences, e.g. large 
number of fatalities, from a single incident, known as differential risk aversion. 
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Aven, [81], has noted that, even within what might be considered to be the technical perspective, 
there are many different definitions of risk. He notes nine different ones all constructed from one 
or more of: expected value (loss), probability (of an undesirable event), objective uncertainty, 
uncertainty, event/consequence, potential/possibility (of a loss), and uncertainty on objectives. 
Some definitions only consider the possibility that an adverse outcome may occur, some only 
consider the severity of the outcome while others consider both. It is the last of these which is 
usually used in an engineering context. 
Whereas it can be seen that socially acceptable risk does not exist in any meaningfully quantifiable 
way, papers coming from the engineering and science background pre-suppose that it does. Aven, 
[78], who after having used it as a parameter, says that there are no strict limits on what is socially 
acceptable. There are differences of opinion, sometimes extreme, for example among politicians; 
there is also disagreement among experts. Aven, [64], also notes that when risk acceptance criteria 
are formulated by the plant operators this does not generally serve the best interests of society as a 
whole. He concludes that it is preferable for the authorities to formulate the risk acceptance criteria. 
Probability 
We see from the above that notions of acceptable risk are fraught with difficulties. While the general 
public, and those in authority, would like decisions to be based on undisputed scientific fact, it is 
recognised that such firmness in the underlying data still eludes us. As noted, most definitions of 
risk involve the possibility that an adverse outcome will occur. There are differing views on how 
the ‘possibility’ of an adverse outcome should be captured. Probability is often used as the 
underlying concept. There are different interpretations of probability; the two main schools are often 
referred to as frequentist and Baysian (also called subjective), [82]. Although the mathematics is 
the same in both cases the underlying philosophy is different. The frequentist approach assumes 
that there is an objective value of probability for some event which exists in the universe 
independently of people, while the Bayesian approach takes the value of probability to a measure 
of personal belief rather than a property of the world, Aven, [81]. All schools of probability are 
attempting to deal with uncertainty which is often classed as either aleatory or epistemic, [58]. 
Aleatory uncertainty is used for those circumstances where the uncertainty is due to the stochastic 
nature of the world and as such is considered to be inherent and thus irreducible. Epistemic 
uncertainty is used for those circumstances where the uncertainty is due to a lack of knowledge and 
in principle further exploration would produce more knowledge which in turn would reduce the 
uncertainty. Aven, [83], links the frequentist understanding to aleatory uncertainty while the 
subjective Baysian approach he links to epistemic uncertainty. To some extent epistemic is often 
treated as if it is aleatory because it is just too difficult and requires too much effort to reduce the 
epistemic uncertainty. 
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Cohen, [84], has quite a different take on probability. He is critical of previous formulations and 
states that they are not applicable in all circumstances. He takes legal systems as an example. They 
use probability because in a civil case it has to be decided on the balance of probabilities. Cohen 
makes the point that the amassing of circumstantial evidence is considered to increase the likelihood 
in favour of the balance of probabilities. However, if a standard mathematical approach was used, 
each piece of circumstantial evidence would have a probability value and to process the conjunction 
of the evidence the probability values would be multiplied together. As each value of probability is 
less than one the result would be smaller than any of the originals. Thought of in this way, the more 
evidence that was presented the less strongly the case would be made. This is clearly not how the 
court sees it, so its concept of probability is different from the standard mathematical one. It is not 
obvious how to apply this in an engineering context, although Weinstock, Goodenough and Klein, 
[85], suggest it may have a role to play in the context of safety cases. 
Taleb, [86], has also argued that a probabilistic approach is not appropriate for predicting rare events 
which have a significant impact. These types of events he refers to as black swans. Interpreting this 
in a risk context, Aven, [87], suggests that it is most appropriate to think of a black swan as an 
extreme, surprising event relative to the present knowledge rather than a rare event with extreme 
consequences. In [88] he proposes a new risk perspective which adds surprises (black swans) to the 
elements of probability-based-thinking and knowledge-dimension which he had discussed at length 
in other papers. 
Legal Considerations 
The state exercises its will through either the civil or criminal law, [89]. The civil law is used to 
compensate victims of faulty products. The 1987 Consumer Protection Act, in the UK, brought 
together the previous piece-meal legislation with a general requirement that consumer goods 
comply with a catch-all general safety requirement, but the act does not give any details of what 
constitutes the general safety requirement. Where appropriate standards exist, a manufacturer will 
seek to meet the general safety requirement by complying with the standard because they know 
that a court of law will accept this as being a statement of best practice. The criminal law is intended 
to prevent faulty products being sold; it also encourages manufacturers to rectify goods found to be 
faulty, and perform recalls if necessary, as a way of reducing penalties imposed by the courts. 
Sociological view of risk summary 
Risk is seen as a human construct and there is no absolute concept for it. The general public are not 
sympathetic to a probabilistic definition and there is also debate in the engineering community about 
defining risk this way and then using probabilistic design targets. The concerns of the public change 
over time, and there is a disconnect between public perception and the engineering view and 
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treatment of risk. The state attempts to bridge this gap by creating legislation, with the aim of 
reassuring the public, while leaving the details to the engineering community. 
2.2.2 Industrial Regulations and standards 
As mentioned previously, there are several different aspects of risk regulation. The regulations, or 
regulatory guidelines, could be written at the international level or at the national level. If the latter, 
then there is the nature of the relationship between international and national material. The 
regulations, or regulatory guidelines, may specify performance targets; they may include 
certification requirements together with requirements for achieving certification. Performance 
monitoring may also be included. 
In this section we review the regulations and standards of a number of industrial uses of mechatronic 
systems. Our main focus is on vehicles excluding trucks and buses.  
Railways 
The public only come into contact with this equipment via the companies that operate the rail 
network containing or using the equipment and there are a large number of supplier companies that 
produce the individual pieces of equipment. 
Railways are mainly governed nationally, but in April 2004 the European Railway Agency (ERA), 
[90], was set up to create a competitive European railway area by increasing cross-border 
compatibility of national systems, and in parallel ensuring the required level of safety. In the main, 
the regulators are Government agencies. A yearly performance report is produced by the European 
Railway Agency, [91], which reports fatalities against Passengers, Employees, Level-crossing 
users, Unauthorised persons and Others. Fatalities are dominated by ‘unauthorised persons’ and 
‘levelcrossing users’. There is no direct correlation between equipment failure and this data. 
Railway operators are required to have a safety management system, and the mainline railway 
should include targets related to the European Common Safety Targets set for the member state, 
[92]. The EU requires that risks in the following categories be assessed as a number of passenger 
Fatalities and Weighted Injuries (FWSIs) per year: 
 Risk to passengers 
 Risk to employees 
 Risk to level crossing users 
 Risk to ‘others’ 
 Risk to unauthorized persons on railway premises 
 Risk to the whole society 
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These are to be judged against a national reference value (NRV). The intention is to derive common 
EU safety targets (CSTs) from the NRVs, [93]. There is also a European requirement to adopt a 
common safety method on risk evaluation and assessment, [94]; this specifies a process but does 
not give the details of how to assess risk or decide if the risk is acceptable. Instead there are many 
references to national and European documents. 
The CENELEC norms EN 50126, [95], EN 50128, [96], and EN 50129, [97], are obligatory 
standards for European countries. EN 50126 defines a systematic process for specifying 
requirements for reliability, availability, maintainability and safety (RAMS) and demonstrating that 
the requirements have been achieved. The EN 50128 specifies procedures and technical 
requirements for the development of software and the interaction between software and the system 
which it is part of. The EN 50129 specifies lifecycle activities to be completed before the acceptance 
stage, followed by additional planned activities to be carried out after the acceptance stage. It is 
closely related to the EN 50126, [98]. 
Civil Aircraft Avionics 
Again, the public only come into contact with this equipment via the aviation companies that 
operate the planes containing the avionic equipment. The government bodies act as the regulators, 
assessors and certifiers. The top-level regulator for civil aviation is the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), an agency of the United Nations, established by the Chicago Convention in 
1944, [99]. It sets international standards that national authorities have to follow. Different national 
or international bodies exist, e.g. US Federal Aviation Authority FAA, [100]. European regulation 
is increasingly coming under the remit of European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), [101], created 
in 2002, instead of the national authorities such as the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the Direction Générale de l’Aviation Civile (DGAC) in France. In the US, 
requirements are issued as Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) and in Europe as Joint 
Airworthiness Regulations (JARs). Minimum performance standards are specified by the issuing 
of Technical Standard Orders (TSO). Targets for reductions in aviation fatalities are set by 
government bodies. 
The following documents are normally considered to be the relevant standards but in practice their 
legal status is of guidance which RTCA defines as: “material that could be recognized by the 
authorities as a means of compliance to the regulations”, [102]. 
 ARP4761 Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment on Civil 
Airborne Systems and Equipment, [103] 
 ARP4754A/ED-79A Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems, [104] 
 DO-178C/ED-12C Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment 
Certification, [105] 
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 DO-254/ED-80 Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware, [106] 
ARP4754A/ED-79A, DO-178C/ED-12C and DO-254/ED-80 are all objective-based. They 
do not prescribe any particular system, software or hardware processes or lifecycles. 
Rather, they describe the objectives that the chosen system, software or hardware lifecycle 
has to satisfy. 
It is a common misconception that FAR 25 requires that avionic software has to demonstrate a 
failure rate of 1 × 10-9 failures per hour or less. FAR 25 states that the aeroplane systems must 
be designed so that: “the occurrence of any failure condition which would prevent the continued 
safe flight and landing of the airplane is extremely improbable”. FAR 25 does not mention 
software, nor does it define “extremely improbable”. Advisory Circular AC 25.1309-1A (FAA 
1988) describes various acceptable means for showing compliance with FAR 25.1309. These 
means are not mandatory. AC 25.1309-1A suggests that, when using quantitative analyses, 
extremely improbable failure conditions should be considered to be those having a probability 
on the order of 1 × 10-9 or less, [107]. 
The use of QRA in aircraft certification tends to be restricted to the use of techniques such as 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) to calculate the effect of 
random hardware failures such as component wear-out. 
Medical Devices 
These devices are worn by the patient. Currently most devices are fitted by medical staff but this 
may change in the future as more publicly available devices come on to the market. 
The Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), [108], is responsible for 
regulating all medicines and medical devices in the UK by ensuring they work and are acceptably 
safe. The MHRA also includes the National Institute for Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC), 
[109], and the Clinical Practice Research Datalink (CPRD), [110]. The MHRA is an executive 
agency of the Department of Health. 
Manufacturers wishing to make an application for pre-clinical assessment of a proposed clinical 
investigation of an active implantable medical device or a medical device to be carried out in part 
or in whole in the UK have to apply to the MHRA in accordance with specified guidance notes 
[111] which calls up ISO 14971, [112]. This has requirements for hazard and risk assessment but 
does not provide a common risk assessment or mitigation scheme, requiring each company to 
decide for themselves. It also makes no mention of development process measures for hardware 
and software. 
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Nuclear 
In the US regulation is performed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), [113] which is 
an independent agency of the United States government. The European Nuclear Safety Regulators 
Group (ENSREG), [114], is an independent, authoritative expert body created in 2007 following a 
decision of the European Commission. It is composed of senior officials from the national nuclear 
safety, radioactive waste safety or radiation protection regulatory authorities and senior civil 
servants with competence in these fields from all 27 Member States in the European Union and 
representatives of the European Commission. ENSREG’s role is to help to establish the conditions 
for continuous improvement of safety and to reach a common understanding in the areas of nuclear 
safety and radioactive waste management. 
The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), [115], is the designated UK Nuclear Regulatory 
Authority responsible for regulating safety and security. ONR is an agency of the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) pending relevant legislation to create ONR as a statutory corporation. ONR brings 
together the safety and security functions of HSE's Nuclear Directorate (incorporating the Nuclear 
Installations Inspectorate, Civil Nuclear Security and the UK Safeguards Office) and from summer 
2011 the Department for Transport's Radioactive Materials Transport division. 
In the UK, the Health and Safety Executive publishes the Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear 
Facilities (SAPs), [116], which apply to the assessment of safety cases for nuclear facilities that 
may be operated by potential licensees, existing licensees, or other duty holders. In paragraph 529 
it states that: 
 “Probabilistic Safety Analysis should assist the designers in achieving a balanced and 
optimised design, so that no particular class of accident or feature of the facility makes a 
disproportionate contribution to the overall risk, e.g. of the order of one tenth or greater. 
PSA should enable a judgement to be made of the acceptability or otherwise of the overall 
risks against the numerical targets and should help to demonstrate that the risks are, and 
remain, ALARP.” 
In paragraph 599 it sets targets for the effective dose received by any person arising from a design 
fault for both onsite and off-site persons. This is the clearest setting of risk targets of any of the 
industrial domains considered. 
The US recognises three levels of Probabilistic Risk Assessment, [117]: 
 Level 1 PRA estimates the frequency of core damage. It starts with conditions that are well 
known, usually with a reactor operating at full power. All of the systems that work to protect 
the reactor are modelled. Since the workings of these systems are well understood, the 
uncertainty of the result is relatively small. 
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 Level 2 PRA estimates the magnitude and timing of releases. (That is, “Assuming that the 
core is damaged, how much radioactivity might escape into the environment?”) 
Uncertainty associated with how much coolant escapes the reactor systems (and how 
violently), as well as variation in containment system response, makes a Level 2 PRA less 
precise than a Level 1 PRA. 
 Level 3 PRA assesses the injuries and economic losses that might result if radioactivity 
escaped from containment. Highly variable factors like wind speed and direction will affect 
the results. 
However, a report written in 2012 proposing a risk management regulatory framework, [118], found 
that: “The concept of design-basis events and accidents continues to be a sound licensing approach, 
but the set of design-basis events and accidents has not been updated to reflect insights from power 
reactor operating history and more modern methods, such as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)” 
and recommended that: “The set of design-basis events and accidents should be reviewed and 
revised, as appropriate, to integrate insights from the power reactor operating history and more 
modern methods, such as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA).” This implies that although PRA has 
a long history of use in the nuclear industry it is not as central to the licensing requirements as it 
could be. 
While regulating safety is a national responsibility, international standards and harmonized 
approaches to safety promote consistency and help to provide assurance that nuclear and radiation 
related technologies are used safely. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), [119], is 
required by Statute to promote international cooperation and for over fifty years has published more 
than two hundred safety standards which reflect an international consensus on what constitutes a 
high level of safety for protecting people and the environment. The principal users of the safety 
standards are regulatory bodies and organisations that design, manufacture and operate nuclear 
facilities but they are not binding on states and are used in different ways in different countries. 
They are applicable, as relevant, throughout the entire lifetime of all facilities and activities, existing 
and new. 
Within the UK, the IAEA Safety Standards were used to benchmark the recent review of SAPs, and 
in the continuing review of the Technical Assessment Guides (TAGs), [115]. The Safety Standards 
were also used by the Western Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) in deriving their 
reference levels, [119]. 
Automotive 
In the main, the product is owned and operated by members of the general public although vehicles 
are also hired and leased. In the automotive domain there is government direction pertaining to both 
the sale of individual vehicles and to targets, or aspirations, for road traffic accidents as a whole. 
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Road safety targets, or aspirations, are often expressed as relative reductions in terms of road deaths 
or those Killed or Seriously Injured (KSI), [120]. They may be set at international and national 
level. The United Nations General Assembly has proclaimed the period 2011-2020 as the Decade 
of Action for Road Safety. Their goal is to stabilise and then reduce the forecast level of road traffic 
fatalities around the world. They hope to do this by conducting activities at the national, regional 
and global levels related to five pillars, namely: road safety management; safer roads and mobility; 
safer vehicles; safer road users and post-crash response. They list ten reasons to act based on the 
number of people killed or injured (90% of these injuries occur in developing countries), the direct 
and indirect costs to the economies and the fact that: “Road crashes are preventable”, [121], [122]. 
A hundred governments, including the UK, have co-sponsored the UN resolution establishing the 
Decade of Action and committing themselves to work through an Action Plan with targets for 
raising helmet and seat belt use, promoting safer road infrastructure and protecting vulnerable road 
users, such as pedestrians and cyclists, [123]. Note, vehicle defects of the type that this thesis is 
concerned with are not included. 
The focus on achieving these is on the driver because this reflects the common understanding, based 
on the data currently available, that it is the driver who is directly responsible for most accidents, 
[120], [7]. Road infrastructure is a significant, but much smaller, contributing factor and vehicle 
defects make a very small contribution. A 2010 report from the Institute of Advanced Motorists 
covering 2005 - 2009, [124], assigned the road environment as being a contributory factor in 15% 
of all road traffic accidents and vehicle defects as a contributory factor in 2% of them. The UK 2011 
Annual Report for reported road casualties, [125], placed vehicle defects as the smallest 
contributory factor. Ellims, [126], argues that very few of these will be the result of software defects. 
This understanding is used as the rationale for moving more and more towards driverless vehicles; 
[6], it remains to be seen if this will yield the hoped for results. It is observed that when all vehicles 
are driverless then all accidents will be the result of vehicle defects. In 1987 the UK government 
set its first target of reducing road accident casualties by a third by the year 2000. The actual result 
was that fatalities and serious injuries had fallen by a third, but there was an overall rise due to an 
increase in slight casualties. In 2000 targets were set for 2010. These were based on what was 
thought possible by addressing alcohol consumption, road safety engineering and secondary safety. 
The targets, against a baseline of a 1994 to 1998 average, were set as a 40% reduction in KSI, a 
50% reduction in children KSI and a 10% reduction in slight casualties per 100 million vehicle 
kilometres, [127]. 
The UK response to Decade of Action for Road Safety is contained in Framework for Road Safety, 
[3]. Responsibility is devolved down to local authorities and no national targets for reductions are 
given, a decision that was criticised by RoSPA (Royal Society for Prevention of Accidents), [128]. 
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The main focus is on addressing driver failings; other factors also known to contribute to road 
accidents, such as the road infrastructure and vehicle defects, are not mentioned. The report says 
that performance against the indicators in the Road Safety Outcomes Framework will be monitored 
and anticipates that: “… we could see fatalities falling by around 37% … by 2020” and a “Killed 
or Seriously Injured …reduction of 70% by 2030”. The report acknowledges the rapid development 
of advanced safety systems, and ones with good safety potential; these include advanced emergency 
braking systems, lane departure warnings, and blind spot warnings. It also acknowledges that other 
new technology may affect driver workload in terms of distraction or detachment from the driving 
task. The change in emphasis in this from the target setting of 2000 probably reflects a different 
political philosophy. 
An example of a response to this devolved responsibility is that of Kent, [123], whose approach is 
broader than that of the UK government, being based on: 
 influencing the road user (through Education, Training and Enforcement); 
 the road environment (through Engineering); 
 the vehicle (through working with Manufacturers) in combination with a range of practical 
measures to continue to deliver reductions in road casualties. 
Each nation determines for itself what regulations apply for the sale of motor vehicles and the means 
by which the regulations are enforced. There can be hundreds of different regulations for one 
vehicle with differing versions in different markets. However, there is much cooperation between 
nations and cross-acceptance of each other’s regulations. There is ongoing work towards global 
harmonisation of regulations, [129]. In the main, regulations apply to components or systems 
although there are some whole vehicle regulations, e.g. electromagnetic compatibility. The 
acceptance criteria are based on tests prescribed in regulations; there is little analysis of design and 
the criteria are not based on failure rates, [2]. 
Most regulations are not directly related to safety concerns, although some are, for example steering 
[130]. The means of enforcement differ. In many countries, including those which are members of 
the European Union, vehicles have to be certified before they can be sold. The certification prior to 
sale is performed by public or private agencies; this is the Vehicle Certification Agency, VCA 
[131], in the UK. In other countries, e.g. the US and Canada, the vehicle manufacturers self-certify. 
The government agencies, National Highways Traffic Safety Administration, NHTSA [132], in the 
US sample vehicles for compliance. 
Regulations are made concerning both the manufacture of vehicles and the licensed use of vehicles 
on the public highway. The former are technical, with details being provided by technical people 
rather than by governments. The latter are seen as the major source of accidents and this view is 
supported by the data. With such a low percentage of accidents being attributed to vehicle defects, 
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it is not surprising that no attempt is made to link road accident reduction targets, or aspirations, to 
the contribution of the legislative regulations. 
Where the vehicle itself is concerned, previously the emphasis was on severity mitigation, helping 
the vehicle occupants to survive crashes. Now, greater emphasis is being placed on preventing the 
accidents; it is argued that this can be achieved by using Advanced Driver Assistance Systems 
(ADAS) to provide more information to the driver and progressively take actions on behalf of the 
driver to prevent collisions, [133]. As mentioned above, the long-term goal is to move increasingly 
to autonomous vehicles which tend to be seen as safe by definition as there is no longer a driver, 
[6]. 
The only automotive functional safety standard, ISO 26262, [13], acknowledges, that with the trend 
of increasing technological complexity, software content and mechatronic implementation, there 
are increasing risks from systematic failures and random hardware failures and so it includes 
guidance to avoid these risks by providing appropriate requirements and processes. It is not a legal 
requirement, i.e. it is not part of any regulations that must be met to sell the vehicle. It is followed 
as a statement of best practice which would form the basis of any defence in a product liability case. 
There is also the Code of Practice for the Design and Evaluation of ADAS, [134], which summarises 
best practices and proposes methods for risk assessment and controllability evaluation. It pre-dates 
ISO 26262 but has essentially the same risk assessment scheme. Again, this document is not a legal 
requirement and only serves to provide a benchmark for what can be considered to be best practice. 
The scope of the risk addressed in ISO 26262 is limited to: “failure or unintended behaviour of an 
item with respect to its design intent”. The term item is defined as system or array of systems to 
implement a function at the vehicle level, to which ISO 26262 is applied. When work began in 
Germany on what was to become the standard, the intention was to cover the automotive electronic 
control systems that were current at that time, but during the course of the eleven years that it took 
to reach publication, the standard sought to address: “the trend of increasing technological 
complexity, software content and mechatronic implementation”. 
Like IEC 61508, [135], ISO 26262 is based around a safety lifecycle that starts with identifying 
hazards and covers development, manufacture, service and disposal, although in practice the last 
three are not covered in any depth and do not generate any significantly new requirements. 
The standard requires that hazards associated with the item being developed are identified and their 
unmitigated risk assessed. The risk scale starts with Quality Management (QM) for which the 
remainder of the standard is not applicable, and then proceeds through a series of Automotive Safety 
Integrity Levels (ASILA, ASILB, ADSILC and ASILD), as the assessed unmitigated risk increases. 
This automotive standard seems to be unique among the sectors in providing a single risk 
assessment scheme for all vehicles in the scope of the standard. However, using the risk assessment 
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scheme involves making subjective judgements which could lead to different risk assessments for 
similar items. Practical experience is showing that in the main this is not happening. 
ISO 26262 seeks to avoid unreasonable residual risk. The fact that the standard does not apply to 
hazards classified as QM implies that unreasonable residual risk can be avoided by the application 
of standard automotive quality management practices, including the failure mode avoidance 
practices. For each hazard not classified as QM, a safety goal has to be defined, which if met, 
achieves freedom from unreasonable risk.  
Current safety goals are usually defined around ensuring that vehicle control can be maintained by 
the driver. This correlates well with the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic, [136], which 
requires that: “Every moving vehicle or combination of vehicles shall have a driver.” and that: 
“Every driver shall at all times be able to control his vehicle …”. This convention will need to be 
changed in order for driverless vehicles to be allowed on the road. There are moves within Europe 
to amend the convention in this way. 
From the safety goals, a succession of safety requirements are progressively derived: functional 
safety requirements, technical safety requirements, hardware safety requirements and software 
safety requirements. 
Assurance that the safety goal has been met is gained by meeting the standard’s recommendations 
for system, hardware and software development process measures and its recommendations related 
to hardware reliability and diagnostic coverage. The standard also says much about general 
engineering issues such as planning, document control and tools. 
The requirements of ISO 26262 to achieve freedom from unreasonable risk contain a lot of leeway 
and allow many different solutions, for example: 
 There are no explicit criteria against which the adequacy of the top-level safety 
requirements, safety goals, can be judged; 
 A large amount of discretion is allowed in deciding which development process measures 
to use; 
 The requirements related to random hardware failures and diagnostics coverage allow 
significant variation in the setting of targets and the means by which a design target can be 
shown to have been met. 
A fuller exposition of ISO 26262, covering risk assessment, safety requirements, integrity and 
functional safety assessment is given in Appendix B. 
The scope of ISO 26262 is limited to malfunctioning behaviour against design intent. A new 
document giving guidance for how to define functionality that is considered safe is being prepared 
and is due for final publication in 2018, [137]. 
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Regulations and Standards Discussion 
The nuclear, railways, civil aviation and medical devices sectors are strongly regulated whereas the 
automotive sector is less regulated, for example in some markets the vehicle manufacturer performs 
self-certification. This may be because the strength of the regulations is related to the extent to 
which those affected have any ability to control the risk and also the number of people exposed to 
risk as a result of a failure event. In the automotive sector the vehicle is owned and used by members 
of the public, so they inherently have to take some responsibility. The other sectors are run by 
professionals on their behalf and the public has no role and consequently no responsibility. The 
process for the harmonisation of automotive regulations is as much driven by a desire to promote 
trade as it is to ensure common standards, most of which are not directly related to safety concerns. 
The railways sector has the most similarity to the automotive sector in terms of the interaction of 
the public with the machine and their exposure to the associated risk. In the rail industry, the many 
different ways that people are exposed to risk are considered individually because the means to 
achieve risk reduction may be different in each case. There is no equivalent for automobiles as, to 
date, improving driver performance is seen as the major was of reducing risk associated with the 
automobiles. Railway companies are required to operate a safety management system; there are no 
such requirements for automotive companies. It is common practice to conform to quality 
management requirements, e.g. TS16949, [138]. It is also common practice to have a process that 
specifically responds to in-service incidents that are safety-related. 
All sectors have safety standards and in most sectors there are efforts to have common ones in 
different jurisdictions. The civil avionics standards, while mentioned in regulations, are not a formal 
regulatory requirement. This is similar to the situation with ISO 26262, which is not yet mentioned 
by any piece of regulation. ISO 26262 is more prescriptive than the civil avionics standards, 
although it attempts to be goal orientated in places by allowing quite a lot of discretion in how the 
goals are achieved. Like ISO 26262, the railway CENELEC standards are based on the generic IEC 
61508, but unlike ISO 26262, they are a regulatory requirement. The medical devices sector appears 
to have the weakest standards.  
The nuclear industry is alone in prescribing the use of Probabilistic Safety Analysis. Their situation 
is quite different to the other domains considered here in having just one plant with a fixed 
environment. While the risk is known and fairly constant, those potentially exposed to it include 
employees and near neighbours as well as national and international geographic areas. ISO 26262 
uses numbers for assessing hardware reliability and diagnostics coverage, but they are not used as 
a key target of the standard; there is much discretion left to the developer about what targets to set 
and how to show they have been achieved, e.g. a target may be: “derived from the hardware 
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architectural metrics calculation applied on similar well-trusted design principles”. While civil 
avionics has a well-known target for hardware failures, it is not in practice a regulatory requirement. 
2.2.3 Risk Summary 
From an engineering perspective it is necessary to meet standards, either because they are required 
by regulations or represent best practice from a product liability perspective. As we have seen, these 
are not necessarily in good alignment with the view of the general public. When performing risk 
assessment, in accordance with a process given in a standard, there are many subjective judgements 
that have to be made, so it is well to bear in mind the potential gap between the engineering handling 
of technical risk and the public perception of those risks. Having acknowledged that, working within 
the limitations of standards, e.g. ISO 26262[13], still provides a good base for the work on a 
mechatronic system safety argument. 
2.3 Product Assurance - Industrial practice 
We first provide an historical overview of quality control and management before reviewing how 
this is applied to product quality. We then review how safety has been addressed in mechanical 
engineering before considering the more recent development of functional safety. 
2.3.1 Quality 
By the start of the 20th century the use of standardised interchangeable parts in manufacturing had 
become common. This increased the repeatability in the manufacturing process and opened the way 
for a probabilistic treatment. In the 1920s, Dr. Walter A. Shewhart at Bell Labs pioneered the use 
of statistical quality control for product improvement and in1931 he published Economic Control 
of Quality of Manufactured Product, [139], and set the founding principles of quality control. 
Quality Management systems grew out of the defence industry’s need to move away from quality 
control by inspection to quality assurance based on a demonstration that their suppliers’ processes 
were both effective and under control and that there was effective control over procedures and 
systems [140]. The global standard for quality management systems is ISO 9000, first published in 
1987. This has its origins in the British Standards Institute’s quality standards BS 5750.  The latest 
version was published in 2015, [141]. The standard requires clear and specific documentation of 
policies, procedures and work instructions. There are six required quality policies and procedures:  
Document Control, Control of Quality Records, Control of Non-Conforming Product, Corrective 
Action, Preventive Action and Internal Audits. In 1994 a version of ISO 9000 was created 
specifically for the automotive industry, QS9000, [142]. This was widely used until 2006. It has 
now been replaced by  IATF 16949:2016, [143], which itself superseded the earlier ISO/TS 16949, 
[138]. ISO 9000 has also been applied to software development. In 1997 ISO issued ISO 9000-3, 
[144], under the name of TickIT, this has now been superseded by TickITplus, [145]. A common 
61 
 
software quality framework used with the automotive industry is Automotive SPICE®, [146], 
derived from ISO 15504, [147]. 
While quality management systems address the design and manufacture of a product, Total Quality 
Management (TQM) seeks to address all aspects of the business, including the quality control and 
quality assurance, [140]. It is an umbrella term that encompasses many product and quality 
initiatives. One such initiative is Six Sigma, originating from Motorola in the 1980s. This is a 
methodology to improve product or a service process provided to outside customers by increasing 
performance and decreasing performance variation. The name Six Sigma derives from statistical 
terminology where sigma means standard deviation. For normal distribution, the probability of 
falling within a ±6 sigma range around the mean is 0.9999966. The intent of Six Sigma is to reduce 
variation so as to achieve very small standard deviations. This is accomplished by the DMAIC 
process (define, measure, analyse, improve, control) for improving existing processes and the DFSS 
(design for six sigma) process to develop new processes or products at Six Sigma quality levels, 
[148]. 
2.3.2 Product Quality 
As mentioned above, the first approaches to product quality was quality control by inspection. 
Fuelled by the large scale use of electronics starting in World War  II, mainly vacuum valves, [149], 
there was a move to predicting failure rates of equipment, based on component failure rates, and 
then setting target values for equipment failures in the field, [150]. Also, at this time a number of 
reliability societies and journals were established. Reliability engineering remains a major 
technique in product development, [151], [152], including electronics, [153]. 
Components are characterised by simple failure models based on what is physically possible. For 
electronic technology this includes resistors, capacitors, field effect transistors and integrated 
circuits, although the last of these has a very complex internal structure. As the failure model is 
simple, the main source of uncertainty is aleatory, relating to when a component will fail. For this 
circumstance a probabilistic approach to predicting failure rates has been shown to be accurate over 
many years of successful use, [154], [155]. The previous performance of a large population of 
components can be taken to be a good indicator of the future performance of a similar population 
provided that the two populations are assumed to have the same properties. This assumption is 
normally justified on the basis of a common and controlled manufacturing process. In assessing the 
failure rates local environmental factors, e.g. temperature, also have to be accounted for and so the 
assessment must be made under a typical operational and environmental profile. Generic tables are 
available that give failure rate data for electronic components; these have wide acceptance in many 
industries and are generally judged to be on the conservative side, [156], [157]. Problems may arise 
in obtaining the basic figures. Aven, [158], highlights that lack of relevant component reliability 
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data is a problem in many reliability analyses. Often new components are used in the design and so 
the predicted performance is based on an assumption that the failure properties of new component 
will be similar to those assessed for an established component. With assemblies of components the 
failure modes are no longer be generic but particular to the design. Therefore, a failure model has 
to be constructed and, particularly for an assembly of assemblies, may get quite complex. It may be 
modelled explicitly by constructing a fault tree, [58], [154], or just be implicit in a Failure Mode 
Effects Analysis (FMEA), [159], [160]. The more complex the failure model, the greater will be 
the epistemic uncertainty associated with it. The failure model uses the failure data of the 
components of the assembly, each of which brings with it its aleatory uncertainty. 
Another approach to reliability is Physics of Failure, [161], [162], [163]. This seeks to understand 
why failures occur in terms of the fundamental physical and chemical behaviour of the materials 
out of which the components are made. Such understanding can then be used to eliminate the 
failures or provide more accurate formulations reliability models. This is in contrast to the more 
empirically-based reliability prediction approaches. The advocates of Physics of Failure believe 
that while the analysis is complex and costly to apply, it provides the strongest characterization 
available of reliability of components, structures and systems. By the early 1960s there were then 
two approaches to reliability; one a quantitative approach based on predicting failure rates and the 
other based on identifying and modelling the physical causes of failure. 
There has been much debate about whether or not reliability can be applied to software. Perhaps 
the most common view is that software is purely a design and as such does not fail in the way that 
a physical component can fail. Therefore, a probabilistic approach is not appropriate. This is the 
view of all the safety standards, e.g. IEC 61508, [12], that clearly state that the probabilistic targets 
do not apply to software. This common view has been challenged by staff at City University and 
the Centre for Software Reliability, [164], [165]. Their view is that the uncertainty in software 
failure is a result of the randomness in the inputs to the software and that this can be represented 
probabilistically. 
In the automotive industry there has been a move away from basing quality on reliability due to the 
difficulty of obtaining accurate field performance figures given that there is large uncertainty 
concerning the nature of the environment in which the product will be used. Brown, [166], 
highlights the problem of knowing the stated conditions and specified period of time which would 
have to take into account the field usage, speeds, loads, duty-cycle of loads, temperature dynamics, 
humidity, corrosive environments and shock loads. Davis, [167] highlights the lack of closed-loop 
feedback from units in the field when data outside the warranty period is not collected. 
Given these criticisms an approach, known variously as Robustness Engineering or Failure Mode 
Avoidance (FMA), has been adopted. Robustness is also a part of TQM and Six Sigma and has its 
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roots in the work of Taguchi, [168]. Taguchi defines robustness as the “state where the technology, 
product, or process performance is minimally sensitive to factors causing variability (either in the 
manufacturing or user’s environment) and aging at the lowest unit manufacturing cost”. 
Robustness recognizes two types of quality: customer quality, i.e. features the customer wants, and 
engineered quality, i.e. features the customer does not want. Robustness is about engineered quality, 
i.e. removing the features that the customer does not want such as failures, noise, vibrations, 
unwanted phenomena and pollution. It does this by identifying the ideal function and then 
selectively choosing the best nominal values of design parameters that optimise performance 
reliability at lowest cost. The classical metrics for quality/robustness, e.g. failure rate, are 
considered to come too late in the product development. The Taguchi measure for robustness is 
signal-to-noise ratio. The signal-to-noise ratio measures the quality of energy transformation as 
expressed by the ratio of the “level of performance of the desired function” to the “variability of the 
desired function”. The signal-to-noise ratio is increased by reducing variability and specifying 
nominal values of the design parameters such that the design is insensitive to noise factors, e.g. the 
customer environment, aging and wearing, and manufacturing variations.  
Clausing, [169] has suggested a new definition for reliability: “reliability is failure mode 
avoidance”, with failure being any customer perceived deviation from the ideal condition. As 
reliability is being equated to failure mode avoidance it is necessary to a have a way of measuring 
it. Clausing proposes the “operating window”, (OW) as a metric for robustness. The OW is the 
range in some input noise that produces a fixed failure rate in the failure modes. Davis, [167], 
accepts Clausing’s view of reliability as failure mode avoidance and proposes a robustness metric 
called the “distance from the failure mode”. The distance is captured as measurements of physical 
properties in SI units, the greater the distance the higher the reliability. Campean et al, [170], [171], 
also agree with Clausing and Davis that: “reliability is failure mode avoidance”. 
Failure Mode Effects Analysis 
Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a technique that is used extensively by the quality, 
reliability, robustness and failure mode avoidance disciplines. There are a number of standards for 
FMEA, including SAE J1739, [159], VDA Product- and Process-FMEA, [172], and 
IEC 60812, [160]. J1739 and the VDA guide are commonly used in the automotive industry. Use 
of FMEA is called for by IATF 16949:2016, [143], which is the universally used quality standard 
in the automotive industry. An FMEA may be performed on a process or a product; here, we are 
only concerned with the analysis of a product, which is often referred to as a design FMEA 
(DFMEA). 
The primary purpose of the FMEA is to identify potential high risks and keep them from occurring 
in the end product, or minimize their effect on the end user. Three means are used: changing the 
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design, preventing the risk from occurring, or detecting the risk before production. Risk in this 
context is mainly concerned with quality issues, with only the highest severity effects being related 
to the safe operation of the vehicle, see below. 
The description of the FMEA given here is largely taken from J1739 which describes the procedure 
for a DFMEA in terms of the data produced when performing the technique, see Table 2. 
The item is represented as a set of functions. For each function, the effect of it experiencing a number 
of failure modes is considered. Typical failure modes considered include: loss of function, partial 
function, intermittent function, degradation and unintended function. It is normal to consider what 
the effect will be at the boundary of the item and also at the final product level. Each effect is 
assigned a severity ranking, 1 to 10, and the severity of the function failure mode is taken as the 
highest ranking value from all of its effects. The ranking is relative within the scope of the individual 
FMEA and is determined without regard to the occurrence ranking or the detection ranking. A 
severity ranking of 9 or 10 is typically assigned if the effect is considered to affect the safe operation 
of the vehicle. The severity ranking cannot be changed without eliminating the failure mode and its 
effects. 
Data Item Description 
Item The name or other pertinent information of the item being 
analysed. 
Function and Requirement Function is a description of the design intent for a system, 
subsystem, or component. 
Product requirement defines how a product function should 
perform. 
Potential Failure Mode The manner in which a component, subsystem, or system could 
potentially fail to meet or deliver the intended function(s) and its 
requirements. 
Potential Effects Consequences or results of each failure mode. 
Severity Ranking Number Relative ranking within the scope of the individual FMEA for the 
most serious effect for a given failure mode for the function being 
evaluated. 
Classification Optional means to highlight failure modes or causes for further 
action. 
Potential Cause of Failure Indication of how the failure could occur. 
Occurrence Ranking Number Relative ranking within the scope of the individual FMEA for the 
likelihood that the cause will occur during the design life of the 
product. 
Current Design Controls – Prevention Description how a cause, failure mode or effect is prevented. 
Current Design Controls – Detection Description how a cause and/or failure mode is detected, either by 
analytical or physical methods, before the item is released to 
production. 
Detection Ranking Number Relative ranking within the scope of the individual FMEA for the 
likelihood that the cause and/or failure mode will be detected 
before the item is released to production. 
Risk Priority Number (RPN) and Criticality 
Number (SO) 
Optional tools for evaluating potential risk. 
Table 2: SAE J1739 Data Items 
The potential causes of the failure mode are considered and each one is assigned an occurrence 
ranking, 1 to 10. The ranking is relative within the scope of the individual FMEA and is determined 
without regard to the severity ranking or the detection ranking. The ranking does take account of 
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prevention controls; these are means by how a cause, failure mode or effect can be prevented from 
occurring. The occurrence ranking cannot be changed without changing the design such that the 
failure mode is less likely. 
The likelihood that a cause or a failure mode will be detected is assigned a detection ranking, 1 to 
10. The ranking is relative within the scope of the individual FMEA and is determined without 
regard to the severity ranking or the occurrence ranking. The ranking takes into account the 
detection controls, these are means by how a cause or a failure mode can be detected before the 
item is released to production. 
An overall consequence ranking can be arrived at in a number of ways. A classification may be 
assigned based on the rankings of severity, severity and occurrence, or severity and detection. Such 
classifications can be used to assign special characteristics to particular failure modes or causes to 
signify that they can have an impact on factors such as safety or compliance to regulations. Special 
characteristics are defined by each organisation. Alternatively, or as well as, the three values may 
be multiplied together to produce a Risk Priority Number (RPN). This last approach has been 
criticised by several authors, [173], [174]; the latter on the basis that the scales are ordinal and that 
an interval scale is required in order for the multiplication operation to be valid. 
A fuller exposition of the FMEA technique is given in Appendix B.  
2.3.3 Product Safety 
Within reliability engineering literature, safety is often quoted as a beneficial outcome, [155], [154], 
[175], [176]. In mechanical systems, the functionality is constrained by geometry and the 
continuous nature of the physical properties of materials. The systems tend to have a small number 
of functions, for which the physics is well-established, and there are only a limited set of modes of 
operation. For these mechanical systems it has generally been the case that a system that does not 
fail is also a safe system, e.g. “If one is examining the hydraulic system of an aircraft, the reliability 
of that system is more or less complementary to the safety. As reliability increases safety also 
increases”, [10]. For these mechanical systems the quality techniques, whether based on reliability 
or robustness, could also be perceived to be sufficient to address the safety issues. But the issues of 
predicting system values and setting an acceptable target remain. 
Mechanical Design 
In the context of mechanical engineering, Ullman, [38], discusses three ways to establish product 
safety. The first way is to design safety directly into the product so that it is inherent. This means 
that the product poses no inherent danger during normal operation or in case of failure. The second 
is to design in safety by adding protective devices to the product, e.g. shields, automatic cut-off 
switches. The third, and weakest, way is the use of warnings, e.g. labels, loud sounds, flashing 
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lights. In producing a design, he acknowledges that there is uncertainty in the real world due to 
uncontrollable noises which he lists as unit-to-unit manufacturing variations, aging and 
environmental conditions. These are addressed by the use of a factor of safety, which he also terms 
a factor of ignorance. He defines the factor of safety as the ratio of allowable-strength to 
applied-stress and should have a value greater than 1. There are two ways to estimate the value of 
an acceptable factor of safety: the classical rule-of-thumb method and the probabilistic method of 
relating it to the desired reliability and to knowledge of the material, loading, and geometric 
properties. He concedes that the latter is not very precise and the tendency is to use it very 
conservatively.  
For Palh and Beitz, [48], writing in the context of mechanical design, safety is achieved by a 
combination of the reliable fulfilment of technical functions and the use of protection mechanisms. 
Safety concerns the operation of the machine, the operator and the effects on the environment. 
These can be addressed directly using the safe-life principle or the fail-safe principle, or indirectly. 
In the safe-life principle, based on accurate qualitative and quantitative knowledge, all components 
and their connections are constructed so that they operate without breakdown throughout their 
anticipated life. The fail-safe principle allows for the failure of a system function, or a component, 
during service by ensuring that no grave consequences ensue. Redundancy may be used as a means 
for increasing safety and reliability. Redundancy may be active redundancy, e.g. provision of 
multiple engines on an airplane, or passive, e.g. standby pumps. Indirect safety is used whenever 
direct safety methods prove inadequate and is provided by the use of protective systems or 
protective barriers. These have to operate reliably, function when danger occurs and resist 
tampering. A protective system should disable the plant, or prevent operation of the plant in a 
dangerous state, and provide a warning when changes in the working conditions is noted. It may be 
achieved by the use of redundancy, it may be self-monitoring and it should be testable. During 
design they also describe the use of a safety factor and use the same definition as Ullman. Cruse, 
[177], and Bergman et al, [178], also describe the use of safety factors in design. Palh and Beitz 
acknowledge that it is now understood that there is no absolute safety in the sense of complete 
freedom from danger. Safety measures aim to reduce risks to an acceptable level, but this can only 
be quantified in a few cases. This can only be determined by technical knowledge, social standards, 
and the experience of design engineers. 
Functional Safety 
It was remarked above that, for mechanical systems with a small number of functions and a limited 
set of modes of operation, it may be legitimate to consider that the safety issues could be addressed 
by the use of reliability or robustness techniques. In her book Engineering a Safer World, [75], 
Leveson describes this as one of the basic false assumptions that is pervasive in engineering and 
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other fields. This is certainly the case for software-based electronic control systems where there are 
typically many modes of operation and the control algorithm is not constrained by physics and 
geometry. For these types of systems, the role of safety requirements and non-stochastic systematic 
failures is at least as important as random failures. 
To address the perceived need for a new approach for software-based control systems, a new 
discipline of functional safety has developed in the last thirty years. A number of standards have 
been published in this time, as mentioned in section 2.2.2. One of significance for this thesis is 
IEC 61508, [12], which defines functional safety as: “part of the overall safety that depends on a 
system or equipment operating correctly in response to its inputs”. The automotive functional safety 
standard ISO 26262, [13], is an adaptation of this standard, a brief overview was given in section 
2.2.2 and a  fuller exposition of ISO 2626 is given in Appendix B. Here we note that unlike the 
automotive FMEA standard, J1739, [159], ISO 26262 does provide a common risk assessment scale 
for all automotive E/E systems. The standard has a prerequisite that the activities necessary to meet 
its requirements are being carried out under the operation of a quality management. Some of its 
requirements are effectively enhancing those of a quality management. Its product process 
requirements are dependent on the unmitigated risk assessment performed on the E/E system at the 
vehicle level. It requires that hardware failure rate targets be set for evaluation of the design, and, 
while providing some possible values, does not mandate particular values. While it acknowledges 
that some of the safety issues may be addressed by measures, including non-E/E technologies, 
which are external to the system being developed, their specification and verification are considered 
to be outside of the scope of the standard. The standard also requires that a safety case be produced; 
this is central to the subject of this thesis. 
Levels 
The amount of effort and care that does into designing and implementing a system will intuitively 
be influenced by the consequences of it failing in the field. There are two conflicting considerations; 
one is a financial concern to not expend more effort than is really necessary and one is a concern to 
have done everything possible at the time to prevent the failure in the field. To help balance these 
two conflicting concerns many functional safety and security standards in different domains 
introduce a categorisation of levels. In general, the approach is: 
 Perform some assessment to determine how serious the consequences of a failure are; 
 Assign a level to the engineering process or one of its artefacts; 
 Perform the design and implementation according to requirements dictated by the standard 
for the assigned level. 
Most standards accept that there are two basic causes of failure: random hardware failures and 
systematic design errors at the system, hardware and software level. Different standards address 
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one or both. Generally random hardware failures are addressed via probability of failure and 
systematic errors are addressed through process measures that give assurance or confidence that no 
unmanaged error remains in the system when it becomes operational, [179]. 
ARP4754a, [104], defines a Development Assurance Level (DAL), A to E (most rigorous to least 
rigorous) as the measure of the rigour applied to the development process to limit, to a level 
acceptable for safety, the likelihood of errors occurring during the process of aircraft/system 
functions. The Development Assurance Level is assigned depending on the severity classification 
of the aircraft level failure conditions considering the possible independence between development 
processes that can limit the consequences of development errors. DALs only addresses systematic 
faults and not to random faults. DALs can be assigned to functions (FDAL) or to items (IDAL). 
The significance of a DAL is given by the objectives that it sets. For the systems these are specified 
in ARP475a, for the software these are specified in DO-178 and for hardware in DO-254. 
One of the results of following ISO/IEC 15408, [180], the Common Criteria for Information 
Technology Security Evaluation for computer security certification, is the assignment of an 
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL), which, if met through quality assurance processes, establishes 
the level of confidence that may be placed in the product's security features. The EAL takes values 
of EAL1 to EAL7 and as the level increases greater rigour is required for testing and design. The 
EAL does not specify any hardware failure rates. 
IEC 61508, [12], requires that the risks associated with equipment and its 
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic system should be assessed and compared against a 
tolerability criteria. If the risk is intolerable, risk reduction measures must be taken. The stringency 
of the risk reduction measures is assigned a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) which takes values of SIL1 
to SIL4, with SIL4 being the most stringent. The value of the SIL sets a limit on the probability of 
a dangerous failure, either per hour or on demand. The standard requires that safety requirements 
are derived to prevent or manage dangerous failures, each safety requirement also has an associated 
value of SIL which is used to indicate which process requirements of the standard are to be met. 
Meeting these process requirements does not imply values for the probability of failure. 
In common with other sector specific standards adapted from IEC 61508, ISO 26262, [13], requires 
that the unmitigated risk associated with the item is assessed by identifying hazardous events which 
are assigned an Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL). The ASIL is inherited by all safety 
requirements derived to prevent or mitigate the hazardous event. Again, the ASIL indicates which 
process requirements of the standard are to be met and, as mentioned above, that hardware failure 
rate targets be set while not mandating particular values be set or met. A fuller exposition of ISO 
2626 is given in Appendix B. 
69 
 
2.3.4 Product Assurance Discussion 
In quality engineering the qualitative approach is taking precedence over the quantitative approach 
with the adoption of processes based on robustness and failure mode avoidance. The FMEA 
technique is at the centre of all these approaches. Safety in mechanical engineering is based around 
the use of protective devices and safety factors while, for E/E systems development, it is the 
functional safety approach that dominates E/E. The concept of integrity with regards to the rigour 
with which systems are developed is common practice, but there is a lot of variation in how this is 
applied. 
2.4 Safety Arguments 
As discussed, when a product is placed into operation or the market place, the supplier will wish to 
claim that it is safe according to the definition they use. A claim such as this should be justified, 
and an argument is the means of justifying the claim. Argumentation formats can be traced back to 
Stephen Toulmin's work in the 1950s, [181], who produced a general model for reasoning about 
issues that could not be known with certainty. The Toulmin model  has three main components: the 
claim that is the conclusion of the argument, the support which is provided by evidence for the 
claim and the warrants which are the accepted belief or value systems that link the evidence to the 
claim. There are also three supporting components to the model: the backing which justifies that 
the warrants are appropriate and acceptable, the qualifiers which limit the scope for the claim and 
rebuttals which consider alternative viewpoints. 
This argument framework has been applied to arguments to support safety claims for man-made 
machines. One approach is the claims-argument-evidence model where claims are the same as 
Toulmin’s claims, evidence is the same as Toulmin’s grounds and argument is a combination of 
Toulmin’s warrant and backing, [182]. Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), [183], [184], [185], is a 
graphical notation for documenting a safety argument which is also consistent with the Toulmin 
model, [182] The automotive functional safety standard ISO 26262, [13], requires a safety case 
which it defines as: “an argument that the safety requirements for an item are complete and satisfied 
by evidence compiled from work products of the safety activities during development”. An example 
of an automotive safety argument is given in [186]. Further guidance on how to structure an 
automotive safety argument is given by MISRA, [187]. This is based on a hierarchy of safety 
requirements at different levels of abstraction, i.e. safety goals, functional safety requirements, 
technical safety requirements, hardware safety requirements and software safety requirements. 
Claims are made at each abstraction level regarding the relationship between the safety 
requirements at that level and those at the next higher level. Claims are also made at each abstraction 
level regarding the safety requirements and the corresponding design artefacts. MISRA also 
propose a categorisation of claim types: claims which concern the technical adequacy of the safety 
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requirements (rationale), claims which concern the relationship between the safety requirements 
and the corresponding product artefacts (satisfaction), claims which concern the processes tools 
and people used to perform a specific activity (means) and claims which concern the nature of the 
organisation responsible for performing these activities (organisational environment). The 
rationale claims have much in common with documenting the design rationale and the need to do 
this has been long known, [188].  
2.4.1 Safety Argument Discussion 
The role of the safety case in automotive is increasing due to the ISO 26262 requirement for one to 
be written. Much of the material already produced as a result of systems engineering, quality and 
safety activities can be included in a safety argument using the MISRA framework. An argument 
that covers the entirety of a mechatronic system provides a much stronger claim to the system safety 
than is currently the case as it would allow the reasoning about the non-E/E technologies to be 
included. We adopt the MISRA approach based around a hierarchy of safety requirements at 
different levels of abstraction. 
2.5 Conclusion of Literature Review 
One of the objectives of the literature review was to determine if there existed a description of a 
mechatronic system in terms of requirements decomposition through levels of design abstraction 
which could serve as the basis of a safety argument. While the system engineering principles are 
relevant there was no model we could build on. Abstraction levels like system, sub-system and 
component have explanatory usefulness but do not correspond neatly to real world solutions. 
Therefore, it is necessary to produce our own description to use as the basis for the safety argument. 
This is addressed in Chapter 3. 
The automotive industry has a functional safety standard, ISO 26262, [13],which is a member of 
the IEC 61508 family of standards and it has been voluntarily adopted by the industry. It provides 
a good base for the work on an automotive mechatronic system safety argument as it is an 
automotive standard, the risk assessment is independent of implementation and it requires a safety 
argument. Therefore, we adopt this as our base safety standard. We also adopt the MISRA approach, 
[187], for structuring the safety argument as it is the most mature work in this area. We note that 
while the concept of integrity levels is fundamental to the standard it is not part of the mechanical 
design process; this issue is addressed in Chapter 6. 
For the mechanical component evidence necessary to support the mechatronic safety argument we 
will investigate the use of the FMEA process as this is well established practice within the 
automotive industry. The feasibility of using it for this purpose is investigated in Chapter 5. 
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Regarding the topic of risk, we have seen that there is a disconnect between the public perception 
and the engineering treatment of risk; the engineering community has to follow a technical approach 
as prescribed by the relevant standards. The assessments of the unmitigated risk, and the sufficiency 
of risk mitigation, as required by the standards, entail having to make judgements that have a degree 
of subjectively about them. The engineers making these judgements should have some awareness 
and understanding of their society’s view of risk and be ever mindful that what is assumed to be 
societally acceptable can, and will, change in the future. 
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Chapter 3 Design Ontologies and Arguments 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of the work is to have a safety argument for a mechatronic system that is based 
systematically on a model of the design. There cannot be a uniform argument if there is no 
underlying uniform design model; this is the necessary starting point. The unifying design model 
has to be able to include both the mechanical and E/E the aspects of a mechatronic system. We saw 
from the literature review that such a model does not exist. 
We then need to understand how a unifying design model can be used as the basis for the safety 
argument. As mentioned in Chapter 2, MISRA, [189], has published work on a safety argument 
framework for an E/E system. This is based on the ISO 26262 hierarchy of design levels with 
associated safety requirements: 
 safety goals associated with the item definition 
 functional safety requirements placed on the assumed preliminary architecture 
 technical safety requirements placed on the system design 
 hardware safety requirements placed on the hardware design 
 software safety requirements placed on the software design 
The difficulty of adopting this approach is that there is no commonly accepted equivalent hierarchy 
of design levels for a mechatronic system or a mechanical system in the literature and it is not 
appropriate to speculate about what such a hierarchy might be. The MISRA work published at the 
time did not cover the technical safety requirements, hardware safety requirements or software 
safety requirements in any detail, so further work to extend these in this thesis would also not be 
appropriate. The desire was to base the work on a more basic conceptual model that would be 
equally applicable to a mechatronic system, a mechanical system and an E/E system. There are no 
existing safety argument patterns for mechanical components or any argument patterns based on 
quality processes. 
So, there are two challenges: to produce a unifying design model and to understand how it can be 
used as the basis for a safety argument. 
In this chapter we propose an approach that could serve as a unifying design model. It is a 
compositional approach based on a generic ontology of design. This generic representation of the 
design is compared with material in the literature review and issues related to composition are 
discussed. A generic design process based on the ontology is produced and compared with material 
in the literature review. We then proceed to understand how the generic ontology of design can be 
used as the basis for a safety argument and how the compositional aspect of the model is represented 
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in the safety argument. Finally, we see how well the unifying design model and safety argument 
fare when applied to an E/E system, as understood by ISO 26262. 
3.2 Preliminary Considerations 
It was decided to approach the modelling task by using ontologies drawn in the SysML Block 
Diagram notation, [27]. The models produced are similar to Figure 2 and Figure 3 from Chapter 2, 
which were taken from ISO/IEC 42101, [20], in that they provide both a means of abstracting away 
from the detail while also providing a degree of formality. The term ontology is used in the sense 
of a formal representation of knowledge by a set of concepts within a domain and the relationships 
between those concepts, i.e. the type of objects that exist, and their properties and relations, [190]. 
In this section we produce models of some of the base concepts and subject matter that we need to 
consider and discuss how different approaches to modelling influence our search for a unifying 
design model. 
3.2.1 Flat Ontology Models 
It is useful define our understanding of an embedded system by creating a general model which 
includes both representations of the design and the physical structure, Figure 13. This is based on 
the literature.  
 
Figure 13: General model of an embedded system 
To clarify our understanding of the physical structure of a mechatronic system another model was 
created, Figure 14, although it is accepted that the modelling of the mechanical aspects is 
superficial. 
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Figure 14: Ontology of the physical structure of a mechatronic system 
As ISO 26262 is one our base documents and likely to influence our final model, it is useful to 
explicitly document its underlying model, Figure 15. 
Another key source material is the FMEA. Understanding its relationship to the ISO 26262 model 
is an important consideration in producing a unified design model. Figure 16 shows the models 
concept, and component FMEAs, taken from Appendix A, are related to our model of ISO 26262. 
While providing useful insights into the material we have to handle, these types of models do not 
form the basis for a unifying model on which a safety argument can be based. 
While Figure 13 and Figure 14 use reflexive associations for the physical structure, e.g. a 
component is constructed from components, the modelling of the design representation does not. 
For example, in Figure 15 the functional safety requirements and technical safety requirements 
appear as separate blocks rather than both being modelled as a single safety requirements block. 
One point taken from this work is that the distinction between a representation of the design and a 
physical component should be maintained. 
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Figure 15: Ontology of ISO 26262 
We now proceed to produce a more abstract model of the design process and the physical 
implementation.  
3.2.2 Hierarchical Ontology Model 
Taking a more abstract approach, Figure 17 shows a model that is technology-free in that there is 
no mention of a mechatronic system or an E/E system and no mention of hardware design or 
software design. 
A reflexive association is used to show that there is a hierarchy of design representations (Logical 
Design) at different abstraction levels. A reflexive association is used to show that Physical Parts 
may be composed of other Physical Parts; the model also shows that one Physical Part may also 
have a non-compositional association with another. The modelling element Physical Part 
Description is used to represent the specification of the Physical Part, marking a distinction 
between the design and the specification for the physical component used to implement the design.
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Figure 16: Relationships between HARA and concept and component FMEAs 
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Figure 17: Hierarchical Model 
This models the fact that many of the parts will be standard ones that are selected based on the 
correspondence between their specification and the requirements of the design representation. The 
Physical Part Description can be associated with the design representations at any abstraction level, 
as standard components can be obtained for many levels of abstraction, for example an assembly 
of components or a single component. It is also noted that at any level of abstraction there can be 
both a design representation and a corresponding Physical Part. For example, at the E/E system 
level there can be a system design representation and the physical system itself but at a lower level 
of abstraction there can be the hardware design representation, which is a component of the E/E 
system, and the populated PCB in a case.  
While giving these useful insights, a hierarchical ontology model does have some issues. Basing 
the model on a hierarchy of abstraction levels on the understanding that the design process is one 
of refining an abstract representation to a concrete one through a set of abstract levels is not always 
appropriate. For example, when an abstract description of the mechatronic system is refined to an 
abstract description of an E/E system and an abstract description of a mechanical system, the 
refinements are both at the same level of abstraction and both proceed separately through further 
layers of refinement, see Figure 8. Consequently, there is not a view at the same level of abstraction 
that includes both the E/E system and mechanical system refinements. The same is also the case 
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when the abstract description on an E/E system is refined to separate electronic hardware and 
software designs. 
3.2.3 Chunked Models 
Given the above comments, it is more practical not to use the terminology of levels of abstraction, 
but rather to think of the design as a set of chunks. In this way, some chunks can represent an 
abstraction of other chunks, but some chunks can also be at the same level of abstraction. Chunks 
could be defined based on organisational splits, for example between departments or companies, or 
different technologies, for example mechanical and electronic, because this reflects how products 
are actually developed. This has the benefit of allowing a division between different engineering 
disciplines and division between organisations by drawing of boundaries as is appropriate to the 
situation (these types of boundaries are discussed in the MISRA Guidelines for Safety Analysis 
[52]). A chunked model also allows the refinement of requirements over architecture as it evolves 
in different chunks whose elements consists of different technologies developed by different 
organisations. Rather than having one model of the whole system representing all levels of 
abstraction, this allows us to have an ontology model for a single chunk. This approach will require 
a means of defining interfaces between chunks to allow one chunk to share information with another 
chunk and raises issues of composition. These are addressed in the next section. 
3.3 The Pars Approach 
Rather than continuing to use the term chunks, which is seen as being inelegant, it was decided to 
use the term the Pars1 instead. This term was chosen as the standard engineering terms, such as part 
and component, already have multiple and context-related definitions 
In this section we present the Pars approach which consists of an ontology, a process and a design 
argument pattern. These are all described in the following sections. 
3.3.1 Generic Pars Design Ontology 
The generic Pars design ontology is shown in Figure 18. 
As has been mentioned, the design process can be seen as an evolution of requirements. The process 
starts with very abstract representations of requirements and progresses to more concrete 
requirements. At the same time, the technological solutions start to be introduced, and these proceed 
from abstract designs to concrete designs realised as specific physical parts. The Pars model is 
intended to be applicable at every stage, but the design representations may take many forms 
depending on the design or implementation work being performed in the Pars. 
                                                     
1 Pars is the Latin for part or component, pl Partes. 
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Figure 18: Pars Design Ontology 
Design representation may take the form of textual descriptions, requirements, diagrams 
representing logical structure, e.g. architectures composed of elements, or physical structure. Broy 
et al, [24], acknowledge three categories of representation: informal descriptions, e.g. natural 
language; formal descriptions, e.g. logical and mathematical expressions with formally defined 
semantics; and visual representations, e.g. tabular, graphical. The ISO/IEC 42010 conceptual model 
of an architecture description, Figure 3, can be applied at many levels of abstraction and for different 
aspects of the design. For instance, there can be a mechatronic system architecture description, an 
E/E system architecture, a hardware architecture and a software architecture. Therefore, the 
definition of the design representation allows for the fact that it may take a variety of forms, Figure 
19. In the Pars ontology, the blocks B1, B2, B6 and B7 are all design representations.  
Except for the first Pars, each Pars processes one or more Design Representations that have been 
cascaded from other Pars. The first Pars processes less formal material which is motivating the 
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work as a whole, for example, evolution of an existing idea or a new inspirational idea. This is 
discussed further below. 
 
Figure 19: Pars Model - Design Representation 
. 
Each Pars may refine or evolve the design and this may include making choices, block B3, about 
what standards or regulations are to be met, what design patterns are to be used or what technologies 
are to be used, Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20: Examples of design choices 
The refined or evolved Design Representation may be required to exhibit particular properties, 
block B4. Some properties are part of the Design Representation cascaded from other Partes, e.g. 
compliance to functional and non-functional requirements; some properties will arise from the 
nature of the design or the technology used, e.g. absence of deadlock for a software design. 
Depending on the nature of the Design Representation these may relate to the design material or 
the anticipated physical realisation of the design, Figure 21. 
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Figure 21: Examples of Property 
The presence, or absence, of these properties is established by use of techniques such as inspection, 
demonstration, test, analysis or simulation, which is represented by block B5. A classification of 
such techniques by Avizienis et al, [191]is given in Table 3. This forms the basis for our model, 
Figure 22. 
Technique Static Dynamic 
Static Analysis 
Inspection 
Review 
Y  
Theorem Proving Y  
Model Checking Y  
Symbolic Execution  Y 
Testing (at multiple levels) 
Demonstration 
 Y 
Table 3: Verification Approaches (taken from [191]) 
 
Figure 22: Examples of Verification 
Part, or all, of the refined or evolved Design Representation may be cascaded to another Pars, block 
B6, or else part, or all of it, may be realised as physical parts, block B7. 
Comparison with existing models 
In this section we review how this approach relates to the different design models we saw in the 
literature review, considering the splitting of the overall product development process into Pars and 
the how other ontologies compare with the Pars ontology. 
The mechatronic V life cycle diagram shown in Figure 8 [46], lists the lifecycle tasks for system, 
mechanical, electrical and software sub-systems and mechanical, electrical and software 
components. One possible division of this into a set of Partes is a system Pars, a system design 
Pars, a mechanical module Pars, multiple instances of a mechanical component Pars, an electrical 
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module Pars, multiple instances of an electrical component Pars, a software module Pars, and 
multiple instances of a software component Pars. This is shown graphically in Figure 23, which 
also shows the interfaces between the Pars. 
 
Figure 23: Mechatronic Systems Partes based on [46] 
Considering the Twin Peaks model, Figure 5 [33], the specification is represented by the Design 
Representation, B1, B2, B8 and B9; the spiral down occurs as the aspects are cascaded to other 
Pars, B9; the solution structure becomes concrete, detailed, as aspects are realized in the current 
Pars, B8, B10 and B11; the problem structure evolves in the different Pars as they are spawned. 
Considering the Context of architecture description from [20] Figure 2, an architecture can be part 
of any Pars. For a mechatronic system there could be architectures for the mechatronic system, the 
mechanical system and the E/E system. The elements of the diagram can be related to the Pars 
ontology as shown in the Table 4. 
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IEC 42010 Partes 
Stakeholder Dependent on the Pars 
System Concern Design Representation: Requirements 
Purpose Design Representation: Requirements 
System Set of Partes 
Environment Design Representation: Requirements 
Architecture Not applicable 
Architecture Description Design Representation: Structure 
Table 4: IEC 42010 Architectural Context Blocks vs Partes 
The Pars model is effectively an Architectural Viewpoint; it is written from a requirements 
perspective, so the stakeholders are those concerned with requirements. 
The mechatronic design process shown in Figure 7, [42], could be split into two Partes. One, Pars1, 
covering the processes of Recognition of Need, Conceptual Design and Functional Specification, 
First Principle Modular Mathematical Modelling and Sensor and Actuator Selection. The other, 
Pars2, covering the processes of Detailed Modular Mathematical Modelling, Control System 
Design, Design Optimisation, Hardware-in-the-loop Simulation and Control System Design. While 
this split is essentially arbitrary, the rationale is that Pars1 covers the concept design while Pars2 
covers the detailed design. 
When considering the examples of mechanical processes, both the Pahl and Beitz process shown in 
Figure 9, [48], and the Ullman process shown in Figure 11, [38] can easily be grouped into Partes. 
The mechanical ontologies of these two books are essentially the same with the Design 
Representation variously modelled as Function Structure, Function and Sub-functions, while 
Physical Parts, B11, are modelled as Product, Component and Assembly. 
Composition Issues 
Schemes for decomposing work (requirements, design, etc) are based on the assumption that the 
separate parts can be brought back together without invalidating any of the required properties of 
the whole; this capability is referred to as composability, [192]. The assumption that the separate 
parts can be brought back together without invalidating any of the properties of the whole is not 
necessarily true and to make the assumption when it is not true is called the Fallacy of Composition. 
For the assumption to be true, the resulting behaviour due to the interactions between the parts 
needs to be completely understood and the requirements for the individual parts defined so as to 
avoid invalidating properties of the whole. It is one thing to document that this should be the case, 
it is quite another to achieve it in practice. The problem with a top-down approach being advocated 
here is that as the system is decomposed into ever more Pars, new design decisions are made and 
specific technological solutions are used. In terms of the design, if we think of a requirement 
cascaded to another Pars as specifying some minimum behaviour, then the requirement is met 
provided that the behaviour is achieved. But the design produced in the Pars may also produce 
behaviour which exceeds the minimum requirement and which, from the perspective of the 
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individual Pars, is not a problem. But if more than one Pars exceeds its requirements in this manner, 
the result of these behaviours may produce a top-level behaviour which was unanticipated and 
unwanted. Again, a technology solution will produce behaviours and have properties which were 
not necessarily part of the specification. The interaction of these with other parts of the system will 
not have been considered on the top down journey because the choices will not have been made at 
that time. The Pars approach does not solve this problem, it just inherits it as do all schemes that 
use composition. 
3.3.2 Generic Pars Process 
A process has been defined on the basis that it has to produce all the objects of the ontology and 
establish the relationships between the objects. Figure 24 shows the overall process. 
 
Figure 24: Pars Process 
After the initial Pars, the input to the GP1 activity is material cascaded from another Pars. The 
results of the GP1 activity can be material cascaded to other Pars and the creation of physical parts, 
either standard parts or custom parts. The activity diagram shows both data and control flows. 
Figure 25 shows the detail for the GP1 activity.  
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Figure 25: Produce Pars Design Process 
The Pars choice is shown with the most likely choices that have to be made, i.e. standards, 
legislation, design patterns and technology. The processing of the input material produces a new 
design representation with associated required properties the presence, or absence, of which is 
established through verification. 
Comparison with existing processes and literature 
In this section we review how the Pars process relates to the process examples mentioned in the 
literature review material. Here we are not considering how the overall product process can be split 
into Partes, but rather the detail within each Pars. 
Again using the mechatronic design process shown in Figure 7, [42], which we split into Pars1 and 
Pars2 above, the mapping of the mechatronic design processes to the Pars processes is shown in 
Table 5. 
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Table 5: Mechatronic Design Processes, [42], mapped to Pars Processes 
For the mechanical design process of Ullman, [38], Figure 12, the Conceptual Design and Product 
Development both fit with in GP2.5 Produce Design and GP2.6 Verify Design. The Document and 
communicate of Product Development corresponds to the creation of the Custom Physical Part 
Specification and/or the Standard Physical Part Specification. 
Pahl and Beitz, [48], list the steps of conceptual design and the mapping of these to Pars processes 
is shown in Table 6. The mapping for their steps of embodiment design is shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 6: Conceptual Design Steps, [48], mapped to Pars Processes 
Mechatronic Design Process Pars Pars Process
Recognition of Need
Conceptual Design and Functional Specification GP2.5 Produce Design
GP2.1 - 2.4 Choice
First Principle Modular Mathematical Modelling GP2.5 Produce Design
Sensor and Actuator  Selection GP2.1 - 2.4 Choice
Detailed Modular Mathematical Modelling GP2.5 Produce Design
Control System Design GP2.5 Produce Design
GP2.1 - 2.4 Choice
Design Optimisation GP2.5 Produce Design
Hardware-in-the-loop Simulation G2.6 Verify Design
Design Optimisation GP2.5 Produce Design
Deployment of Embedded Software Custom Physical Part Specification
Life Cycle Optimisation
Pars1
Pars2
Pahl and Beitz Figure 6.1. Steps of conceptual design Pars  Process and Documents
Requirements List Pars Specification In
Abstract to identify the essential problem GP2.5 Produce Design
GP2.6 Analyse Design
Establish function structures – Overall function, sub-functions GP2.5 Produce Design (architecture)
Search for working principles GP2.3 Choose Design Patterns
GP2.4 Choose Technologies
Combine working principles into working structures GP2.5 Produce Design
Select suitable combinations GP2.5 Produce Design
Firm up into principle solution variants GP2.5 Produce Design
Evaluate variants against technical and economic criteria GP2.7 Verify Design
Principle solution (Concept) Pars Specification out
87 
 
 
Table 7: Embodiment Design Steps, [48], mapped to Pars Process 
3.3.3 Generic Pars Design Argument 
As the design model is now based on a division of the work into Partes, it follows that the argument 
also has to be based on a division into Partes. As we have defined a design model the arguments 
based on this will also be a design argument. We explain in the next section why the same approach 
can also serve as a safety argument. 
Our intention is to base the design argument on the Pars ontology. A simplistic approach would be 
to frame claims in terms of the ontological blocks and their inter-relationships, but comparisons 
with other argument patterns, e.g. MISRA, show that this is not a useful approach. Instead, we chose 
to approach the problem in a more abstract way by thinking about the structure of the argument for 
each Pars along the lines shown in in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26: Simplistic Pars Argument 
To illustrate how an overall argument may be constructed from an argument split into Pars, if a 
mechatronic system was viewed as being designed in the following Partes: mechatronic concept 
design, mechatronic system design, mechanical system design, E/E system design, hardware design 
and software design, there would be an instance of the ontology and of the argument pattern for 
Pahl and Beitz Figure Figure 7.1 Steps of embodiment design Pars Process and Documents
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each Pars. The argument patterns could link together via contexts referencing common design 
material as indicated in Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27: Indicative example of a design argument constructed from Partes  
These ideas have been developed and the final pattern, which argues over each design artefact, is 
shown in Figure 28. 
Our approach to producing a pattern for a Pars design argument is to base it on the ontology model. 
The blocks B1 and B2 are generalisations of the Design Representation and are instantiated as 
design artefacts. The form these instantiations take will depend on the design process that is being 
performed in the particular Pars and the standards to which the design process is compliant. The 
block B9 is instantiated as physical realisation artefacts. The form the instantiations take will 
depend on the nature of the artefact being realised, i.e. hardware, software, mechanical. 
Both the design and physical realisation artefacts have properties that they are required to achieve 
or display. The properties of the design artefacts can be taken from the standards to which the 
design process is compliant or from what is considered to be best practice as documented in papers 
and books. For example, in the application of the generic argument pattern to an E/E system, we 
take the properties from ISO 26262. The properties of the physical realisation artefacts can be taken 
from the applicable product standards and will always include compliance with functional 
requirements.  
The argument pattern uses claims that the design and physical realisation artefacts have been 
produced in accordance with the process and that the properties required of the artefacts have been 
achieved. 
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Figure 28: Pars Design Argument Pattern 
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The argument pattern also uses two claims about the material that is cascaded from one Pars to 
another. One claim concerns the material on which the design and physical realisation artefacts 
created in the Pars are based, represented by B1: Pars Design Description. The other claim 
concerns the material that is cascaded to other Partes, represented by B6: Aspect Cascaded to other 
Partes. With the exception of the initial Pars, which is discussed in section 3.4.1, the instantiations 
of B1: Pars Design Description consist of material cascaded from other Partes. If the same 
organisation is responsible for one Pars and also for the Pars that material is cascaded to, then the 
development of the claim will be based on document control within a single organisation. If the 
material is cascaded between organisations, then the development of the claim will be based on the 
correct receipt of up-to-date material. 
The generic argument pattern can be described as follows. There is a top claim that all the design 
and realisation artefacts achieve their required properties. This is developed with the following 
sub-claims: 
 The material that the design and realisation artefacts are based on is complete and correct 
 Each design artefact has been defined in compliance with the chosen design process and 
standards and has achieved all its properties 
 Each realisation artefact has been produced in compliance with the chosen production 
process and standards and has achieved all its properties 
 All updated information required by other Pars has been correctly and completely cascaded 
to, and received by, them 
3.3.4 Generic Pars Safety Argument 
A pattern for a design argument was described above; an aspect of the design argument will be a 
safety argument. This follows because the design argument includes claiming that there is a 
complete and correct set of requirements and that the corresponding design implements them. The 
safety argument aspect of this includes claims that there is a complete and correct set of safety 
requirements which have been correctly implemented. Properties necessary to assure safety are a 
subset of the general design properties. 
A typical top level safety claim is of the form “The system is acceptably safe to operate”, [185]. 
The development of this claim typically entails sub-claims concerning: 
 The determination of the risk 
 The mitigation of the risk such that the system is acceptably safety 
 The justification that the risk determination and mitigation have been achieved with 
sufficient confidence 
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In the Pars approach, risk is a property of the system and it is determined by a hazard analysis and 
risk assessment process that falls under the scope of B5: Verification in the ontology. The definition 
of acceptable safety will be based on a standard or regulation as part of B3: Pars Design Choice. 
Risk mitigation is achieved through the development and cascading of the design representations, 
B1: Pars Design Description, B2: Pars Design, B6: Aspect Cascaded to other Partes and 
B7: Aspect Realized in current Pars. Confidence in risk determination and mitigation processes is 
achieved by compliance with a standard or regulation, chosen as part of B3: Pars Design Choice. 
Compliance is viewed as a property of the design, B4: Property, and its assessment process falls 
under the scope of B5: Verification. 
3.4 Application to an E/E System 
We now apply the generic model described above to the safety argument for an E/E system. In the 
following chapter this will be developed in the safety argument for a mechatronic system. We take 
the description of an E/E system from the ISO 26262 standard as it is the safety argument required 
by this standard that we will extend to a mechatronic system. We follow the ISO 26262 standard 
quite strictly. Figure 29 shows the relationship between the design and safety documentation used 
by ISO 26262. 
 
Figure 29: ISO 26262 Design & Safety Documentation 
The figure also shows have we have split the documentation into the following Partes: 
 Pars 1 Item Definition and the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment 
 Pars 2 Functional Safety Concept 
 Pars 3 System Design including the Technical Safety Concept 
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In representing the ISO 26262 standard in this way we are trying to add more formality to a 
document that was not created using a formalism. Our formulisations highlight some issues with 
the standard. A pragmatic approach has been taken to addressing these. The results of the design 
process used in the ontology and argument structure do not take account of the sequence in which 
they are created. Both the ontology and the argument are presented as they are at the completion of 
all the work. In practice, the design does proceed as a sequence of tasks and the result undergoes 
changes as the design process iterates around tasks. 
A numbering convention is used for the symbols in the ontology diagrams (PxBy) and argument 
diagrams (PxGy); Px is the number of the Pars (P1 – P5), By is the number of the block from the 
generic ontology and Gy is the identifier for the GSN goal which are numbered sequentially starting 
with 1 for each individual Pars. 
3.4.1 Pars 1 Item Definition and the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment 
The Pars 1 Item Definition and the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment diagram is shown in 
Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30: Pars 1 Item Definition and HARA - Pars Design Description and Pars Design 
Design 
The starting point of a system development is always difficult to model as there is no higher 
reference point against which it can be verified and as such is outside of any Pars. Here we model 
the primary input to the whole design process as the Initial System Description. In ISO 26262 terms 
in consists of “product idea, a project sketch, relevant patents, the results of pre-trials, the 
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documentation from predecessor items, relevant information on other independent items”. We have 
instantiated the B1: Pars Design Description as P1B1: Item Definition, but one could argue that it 
would be equally valid for PAB1: Item Definition to be an instantiation of B2: Pars Design. The 
Item Definition would document the decision to base the system development on ISO 26262 and 
this decision is an instance of B3: Pars Design Choice. The decision is effectively cascaded to the 
other Partes by the assignment of ASIL values to the requirements. 
The B2: Pars Design is instantiated as P1B2: HARA Documentation and it is composed of 
P1B2: Hazardous Events and P1B2: Safety Goals. P1B2: Hazardous Events is composed of 
P1B2: Hazards and P1B3: Operational Situations; the latter is also an instance of B3: Pars Design 
Choice. 
It is acknowledged that although hazards are primarily identified in this Pars, it is possible for 
hazards to be identified in Pars 3 System Design and Pars 4 Hardware Design. This is not explicitly 
included in the model; any such hazards identified should be communicated to this Pars and 
included in P1B2: Hazards. The safety arguments for Pars 3 and Pars 4 do acknowledge this but 
not Pars 5 Software Design, as the effects of software errors can only be interpreted as hazards 
when their effects are understood in terms of the physical interface with the environment.  
The B2: Pars Design is instantiated as P1B2: HARA Documentation and it is composed of the set 
of documentation required by ISO 26262, namely P1B2: Hazardous Events and P1B2: Safety 
Goals. Each Hazardous Event has a value of ASIL assigned to it using the ISO 26262 risk 
assessment scheme. For the hazardous event, the ASIL value indicates the risk associated with it 
given that no mitigation takes place. Each hazardous event has to have one or more safety goals 
associated with it. The safety goal also has an ASIL value assigned to it which corresponds to the 
highest value of that of its associated hazardous events. For the safety goal, the ASIL value indicates 
the integrity with which safety requirements have to be met. 
It is P1B2: Safety Goals that is cascaded to the Functional Safety Pars and as such represents an 
instance of B6: Aspect Cascaded to other Partes. 
Physical Realisation 
This Pars does not include any physical realisation. 
Design Properties 
The design properties of P1B2: Hazardous Events required by ISO 26262 are that they are: 
 compliant with the Item Definition 
 complete with regard to Operational Situations and Hazards 
 consistent with related Hazard Analyses and Risk Assessments 
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 consistent regarding the assignment of ASIL values to Hazardous Events 
These properties are established by the use of analysis and review techniques given in the standard. 
The design properties of P1B2: Safety Goals required by ISO 26262 are that they  
 completely cover all of the Hazardous Events  
This property is established by the use of review techniques given in the standard. 
Safety Argument 
An instantiation of the generic argument for Pars 1 is shown in Figure 31 
 
Figure 31: Item Definition and the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment Safety Argument 
The generic claim GG2: Pars Design Description is not instantiated as we take the MISRA 
approach whereby this claim is argued as part of P1G4: Hazardous Event ISO 26262 Compliance; 
see the discussion below. 
The argument is structured around the HARA Documentation; a claim is made for both the 
Hazardous Events and the Safety Goals that they meet all their ISO 26262 requirements. Each of 
these has two sub-claims; one that it has been created in accordance with the requirements of 
ISO 26262 and the other that it achieves all the properties required by ISO 26262. To substantiate 
the first of these, further claims and supporting evidence will be based on compliance with the 
requirements of ISO 26262. In terms of the MISRA framework these are means claims. 
To substantiate the second of these, further claims and supporting evidence will be based on the use 
of verification techniques such as review and analysis. The claims will be that the required 
properties have been demonstrated and that the correct techniques have been used. The former 
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correspond closely to the MISRA framework rationale claims. The latter will again be based on the 
compliance with the requirements of ISO 26262 and correspond to the MISRA framework means 
claims. 
The claim, P1G8, relates to cascading information to other Partes. To substantiate this, further 
claims and supporting evidence will be based on how the information has been correctly passed 
from one organisation to another. 
Comparison with MISRA Safety Argument Framework 
The MISRA ISO 26262 framework is not based on the Pars approach and so it is instructive to see 
how the two sets of claims align. 
As we saw in section 2.4, MISRA categorises claims into the four themes of rationale, satisfaction, 
means and environment. While this categorisation of claim types is not explicit in the Pars 
approach, this categorisation can be applied to the claims in its safety argument. 
ISO 26262 does not require that Item Definition be correct and complete and therefore there are no 
claims related to this. As described above, supporting such a claim is difficult as there is no higher 
authority to appeal to. The MISRA framework addresses this by having a single argument for both 
the Item Definition and the Hazardous Events. It has a large argument pattern based on the following 
key claims: 
 Hazard identification has been based on a complete and correct Item Definition 
 All Hazards associated with information in the Item Definition have been identified 
 All relevant combinations of Hazards and Operational Situations have been identified 
 All identified Hazardous Events have been correctly classified 
These claims are supported by a number of rationale and means claims. For all but the first of the 
key claims the rationale claims correspond to the P1G3: Hazardous Event Properties claim and 
the means claims correspond to the P1G4: Hazardous Event ISO 26262 Compliance claim. 
MISRA has two claims for the safety goals: 
 Achieving yields the absence of unreasonable risk associated with Hazardous Events 
 The vehicle behaviour satisfies safety goals 
The first claim is a rationale claim which corresponds to the P1G6: Safety Goal Properties claim. 
It also has associated means claims which correspond to P1G7: Safety Goal ISO 26262 Compliance 
claim. The second claim is not included in this Pars but is included in the System Design Pars. 
All of the claims need further development and ultimately evidence. There are many ways in which 
a claim can be developed; the appropriate way depends on the nature of the system and so it is not 
useful to develop the generic pattern further. The MISRA approach to this is to have a table of 
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Typical Topics which list some of the possible ways the argument could be further developed 
together with the evidence that they should provide. This approach could be applied here. 
3.4.2 Pars 2 Functional Safety Concept 
The Pars 2 Functional Safety Concept diagram is shown in Figure 32 
 
 
Figure 32: Pars 2 Functional Safety Concept - Pars Design Description and Pars Design 
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The B1: Pars Design Description is instantiated as P2B1: Functional Safety Concept Description 
and it consists of the design material cascaded from Pars 1, namely P1B2: Safety Goals. 
The B2: Pars Design is instantiated as P2B2: Functional Safety Concept Documentation and it is 
composed of P2B2: System Architecture, P2B2: System Architectural Element, P2B2: Functional 
Safety Requirements and P2B2: External Measures. 
The Preliminary Architecture Assumptions of ISO 26262 have been replaced with the System 
Architecture, P2B2: System Architecture, which is seen as being a design choice and so also an 
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has to be kept up to date because it is so central to producing a design that mitigates the assessed 
risk.  
The Functional Safety Requirements, P2B2: Functional Safety Requirements, are allocated to 
elements of the system architecture, P2B2: System Architectural Element, and may also be allocated 
to External Measures, P2B2: External Measures. External Measures may be other E/E systems or 
non-E/E systems and are not considered to be part of the Item. Each requirement of the P2B2 
Functional Safety Requirements will have a value of ASIL associated with it. The source of the 
value is that of the Safety Goal from which it is derived, either directly or as a result of ASIL 
decomposition. Functional Safety Requirements allocated to External Measures do not have an 
associated ASIL value unless the External Measure is another E/E system. 
The P2B2: Functional Safety Concept Documentation also includes P2B2: Functional Safety 
Concept. The Functional Safety Concept is a work product of ISO 26262, however the definition 
given in the standard requires some interpretation. The formal definition in part 1 defines it as the 
“specification of the functional safety requirements, with associated information, their allocation 
to architectural elements, and their interaction necessary to achieve the safety goals”. In part 3 the 
architectural elements of the definition are referred as preliminary architectural elements of the 
item and these are an input from an external source which is referred to as preliminary architectural 
assumptions. The Functional Safety Concept could be seen as referring to the Functional Safety 
Requirements and their allocation to both elements of the assumed Preliminary Architecture and 
also to the External Measures. The use of the term concept implies an idea or rationale and so we 
take the Functional Safety Concept to also include the rationale as to why the functional safety 
requirements allocated to E/E system architectural elements and to the External Measures achieve 
the Safety Goals. In doing this, we are picking up on the phrase “their interaction” in the formal 
definition. A similar approach has been taken by MISRA. 
It is P2B2: Functional Safety Concept that is cascaded to the System Design Pars and as such 
represents an instance of B6: Aspect Cascaded to other Partes. 
Physical Realisation 
This Pars does not include any physical realisation. 
Design Properties 
ISO 26262 only requires design properties of P2B2: Functional Safety Concept; these are that it is: 
 compliant and consistent with the Safety Goals 
 is able to mitigate or avoid the Hazardous Events 
 compliant with the rules of ASIL decomposition 
These properties are established by the use of analysis and review techniques given in the standard. 
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Safety Argument 
The safety argument for the System Design Pars is shown in Figure 33. 
 
Figure 33: Functional Safety Concept Pars Safety Argument 
The argument is structured around the Functional Safety Concept for which the claim, P2G1, is 
made that it meets all its ISO 26262 requirements. The P2G2: Pars Design Description Claim is a 
claim made on information cascaded from Pars 1 Item Definition and the Hazard Analysis and Risk 
Assessment. If the Pars 1 work is conducted by the same team as the Pars 2 work, then the claim is 
the same as the P1G3: Safety Goals claim. If this is not the case, then the claim is developed by 
arguing that the information has been correctly passed from one organisation to another. 
The Functional Safety Concept has two sub-claims; one that it has been created in accordance with 
the requirements of ISO 26262 and the other that it achieves all the properties required by ISO 
26262. To substantiate the first of these, further claims and supporting evidence will be based on 
compliance with the requirements of ISO 26262. In terms of the MISRA framework these are means 
claims. 
To substantiate the second of these, further claims and supporting evidence will be based on the use 
of verification techniques such as review and analysis. The claims will be that the required 
properties have been demonstrated and that the correct techniques have been used. The former 
correspond closely to the MISRA framework rationale claims. The latter will again be based on the 
compliance with the requirements of ISO 26262 and correspond to the MISRA framework means 
claims. 
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The claim, P2G6, relates to cascading information to other Partes. To substantiate this, further 
claims and supporting evidence will be based on how the information has been correctly passed 
from one organisation to another. This cascading is within this E/E system, so the External 
Measures, which are a part of the Functional Safety Concept, are not included in the overall safety 
argument. This is a point that will be picked up in the next chapter. 
Comparison with MISRA Safety Argument Framework 
MISRA has two claims for the Functional Safety Requirements: 
 Satisfying the Functional Safety Requirements yields the achievement of Safety Goals 
 The vehicle behaviour satisfies Functional Safety Requirements 
The first claim is a rationale claim which effectively corresponds to the P2G4: Functional Safety 
Concept Properties claim. It also has associated means claims which correspond to P2G5: 
Functional Safety Concept ISO 26262 Compliance claim. The second claim is not included in this 
Pars but is included in the System Design Pars. 
3.4.3 Pars 3 System Design including the Technical Safety Concept 
The Pars Software Design diagram is shown in Figure 34. 
 
Figure 34: Pars 3 Technical Safety Concept - Design Description, Design & Realisation 
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Concept is composed of the system architecture, the Functional Safety Requirements assigned to 
elements of the architecture, the External Measures and the rationale underpinning the safety 
concept. 
The B2: Pars Design is instantiated as P3B2: Technical Safety Concept Documentation and it is 
composed of P3B2: System Design, P3B2: System-Element, P3B2: Technical Safety Requirements, 
P3B2: Hardware-software Interface Specification and P3B2: Design target values for unmanaged 
random failures. 
The Technical Safety Requirements, P3B2: Technical Safety Requirements, are allocated to 
elements of the system design, P3B2: System-Element. The system design is a design choice and so 
also an instance of B3: Pars Design Choice. The system elements may be either hardware elements 
or software elements and interface between the two different types of element is documented in the 
interface specification, P3B2: Hardware-software Interface Specification. 
The interface specification documents the interaction between the software and the electronic 
hardware that executes it and between the software and the services provided by the hardware. The 
microprocessor executing the software has be configured to operate according to the system design, 
and the configuration is set up by the software on start-up, typically by writing values into 
microprocessor registers. Examples of microprocessor facilities to be configured include ports (as 
inputs or outputs), memory management, communication channels, timers, analogue-digital & 
digital-analogue converters, interrupts and watchdogs. Other programmable devices may also need 
to be configured in a similar manner. Where the software uses digital representations of analogue 
values in the environment, the mapping between the environment value and its representation is 
defined for both inputs and outputs. The meaning of digital and analogue inputs is defined, for 
example those that indicate the presence of faults e.g. detection of over-current, short-circuit or 
over-temperature. The response to these conditions will be specified as Technical Safety 
Requirements cascaded to the software Pars. Similarly, where values are communicated over a 
network the meaning of the digital value is defined. 
The hardware elements also have a requirement (for those implementing safety requirements 
assigned ASIL C or ASILD values) for the design to meet a failure rate target for unmanaged 
random failures: P3B2: Design target values for unmanaged random failures. This target failure 
rate is a design choice and also an instance of B3: Pars Design Choice. 
The P3B2: Technical Safety Concept Documentation also includes P3B2: Technical Safety 
Concept. Like the Functional Safety Concept, the Technical Safety Concept is also a work product 
of ISO 26262, and again the definition given in the standard requires some interpretation. The 
formal definition in part 1 defines it as the “specification of the technical safety requirements and 
their allocation to system elements for implementation by the system design”. Here we have 
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modelled it in a similar manner to the Functional Safety Concept of Pars 2, i.e. as embodying the 
Technical Safety Requirements, their allocation and the design rationale. It is P3B2: Technical 
Safety Concept that is cascaded to the Hardware Design and Software Design Partes and as such 
represents an instance of B6: Aspect Cascaded to other Partes. 
Physical Realisation 
The System Design is implemented by hardware and software elements realised in the Hardware 
Design Pars and the Software Design Pars. The realised System Design is represented by P3B9: 
Physically Realised System and is composed of P4B9: Hardware Assembly and P5B9: Embedded 
Executable from the Hardware Design Pars and the Software Design Pars respectively. 
Design Properties 
The design properties of P3B2: Technical Safety Requirements required by ISO 26262 are that they 
are: 
 compliant and consistent with the Functional Safety Concept  
 compliant with the System Design 
 compliant with the rules of ASIL decomposition 
These properties are established by the use of review techniques listed in the standard. 
The design properties of P3B2: System Design required by ISO 26262 are that it is: 
 compliant and complete with regard to the Technical Safety Concept 
 robust against the causes of systematic failures and the effects of systematic faults 
These properties are established by the use of review, simulation, and analysis techniques listed in 
the standard. 
Physical Realisation Properties 
The properties of P3B9: Physically Realised System required by ISO 26262 is that it is: 
 compliant with Hardware-software Interface specification 
 correctly implements the Functional and Technical Safety Requirements when operating in 
the context of the electrical architecture with other controllers 
 correctly implements the Functional and Technical Safety Requirements and achieves the 
Safety Goals when operating as an Item in a vehicle in the context of the electrical 
architecture with other controllers 
Achievement of the Safety Goals at the vehicle level includes an assessment of: 
 the controllability risk parameter under failure conditions when the system is fulfilling the 
Functional and Technical Safety Requirements 
 the effectiveness of safety measures for controlling random and systematic failures 
 the effectiveness of the external measures 
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 the effectiveness of the elements of other technologies 
These properties are established by the use of test techniques listed in the standard. 
Safety Argument 
The safety argument for the System Design Pars is shown in Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35: System Design Pars Safety Argument 
The argument is structured around the System Design artefacts for which the claim, P3G1, is made 
that these meet all their ISO 26262 requirements. The P3G2: Pars Design Description Claim is a 
claim made on information cascaded from Pars 2 Functional Safety Concept. If the Pars 2 work is 
conducted by the same team as the Pars 3 work, then the claim is the same as the P2G3: Functional 
Safety Requirements claim. If this is not the case, then the claim is developed by arguing that the 
information has been correctly passed from one organisation to another. 
Each design artefact-related claim has two sub-claims, one that the design artefact has been created 
in accordance with the requirements of ISO 26262 and the other that the design artefact achieves 
all the properties required by ISO 26262. To substantiate the first of these, further claims and 
supporting evidence will be based on compliance with the requirements of ISO 26262 for the 
appropriate ASIL value, including the correct use of ASIL decomposition. In terms of the MISRA 
framework these are means claims. 
To substantiate the second of these, further claims and supporting evidence will be based on the use 
of verification techniques such as review and analysis. The claims will be that the required 
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properties have been demonstrated and that the correct techniques have been used. The former 
correspond closely to the MISRA framework rationale claims. The latter will again be based on the 
compliance with the requirements of ISO 26262 for the appropriate ASIL value and correspond to 
the MISRA framework means claims. 
The claim related to the realisation is P3G9: Physically Realised System. To substantiate this, 
further claims and supporting evidence will be based on the use of test techniques. The claims will 
be that the required properties have been demonstrated and that the correct techniques have been 
used. The former correspond closely to the MISRA framework satisfaction claims because they 
concern the relationship between the safety requirements and the corresponding product artefacts. 
The latter will again be based on the compliance with the requirements of ISO 26262 for the 
appropriate ASIL value and correspond to the MISRA framework means claims. 
The final claim, P3G10, relates to cascading information to other Partes. To substantiate this, 
further claims and supporting evidence will be based on how the information has been correctly 
passed from one organisation to another. 
The MISRA framework published for public review did not cover this or any of the remaining Pars 
in any detail so a comparison is not possible. 
3.4.4 Pars 4: Hardware Design 
The Pars Hardware Design diagram is shown in Figure 36. 
Design 
The B1: Pars Design Description is instantiated as P4B1: Hardware Design Description and it 
consists of P3B2: Technical Safety Concept cascaded from Pars 3. The Technical Safety Concept 
is composed of the system design, the Technical Safety Requirements assigned to elements of the 
system design, the Hardware-software Interface specification, the design target values for 
unmanaged random failures and the rationale underpinning the safety concept. 
The B2: Pars Design is instantiated as P4B2: Hardware Design Documentation and it is composed 
of P4B2: Hardware Safety Requirements which are allocated to P4B2: Hardware Design. 
ISO 26262 describes the hardware design as being composed of both an architecture, P4B2: 
Hardware Architecture, and a detailed design, P4B2: Hardware Detailed Design. 
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Figure 36: Pars 4 Hardware Design - Design Description, Design & Realisation 
The model also shows instances of B6: Aspect Cascaded to other Partes. P4B2: Hardware-software 
Interface Specification represents the need for the Hardware-software Interface specification to 
remain consistent with both hardware and software design which necessitates a dialogue between 
the two Partes. In our model, changes to the document are cascaded to Pars 3 System Design 
including the Technical Safety Concept.  P4B6: Hazards acknowledges that new hazards may be 
identified at any stage of the design process; they are most likely to be identified when establishing 
the properties of the design. Any hazards identified would be cascaded to Pars 1 Item Definition 
and the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment. 
Physical Realisation 
The hardware design is realised as a set of interconnected hardware parts or components, modelled 
here as P4B9: Hardware Assembly. ISO 26262 defines a hardware component, P4B9: Hardware 
Component, as being composed of two or more hardware parts and a hardware part, P4B8: 
Hardware Part, as being something which cannot be subdivided. As such, the P4B9: Hardware 
Part Description is associated with the hardware part. An ontology of typical hardware parts is 
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shown in Figure 37; this diagram models the software executable as being a part of the 
microprocessor. 
 
Figure 37: Ontology of Typical Hardware Parts 
Design Properties 
The design properties of P4B2: Hardware Safety Requirements required by ISO 26262 are that they 
are complete and consistent with regard to the Technical Safety Concept, the Technical Safety 
Requirements, the System Design and the Hardware-software interface specification. These 
properties are established by the use of review techniques listed in the standard. 
The design properties of P4B2: Hardware Design required by ISO 26262 are that it is: 
 consistent with the Technical Safety Concept and the System Design 
 complete with respect to the Technical Safety Requirements allocated to the hardware 
 compliant with the Hardware Safety Requirements 
 consistent with the relevant Software Safety Requirements 
 able to meet the P3B2: Design target values for unmanaged random failures 
These properties are established by the use of review and analysis techniques listed in the standard. 
Physical Realisation Properties 
The property of P4B9: Hardware Assembly required by ISO 26262 is that it is a complete and 
correct of implementation of the Hardware Safety Requirements. This is established by the use of 
test techniques listed in the standard. 
Safety Argument 
The safety argument for the Hardware Design Pars is shown in Figure 38. 
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Figure 38: Hardware Design Pars Safety Argument 
The argument is structured around the Hardware Design artefacts for which the claim, P4G1, is 
made that these meet all their ISO 26262 requirements. The P4G2: Pars Design Description Claim 
is a claim made on information cascaded from Pars 3 System Design including the Technical Safety 
Concept. If the Pars 3 work is conducted by the same team as the Pars 4 work, then the claim is 
the same as P3G3 and P3G6 claims. If this is not the case, then the claim is developed by arguing 
that the information has been correctly passed from one organisation to another. 
Each design artefact-related claim has two sub-claims, one that the design artefact has been created 
in accordance with the requirements of ISO 26262 and the other that the design artefact achieves 
all the properties required by ISO 26262. To substantiate the first of these, further claims and 
supporting evidence will be based on compliance with the requirements of ISO 26262 for the 
appropriate ASIL value, including the correct use of ASIL decomposition. In terms of the MISRA 
framework these are means claims. 
To substantiate the second of these, further claims and supporting evidence will be based on the use 
of verification techniques such as review and analysis. The claims will be that the required 
properties have been demonstrated and that the correct techniques have been used. The former 
correspond closely to the MISRA framework rationale claims. The latter will again be based on the 
compliance with the requirements of ISO 26262 for the appropriate ASIL value and correspond to 
the MISRA framework means claims. 
P4G1: Pars Claim
All Hardware Design 
artefacts meet their ISO 
26262 requirements
P4C1: Hardware Design 
Artefact
P4B2: Hardware Safety 
Requirements 
P4B2: Hardware Design 
P4G9: Hardware Assembly
P4G2: Pars Design 
Description Claim
The Documentation that the 
Hardware Design is based on 
is complete and correct
P4G10: Cascaded Information
All updated information required 
by other Pars has been correctly 
and completely cascaded to, and 
received by, them
P4G4: Hardware Safety 
Requirement Properties
All properties required of the 
Hardware Safety Requirements 
have been achieved.
P4C3: Hardware 
Safety Requirement 
Properties
P4G3: Hardware Safety 
Requirements
All Hardware Safety 
Requirements meet their ISO 
26262 requirements
P4C2: P4B2: 
Hardware Safety 
Requirements
P4G5: Hardtware Safety 
Requirement ISO 26262 
Compliance
All Hardware Safety 
Requirements have been defined 
in compliance with ISO 26262
P4G6: Hardware Design
The Hardware Design meets 
its ISO 26262 requirements
P4C4: P4B2: 
Hardware Design
P4G8: Hardware Design 
ISO 26262 Compliance
The Hardware Design has 
been defined in compliance 
with ISO 26262
P4G7: Hardware Design 
Properties
All properties required of the 
Hardware Design have been 
achieved.
P4C5: Hardware 
Design Properties
P4C7: Hardware 
Assembly 
Properties
P4G9: Hardware 
Assembly
Hardware Assembly meets 
its ISO 26262 requirements
P4C6: P4B9: 
Hardware 
Assembly
P4C8: Hazards
P4C9: Hardware-
software Interface 
Specification
P3C11: Technical 
Safety Concept
107 
 
 The claim related to the realisation is P4G9: Hardware Assembly. To substantiate this, further 
claims and supporting evidence will be based on the use of test techniques. The claims will be that 
the required properties have been demonstrated and that the correct techniques have been used. The 
former correspond closely to the MISRA framework satisfaction claims because they concern the 
relationship between the safety requirements and the corresponding product artefacts. The latter 
will again be based on the compliance with the requirements of ISO 26262 for the appropriate ASIL 
value and correspond to the MISRA framework means claims. 
The final claim, P4G10, relates to cascading information to other Partes. To substantiate this, 
further claims and supporting evidence will be based on how the information has been correctly 
passed from one organisation to another. 
3.4.5 Pars 5: Software Design 
The Pars Software Design diagram is shown in Figure 39. 
 
Figure 39: Pars 5 Software Design - Design Description, Design & Realisation 
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Design 
The B1: Pars Design Description is instantiated as P5B1: Software Design Description and it 
consists of P3B2: Technical Safety Concept cascaded from Pars 3. The Technical Safety Concept 
is composed of the System Design, the Technical Safety Requirements assigned to elements of the 
system design, the Hardware-software Interface specification, the design target values for 
unmanaged random failures and the rationale underpinning the safety concept. 
The B2: Pars Design is instantiated as P5B2: Software Design and it is composed of P5B2: 
Software Safety Requirements which are allocated to P5B2: Software architecture. The architecture 
is composed of P5B2: Software Components which ISO 26262 classifies as Newly Developed, 
Reused with Modifications or Reused without Modifications. Each software component is composed 
of P5B2: Software Units each of which has a P5B2: Software unit design specification which may 
take the form of a model, P5B2 Software Model, or a textual description, P5B2 Software unit 
specification. The source code, P5B2 Source Code, is either generated from the model or produced 
manually from the textual description. While the concept of a physical part description fits well 
with mechanical and electronic parts it is less obvious how to apply it in the software context. We 
have chosen to take the source code as an instance of B8: Physical Part Description. 
In practice, the complete software architecture is made up of a variety of components, e.g. 
scheduler, communications, device drivers, middleware, and application algorithms, which are 
typically written by different organisations. Including them all in a single Pars is artificial but 
consistent with ISO 26262. The wide variety of actual approaches prohibits the creation of a generic 
model. 
The model also shows instances of B3: Pars Design Choice required by ISO 26262, namely P5B3: 
Design and coding guidelines for modelling and programming languages and P5B3: Tool 
application guidelines. 
The model also shows instances of B6: Aspect Cascaded to other Partes. P5B6: Hardware-software 
Interface Specification represents the need for the Hardware-software Interface Specification to 
remain consistent with both hardware and software design which necessitates a dialogue between 
the two Partes. In our model, changes to the document are cascaded to Pars 3 System Design 
including the Technical Safety Concept.  P5B6: Hazards acknowledges that new hazards may be 
identified at any stage of the design process, they are most likely to be identified when establishing 
the properties of the design. Any hazards identified would be cascaded to Pars 1 Item Definition 
and the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment. 
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Physical Realisation 
Source for each unit is translated (compiled) to object code corresponding to the unit. The final 
executable is created by linking together many unit object code files. 
Design Properties 
The design properties of P5B2: Software Safety Requirements required by ISO 26262 are that they 
are complete and consistent with regard to the Technical Safety Concept, the Technical Safety 
Requirements, the System Design and the Hardware-software interface Specification. These 
properties are established by the use of review techniques listed in the standard. 
The design properties of P5B2: Software architecture required by ISO 26262 are that they are: 
 Compliant with the Software Safety Requirements and the Hardware-software Interface 
Specification 
 Robust against software and hardware failures (achieved by the use of safety mechanisms) 
 Compliant with the rules of ASIL decomposition 
 Compliant with the rules for freedom from interference when the architecture contains 
software components assigned different ASIL values 
 Compatible with the target hardware 
These properties are established by a combination of analysis and review techniques listed in the 
standard. 
The design properties of P5B2: Software unit design specification required by ISO 26262 are that 
each: 
 Fulfils the Software safety requirements allocated to it 
 Is compliant with the Hardware-software interface specification 
These properties are established by a combination of analysis and review techniques listed in the 
standard. 
The design properties of P5B2: Source Code required by ISO 26262 are that it is: 
 Compliant with its design specification 
 Compliant with the coding guidelines (these are an instance of B3: Pars Design Choice) 
 Compatible the target hardware 
These properties are established by a combination of analysis and review techniques listed in the 
standard. 
Physical Realisation Properties 
The properties of each P5B9: Software Unit Object Code required by ISO 26262 are that they are: 
 Compliant with the Software unit design specification 
 Compliant with the Hardware-software interface specification 
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 Achieve the specified functionality 
 Free from unintended functionality 
 Robust against internal errors 
 Execute within the resources that are available 
These properties are established by the use of various testing techniques listed in the standard. The 
tests can be performed on a host or target processor. 
The design properties for object code consisting of linked multiple instances of P5B9: Software 
Unit Object Code required by ISO 26262 are the same as for that of a single unit, except for robust 
against internal errors. Again, these properties are established by the use of various testing 
techniques listed in the standard. The tests can be performed on a host or target processor. 
The properties of P5B9: Embedded Executable required by ISO 26262 are that it satisfies its 
requirements in the target environment. This is established by the use of various testing techniques 
listed in the standard and performed in the target environment. 
Safety Argument 
The safety argument for the Software Design Pars is shown in Figure 40. 
The argument is structured around the Software Design artefacts for which the claim, P5G1, is made 
that these meet all their ISO 26262 requirements. The P5G2: Pars Design Description Claim is a 
claim made on information cascaded from Pars 3 System Design including the Technical Safety 
Concept. If the Pars 3 work is conducted by the same team as the Pars 5 work, then the claim is 
the same as P3G3 and P3G6 claims. If this is not the case, then the claim is developed by arguing 
that the information has been correctly passed from one organisation to another. 
The claims related to the design artefact, (P5G3, P5G6, P5G9, P5G12), are all based on them 
meeting their corresponding ISO 26262 requirements and their further development is shown is 
Figure 41. 
Each design artefact-related claim has two sub-claims: one that the design artefact has been created 
in accordance with the requirements of ISO 26262 and the other that the design artefact achieves 
all the properties required by ISO 26262. To substantiate the first of these, further claims and 
supporting evidence will be based on compliance with the requirements of ISO 26262 for the 
appropriate ASIL value, including the correct use of ASIL decomposition. In terms of the MISRA 
framework these are means claims. 
  
 
 
Figure 40: Software Design Pars Safety Argument 1 
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Figure 41: Software Design Pars Safety Argument 2 
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To substantiate the second of these, further claims and supporting evidence will be based on the use 
of verification techniques such as review and analysis. The claims will be that the required 
properties have been demonstrated and that the correct techniques have been used. The former 
correspond closely to the MISRA framework rationale claims. The latter will again be based on the 
compliance with the requirements of ISO 26262 for the appropriate ASIL value and correspond to 
the MISRA framework means claims. 
 The claims related to the realisation are P5G15: Object Code (Single Software Unit), 
P5G16: Object Code (Linked Software Units) and P5G17: Embedded Executable. To substantiate 
these, further claims and supporting evidence will be based on the use of test techniques. The claims 
will be that the required properties have been demonstrated and that the correct techniques have 
been used. The former correspond closely to the MISRA framework satisfaction claims because 
they concern the relationship between the safety requirements and the corresponding product 
artefacts. The latter will again be based on the compliance with the requirements of ISO 26262 for 
the appropriate ASIL value and correspond to the MISRA framework means claims. 
The final claim, P5G18, relates to cascading information to other Partes. To substantiate this, 
further claims and supporting evidence will be based on how the information has been correctly 
passed from one organisation to another. 
3.4.6 Discussion 
Although decisions may be made at one Pars about issues that are not strictly in the purview of that 
Pars, e.g. actuator selection in Pars 1, in the Pars structure their physical realisation is modelled in 
the appropriate Pars. In process terms, the work in Pars 1 is an assumption that gets confirmed in 
work done later in another Pars, but the timing of the production of the material used in the Pars is 
not represented in the ontologies or argument. 
In practice, work on nearly all the Partes starts at the same time and is performed concurrently. The 
Pars approach gives a way of showing this and making explicit the links. When starting, the 
information that has to be cascaded from another Pars will not always be available in a mature state, 
so work will be based on initial assumptions of tentative designs. This is similar to the ISO 26262 
concept of a Safety Element out of Context. 
The generic B8: Physical Part Description does not have any instances in the application to an E/E 
system. They would be part of a rationale claim supporting why a property had been achieved, i.e. 
because the part selected has a specification stating that the property is fulfilled. 
The generic B10: Related Physical Part does not have any instances in the application to an E/E 
system. This because we did not consider the fitment of the ECU to the body of the vehicle as this 
is not a topic covered by ISO 26262. 
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3.5 Conclusion/Summary 
We have presented a design model that can be used to represent the many different divisions, Partes, 
that an actual development may be split into. Using the design model as the basis, a safety argument 
pattern has been developed for a Pars which has the potential to facilitate the composition of an 
overall safety argument for the system from the arguments for each individual Pars. 
We have illustrated that the design model can be applied to an E/E system, structured according to 
ISO 26262, and how the claims of the safety argument can be related to the requirements of 
ISO 26262. In Chapter 4 we investigate if the design model is general enough to be applied to a 
mechatronic system. 
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Chapter 4 Mechatronic Safety Argument 
In Chapter 3 we described the Pars approach to partitioning the development of a system. This is 
based on a generic design ontology, process and design/safety argument pattern. We applied these 
ideas to an E/E system, based on the ISO 26262 standard, and showed how the design ontology and 
the safety argument pattern could be recast to reflect the design structure used by the standard. 
In this chapter we show how the design ontology and safety argument pattern could be recast for a 
mechatronic system. We take a mechatronic system to consist of both the mechanical system being 
controlled and the E/E system that is controlling it. The addition of the mechanical design to the 
safety argument brings questions concerning both the form of the argument and what evidence 
could be available to support the argument. These are discussed in this chapter and the issue of 
evidence is addressed fully in Chapter 6. 
In this chapter we give examples of mechatronic design artefacts which are taken from a previously 
developed 4 Corner Air Suspension System. An example of how the 4 Corner Air Suspension 
System safety argument could be represented using the Pars approach is given in Appendix C. 
4.1 Example System: 4 Corner Air Suspension 
The application of the Pars approach is illustrated by a system, Four Corner Air Suspension, 
(4CAS) that has been in production since 2004. This was chosen as it is a system well-known to the 
author. It has the classic characteristics of a mechatronic system, as described in section 2.3.1 
Mechatronic Systems, and has typical design artefacts which are available, so it provides a good 
evaluation of the ontology. While the development of the 4CAS system predates the publication of 
the ISO 26262 standard, the concepts that ISO 26262 contains, which were largely based on IEC 
61508, were applied to the development of the system. 
The 4CAS material presented is based on that which was created at the time and is representative 
of what may actually be produced, given the nature of the system. Its use here shows to what extent 
it can be reinterpreted in the new structure. Much of the material has not been changed, while some 
diagrams have been redrawn to better reflect the division into Partes. The material is used as an 
example of what the content of the engineering artefacts of the different Partes may contain. It is 
not a complete description and serves only as an illustration for the design material. All of the safety 
argument diagrams have been created as part of the application of the Pars approach in the course 
of writing this thesis. Although the development of the Pars approach has been informed by 
working with the 4CAS example, the approach itself has been developed from the material in the 
literature review and in particular the ISO 26262 standard. 
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A brief description of the 4CAS system is now presented. The purpose of the 4CAS system is to 
provide the following primary customer features: 
 Raise or lower vehicle body to predefined heights as selected by the user or dictated by vehicle 
handling constraints 
 Maintain a level body at the selected vehicle height 
It is also able to enhance vehicle performance when traversing rough terrain by allowing increased 
articulation of the front and rear wheels using a feature referred to as cross-linking. 
These features are achieved by having an air spring at each of the four corners of the vehicle and 
using compressed air to independently increase or decrease the pressure in each air spring, thereby 
affecting the body ride height and inclination (forward-backwards and side-to-side). Height sensors 
at each corner allow closed loop control of the corner heights. Figure 42 shows a high-level Block 
Definition Diagram for 4CAS. 
 
Figure 42: 4CAS High Level Block Diagram 
The Vehicle Body is raised or lowered relative to the Vehicle Chassis. Lowering the vehicle makes 
ingress and egress easier for a vehicle that would otherwise be higher than a saloon vehicle. A high 
body position is advantageous for driver visibility, but when driving quickly a lower position 
reduces wind resistance and so improves fuel economy. When travelling off-road, a higher-than-
usual body height gives more ground clearance which makes it possible to traverse uneven ground. 
In a passive suspension system the flatness of the body, with respect to the chassis, depends on the 
weight distribution within the vehicle. The 4CAS is able to maintain a flat body whatever the weight 
distribution. If the body is lowered to rest on the chassis, the ride comfort is directly dependent 
upon the road surface, i.e. very uncomfortable. 
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The Pneumatic System is controlled by the 4CAS ECU via an Electromechanical Interface, e.g. air 
compressor, valves. The 4CAS ECU consists of electronic hardware for reading inputs and driving 
the Electromechanical Interface, and a microprocessor executing software that controls the 
Pneumatic System so as to achieve the customer features. The User Interface allows the user to 
select ride heights via switches within the cabin and also via the smart key. The User Interface is 
provided by other vehicle systems and the user’s requests are communicated over a network to the 
4CAS ECU. If the vehicle starts to travel too fast at the off-road height, then the system will lower 
the ride height without a request from the driver. 
4.2 Application of Pars Approach to a Mechatronic System 
In the last chapter we partitioned the E/E system into five Partes. Here we define a set of seven 
Partes for a mechatronic system most of which are reused, sometimes with modification, from the 
E/E system Partes. In practice, the Partes covering the design would normally have further 
subdivisions, but we have restricted ourselves to these seven Partes so that the volume of 
documentation describing them is manageable. The seven Partes are: 
 Pars 1 Mechatronic Item Definition and the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment 
 Pars 2 Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept 
 Pars 3 Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept 
 Pars 4 E/E Technical Safety Concept 
 Pars 5 Hardware Design 
 Pars 6 Software Design 
 Pars 7 Mechanical Design 
A revised version of Figure 29 showing the new relationship between the design and safety 
documentation for a mechatronic system is shown in Figure 43. 
The Item Definition now explicitly includes the mechanical aspects, although in practice this is not 
much of a change from current practice as this document has always had to contain sufficient 
information about the plant being controlled to allow the hazard analysis to be performed. 
Consequently, the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment is the same for the mechatronic system as 
it was for the E/E system. Similarly, renaming the Safety Goals to Mechatronic Safety Goals is not 
a substantive change.
  
 
 
Figure 43: Mechatronic System Design & Safety Documentation 
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On the design side, the Preliminary Architecture Assumptions are replaced by the mechatronic 
system Architecture which is made up of both the E/E system Architecture Assumptions and the 
Mechanical Preliminary Architecture. The use of the words Preliminary and Assumptions allows 
for the fact that the initial stages of the safety process may be performed before the details of the 
design are decided. In the experience of the author, the design is usually quite mature and the main 
design decisions made when the initial stages of the safety process are performed. The Functional 
Safety Concept becomes the Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept with the main change being 
that any mechanical aspects related to the plant being controlled are now included in the concept 
rather than being referred to as External Measures achieved by Other Technologies. The definition 
of the Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept is still intended to be as far as possible independent 
of the details of the mechanical and E/E system design. The Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept 
is where the Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept gets mapped to the actual design and technical 
safety requirements are placed on the mechanical design and the E/E system design. The 
relationships between the requirements placed on the mechanical and E/E system design necessary 
to achieve the Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept are documented in the Mechanical-E/E 
System interface. From this point on, the development of the E/E system is unchanged. 
Note: the use of the terms in the diagram are not intended to prescribe a particular set of 
documentation; rather they are used to communicate an idea. In practice, the information contained 
in these will be embedded in the document structure and supporting tools used by the organisation. 
4.2.1 Pars 1 Mechatronic Item Definition and the HARA 
The Pars 1 mechatronic Item Definition and the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment diagram is 
shown in Figure 44.  
Although it has similarity with the equivalent one for an E/E system, its scope is now that of the 
complete mechatronic system. As discussed above, the Initial System Description now explicitly 
contains any relevant information concerning the mechanical design while the renaming of some 
of the blocks does not substantively change the content. The E/E system example acknowledged 
that hazards may also be identified in System Design and Hardware Design Partes; in the 
Mechatronic System example hazards may also be identified in the Mechanical Design Pars. 
4CAS Example 
The Initial System Description largely consists of the material presented in section 4.1. The P1B1: 
Mechatronic Item Definition lists the formal requirements, Table 8, which are modelled in a number 
of SysML Use Case diagrams which indicate the inputs necessary to achieve the required 
behaviour, see example in Figure 45, Figure 46 and Figure 47. 
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Figure 44: Pars 1 Mechatronic Item Definition HARA - Design Description and Design 
 
Id Requirement 
NBSafReq_1 The Four Corner Air Suspension system shall control the quantity of air in the air springs at all four 
corners of the vehicle. 
NBSafReq_2 The quantity of air in the air springs at all four corners of the vehicle shall be delivered in response 
to the height measured at the four corners using sensors. 
NBSafReq_3 The Four Corner Air Suspension system shall maintain the target ride height under all rated vehicle 
operating conditions 
NBSafReq_4 While the ignition is off, the system shall wake itself periodically to perform restricted levelling, also 
known as periodic levelling. 
NBSafReq_5 The time intervals for the periodic levelling should be long enough to allow the system to cope with 
the length of time needed to identify considerable differences in corner heights. 
NBSafReq_6 Vehicle height changes and corrections shall be restricted when any of the vehicle doors are open. 
 
NBSafReq_7 The Four Corner Air Suspension system shall have selectable ride heights for different operating 
conditions. 
NBSafReq_8 The driver shall be allowed to select one of the available ride heights by lowering or raising the air 
suspension using the in-car controls provided 
NBSafReq_9 The driver controls may include for some vehicles a remote control 
NBSafReq_10 The Terrain Response module may request height changes via the vehicle communications network. 
NBSafReq_11 The 4CAS system will include different modes to inhibit some functionality during special 
procedures such as transportation and maintenance. 
NBSafReq_12 The system shall detect conditions which imply loss of traction; therefore the system shall increase 
the quantity of air in the affected spring(s) to regain traction. 
NBSafReq_13 The system shall detect conditions which imply the vehicle is lifting against an obstacle; therefore 
the system shall decrease the vehicle height or at least disallow raising the vehicle. 
NBSafReq_14 Additional information about the air suspension system shall be displayed in the message centre 
NBSafReq_15 The air suspension system shall be connected to the vehicle communications network. 
NBSafReq_16 The air suspension system shall share some of its input and output signals with other vehicle systems 
using the vehicle communications network. 
Table 8: 4CAS Item Definition Requirements 
P1B1: Mechatronic Item 
Definition
P1B2: Mechatronic HARA 
Documentation
P1B2: Hazards
P1B2: Hazardous Events
P1B2: Mechatronic Safety 
Goals
P1B3: Operational 
Situation
Initial Mechatronic 
System Description
1..* 1..*
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Figure 45: 4CAS Top Use Diagram 
 
Figure 46: 4CAS Maintain Ride Height Use Case Diagram 
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Figure 47: 4CAS Change Target Ride Height Use Case Diagram 
Following the hazard analysis and risk assessment, a number of Mechatronic Safety Goals were 
defined, and examples are shown in Table 9. 
Safety Goal 1 The vehicle occupants and other road users shall not be exposed to an unacceptable risk due to reduced resistance 
to roll over. (ASIL C) 
Safety Goal 2 The vehicle users, and other road users, shall not be exposed to unacceptable risk due to gross height or pressure 
errors at the 4 corners. (ASIL B) 
Safety Goal 3 People around the vehicle shall not be exposed to unacceptable risk due to the vehicle changing height. (ASIL QM) 
Table 9: Example 4CAS Mechatronic Safety Goals 
The instantiation of the argument pattern is shown in Figure 48. The pattern has not changed from 
the E/E system instantiation, the references to ISO 26262 have been retained as its hazard analysis 
and risk assessment process was always applicable to a mechatronic system. There has been some 
rewording to reflect the change of scope to a mechatronic system. 
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Figure 48: Pars 1 Mechatronic Item Definition and the HARA Safety Argument 
4.2.2 Pars 2 Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept 
The Pars 2 Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept diagram is shown in Figure 49.  
Although the structure closely resembles that of the equivalent one for an E/E system with the blocks 
renamed, the content now reflects a complete mechatronic system design. 
 
Figure 49: Pars 2 Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept - Design Description and Design 
P1G1: Pars Claim
The Mechatronic HARA 
Documentation meets its 
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P1C2: P2B2: 
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P1G5: Mechatronic Safety 
Goals
All Mechatronic Safety 
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P1C4: 
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Safety Goals
P1C5: Mechatronic 
Safety Goal 
Properties 
P1G8: Cascaded Information
All updated information required 
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and completely cascaded to, and 
received by, them
P1G3: Hazardous Event 
Properties
All properties required of the 
Hazardous Events have 
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P1G4: Hazardous Event ISO 
26262 Compliance
All Hazardous Events have 
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with ISO 26262
P1G6: Mechatronic Safety 
Goal Properties
All properties required of the 
Mechatronic Safety Goal have 
been achieved.
P1G7: Mechatronic Safety 
Goal ISO 26262 Compliance
All Mechatronic Safety Goals 
have been defined in compliance 
with ISO 26262
P1C4: 
Mechatronic 
Safety Goals
P2B2: Mechatronic Functional 
Safety Concept
Documentation
P1B2: Mechatronic Safety 
Goals
P2B2: Mechatronic 
System Architecture
P2B2: Mechatronic 
Functional Safety 
Requirements
P2B2: Mechatronic 
System Architectural 
Element
P2B2: Mechatronic 
Functional Safety 
Concept
P2B2: External Measures
Other Technologies
E/E Technologies
P2B2: E/E System
Architecture
P2B2: Mechanical
Architecture
P2B1: Mechatronic Functional 
Safety Concept
Description
1..*
1..* 1..* 0..*1..*
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One change is that the Mechatronic System Architecture has to take account of both the E/E system 
and the mechatronic system shown here as P2B2: E/E System Architecture and P2B2: Mechanical 
Architecture respectively. 
Another change is that for the E/E system the mechanical aspects were part of External Measures, 
whereas they are now part of the Mechatronic System Architecture. But the fact that Functional 
Safety Requirements are placed on mechanical elements of the design has not changed.  
This does affect the design properties. The Functional Safety Requirements assigned to the E/E 
elements of the architecture also have an associated value of ASIL; this leads to design property 
compliant with the rules of ASIL decomposition. There ought to be something equivalent to this for 
the Functional Safety Requirements placed on the mechanical elements of the architecture, but this 
cannot be by means of an ASIL value. Here we note the problem and then address it in Chapter 6. 
The External Measures are still included, as there may be other mechanical or E/E system measures 
that are outside the scope of the Item that are included in the Mechatronic Functional Safety 
Concept. 
It is P2B2: Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept that is cascaded to the Pars 3, Mechatronic 
Technical Safety Concept, and as such represents an instance of B6: Aspect Cascaded to other 
Partes. 
4CAS Example 
The 4CAS E/E System Architecture are shown in Figure 50. 
 
Figure 50: 4CAS E/E System Architecture Assumptions 
 
The 4CAS Mechanical Architecture is shown in Figure 51 
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Figure 51:4CAS Mechanical Architecture 
 
The operation of the 4CAS system was further defined by creating SysML Activity Diagrams to the 
required behaviour for the previously defined Use Cases, for example see Figure 52and Figure 53. 
 
Figure 52: Activity Diagram for Maintain Ride Height Use Case 
 
To develop the Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept, potential causes of failures of the activity 
diagrams were analysed and fault management requirements were derived to manage these 
failures such that the Mechatronic Safety Goals are not violated. These were expressed as a 
further set of Activity Diagrams, see example in Figure 54, Figure 55 and Figure 56. 
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Figure 53: Activity Diagram for Change Target Ride Height 
 
 
Figure 54: Fault Management Activity Diagram for Height Control Fault 
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Figure 55: Fault Management Activity Diagram for Vehicle Speed or DSC Fault 
 
Figure 56: Fault Management Activity Diagram for Height or Pressure Fault 
 
The instantiation of the argument pattern is shown in Figure 57. The pattern has not changed from 
the E/E system instantiation; there has been some rewording to reflect the change of scope to a 
mechatronic system. 
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Figure 57: Pars 2 Mechatronic Functional Safety Argument 
4.2.3 Pars 3 Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept 
The Pars 3 Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept diagram is shown in Figure 58. This is a new 
Pars and is necessary to explicitly address the design of a mechatronic system which now explicitly 
includes mechanical elements. 
 
Figure 58: Pars 3 Mechatronic TSC - Design Description, Design & Realisation 
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Design 
The B1: Pars Design Description is instantiated as P3B1: Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept 
Description and consists of P2B2: Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept cascaded from Pars 2. 
The Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept is composed of the mechatronic system architecture, 
the Mechatronic Functional Safety Requirements assigned to elements of the architecture, the 
External Measures and the rationale underpinning the safety concept. 
The B2: Pars Design is instantiated as P3B2: Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept 
Documentation and it is composed of P3B2: Mechatronic System Design, P3B2: Mechatronic 
System-Element, P3B2: Mechatronic Technical Safety Requirements and P3B2: Mechanical-E/E 
System Interface Specification. 
The Mechatronic Technical Safety Requirements, P3B2: Mechatronic Technical Safety 
Requirements, are allocated to elements of the system design, P3B2: Mechatronic System-Element. 
The mechatronic system design is a design choice and so also an instance of B3: Pars Design 
Choice. The system elements may be either E/E system elements or mechatronic system elements. 
The E/E system elements have integrity requirements associated with them in the form of an ASIL 
value.  The meaning of the ASIL is delineated through the ISO 26262 standard, as the standard does 
not apply to mechanical elements of the design; the assignment of an ASIL value to a mechanical 
element has no meaning and is deprecated by ISO 26262. However, the concept of desired integrity, 
given the risk associated with failure, is still a valid concept for the mechanical elements. This issue 
is discussed further in chapter 6. 
The interface between the two different types of element is documented in the interface 
specification, P3B2: Mechanical-E/E System Interface Specification. The interface specification 
documents the interface between the E/E system and the mechanical system. This mediated by 
electromechanical actuators and sensing elements. The mechatronic design has to take into account 
mechanical, hardware and software factors. For example, when considering the design of the 
actuators, there will be mechanical considerations of size needed to achieve the desired effect; these 
will have implications for the electronic drive circuitry in terms of voltage, current and power 
dissipation and also on the software in terms of response times required. 
Following the approach that was used in the E/E system example, the Mechatronic Technical Safety 
Concept embodies the Mechatronic Technical Safety Requirements assigned to E/E system or 
mechanical system elements, their allocation and the design rationale. It is P3B2: Mechatronic 
Technical Safety Concept that is cascaded to the E/E System Technical Safety Concept and 
Mechanical Design Partes and as such represents an instance of B6: Aspect Cascaded to other 
Partes. 
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Physical Realisation 
The System Design is implemented by E/E system elements and mechanical system elements 
realised in the E/E System Technical Safety Concept Pars and the Mechanical Design Pars. The 
realised Mechatronic System Design is represented by P3B9: Physically Realised Mechatronic 
System and is composed of P4B9: Physically Realised E/E System and P7B9: Mechanical Assembly 
from the E/E System Technical Safety Concept Pars and the Mechanical Design Pars respectively. 
Design Properties 
In the E/E system example we were able to take the required properties from the ISO 26262 
standard. While there is not an equivalent standard for mechatronic systems, we can reasonably 
reapply some of the ISO 26262 properties to the Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept. 
The design properties required of P3B2: Mechatronic Technical Safety Requirements could 
reasonably be stated as: 
 compliant and consistent with the Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept  
 compliant with the Mechatronic System Design 
 compliant with the rules of ASIL decomposition for P3B2: E/E System-Element 
These properties could be established by the use of review techniques in a similar way as for the 
E/E system. We have the recurrent problem of how to handle the integrity value for the P3B2: 
Mechanical System-Element given that it cannot be assigned an ASIL value. 
The design properties required of P3B2: Mechatronic System could reasonably be stated as: 
 compliant and complete with regard to the Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept 
 robust against the causes of systematic failures and the effects of systematic faults 
These properties could be established by the use of review, simulation and analysis techniques in 
as similar way as for the E/E system. 
Physical Realisation Properties 
Again, we can reasonably reapply some of the ISO 26262 properties to the Mechatronic Technical 
Safety Concept. 
The properties design properties of P3B9: Physically Realised Mechatronic System could 
reasonably be stated as: 
 compliant with Mechanical-E/E System Interface Specification  
 correctly implements the Mechatronic Functional and Technical Safety Requirements and 
achieves the safety goals when operating as an Item in a vehicle in the context of the 
electrical architecture with other controllers 
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In practice, the achievement of the safety goals at the vehicle level is the same as for the E/E System 
Technical Safety Concept which are an assessment of: 
 the controllability risk parameter under failure conditions when the system is fulfilling the 
Functional and Technical Safety Requirements 
 the effectiveness of safety measures for controlling random and systematic failures 
 the effectiveness of the external measures 
 the effectiveness of the elements of other technologies 
These properties could be established by the use of test techniques in a similar way as for the E/E 
system. 
4CAS Example 
The high level 4CAS Mechatronic System Design is shown in Figure 59. This shows the breakdown 
of physical parts with the sensors and actuators being shown as part of the E/E system. External 
interfaces are not included on this diagram. 
 
Figure 59: 4CAS Mechatronic System Design 
The interface between the components shown in Figure 59 is specified in Figure 60. 
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Figure 60: 4CAS Mechanical-E/E System interface 
The interface specification contains details of the electrical specification of the valves, relay and 
pump and how they have to interface with the valve blocks and air supply assembly. The mounting 
of the valves is the responsibility of the mechanical design. 
Safety Argument 
The instantiation of the argument pattern is shown in Figure 61. The pattern is similar to the E/E 
system instantiation. However, as the properties of the artefacts are no longer defined by ISO 26262 
some of the claims refer to the processes defined in contexts but these have not been instantiated. 
4.2.4 Pars 4: E/E System Technical Safety Concept 
The Pars 4 E/E System Technical Safety Concept diagram is shown in Figure 62. It is not 
substantially changed from the equivalent one for an E/E system. Some of the blocks have been 
renamed, Table 8, but the content has not changed. The model also shows instances of B6: Aspect 
Cascaded to other Partes. P4B2: Mechanical-E/E System Interface Specification represents the 
need for this specification to remain consistent with both E/E system design and mechatronic system 
design which necessitates a dialogue between the two Partes. In our model, changes to the 
document are cascaded to Pars 3 Mechatronic the Technical Safety Concept.  
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Figure 61: Pars 3 Mechatronic Technical Safety Argument 
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Figure 62: Pars 4 E/E System Technical Safety Concept - Pars Design Description, Pars Design and Pars Realisation 
Mechatronic System Example E/E System Example 
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P4B1: E/E Technical Safety Concept Description P3B1: Technical Safety Concept Description 
P4B2: E/E Technical Safety Concept Documentation P3B2: Technical Safety Concept Documentation 
P4B2: E/E System Design P3B2: System Design 
P4B2: E/E System-Element P3B2: System-Element 
P4B2: E/E Technical Safety Requirements P3B2: Technical Safety Requirements 
P4B2: E/E Technical Safety Concept P3B2: Technical Safety Concept 
Table 10: Renamed E/E System Example Technical Safety Concept Blocks 
4CAS Example 
The 4CAS E/E System Technical Safety Concept is shown as a BDD in Figure 63. This shows the 
sensors and actuators now in the context of the external interfaces. The IBD shown in Figure 63 
specifies the technical implementation of the interface between the E/E system and the mechanical 
components. 
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Figure 63: 4CAS E/E System Technical Safety Concept BDD 
 
Figure 64: 4CAS E/E System Technical Safety Concept IBD 
Safety Argument 
The instantiation of the argument pattern is shown in Figure 65. It is identical to the E/E system 
Pars 3 System Design including the Technical Safety Concept except that terms have been renamed 
to match the mechatronic ontologies. 
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4.2.5 Pars 5 Hardware Design 
This Pars is identical to the E/E system example except that P3B2: Technical Safety Concept is 
renamed to P4B2: E/E Technical Safety Concept. 
4CAS example material is not presented. 
4.2.6 Pars 6 Software Design 
This Pars is identical to the E/E system example except that P3B2: Technical Safety Concept is 
renamed to P4B2: E/E Technical Safety Concept. 
4CAS example material is not presented. 
 
 
Figure 65: Pars 4 E/E System Safety Argument 
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4.2.7 Pars 7 Mechanical Design 
The Pars 7 Mechanical Design diagram is shown in Figure 66.  
 
Figure 66: Pars 7 Mechanical Design - Design Description, Design & Realisation 
Design and Physical Realisation 
The B1: Pars Design Description is instantiated as P3B1: Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept 
Description and consists of P2B2: Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept cascaded from Pars 2. 
The Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept is composed of the mechatronic system architecture, 
the Mechatronic Functional Safety Requirements assigned to elements of the architecture, the 
Mechanical-E/E System Interface Specification and the rationale underpinning the safety concept. 
The B2: Pars Design is instantiated based on a high level mechanical design process taken from 
Pahl and Beitz, [48], see Figure 9. 
The model also shows instances of B6: Aspect Cascaded to other Partes. P4B2: Mechanical-E/E 
System Interface Specification represents the need for this specification to remain consistent with 
both E/E system design and mechatronic system design which necessitates a dialogue between the 
two Partes. In our model, changes to the document are cascaded to Pars 3 Mechatronic the 
Technical Safety Concept.  P7B2: Hazards acknowledges that new hazards may be identified at any 
stage of the design process; they are most likely to be identified when establishing the properties of 
the design. Any hazards identified would be cascaded to Pars 1 Mechatronic Item Definition and 
the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment. 
Properties 
Given the high-level process view used to describe the design, it is not possible to define specific 
properties of the design artefacts as for the other Partes. The literature on mechanical design is not 
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described with the underlying model that we are using here. The literature indicates topics to be 
considered for mechanical components; one example is a checklist for embodiment design topics 
taken from Pahl and Beitz, [48], Table 11. Another example is a list for product evaluation topics 
taken from Ullman, [38], Table 12.
Topic Examples 
Function Is the stipulated function fulfilled? What auxiliary functions are needed? 
Working 
principle 
Do the chosen working principles produce the desired effects and advantages? What disturbing 
factors may be expected? 
Layout Do the chosen overall layout, component shapes, materials and dimensions provide: adequate 
durability (strength) permissible deformation (stiffness) adequate stability freedom from resonance 
unimpeded expansion acceptable corrosion and wear with the stipulated service life and loads? 
Safety Have all the factors affecting then safety of the components, of the function, of the operation and 
of the environment been taken into account? 
Ergonomics Have the human-machine relationships been taken into account? Have unnecessary human stress 
or injurious factors been avoided? Has attention been paid to aesthetics? 
Production 
Quality control 
Can the necessary checks be applied during and after production or at any other required time, and 
have they been specified? 
Assembly Can all the internal and external assembly processes be performed simply and in the correct order? 
Transport Have the internal and external transport conditions and risks been examined and taken into 
account? 
Operation Have all the factors influencing the operation, such as noise, vibration, handling, etc. been 
considered? 
Maintenance Can maintenance, inspection and overhaul be easily performed and checked? 
Recycling Costs Can the product be reused or recycled? 
Table 11: Embodiment Design Topics taken from Pahl and Beitz, [48] 
Performance 
Accuracy, variation, and noise 
Tolerance 
Sensitivity 
Robustness 
Manufacture 
Assembly 
Reliability 
Maintenance 
Environment 
Table 12: Product Evaluation Topics taken from Ullman, [38] 
These topics imply properties of the design artefacts, but they are not stated explicitly. Specific 
techniques for addressing the topics may reveal the underlying properties required, but the 
techniques are not given in the literature. 
Testing is part of the mechanical design process, for example Ullman, [38] describes a five-step 
testing process to achieve robustness, based on Taguchi.  In the argument this would be a property 
of one or more of the design artefacts. 
If the mechanical design is carried out within a defined process this will mandate the creation of 
particular artefacts; it may also require defined properties of the work product to be established and 
state how these properties are established. No example of such a process has been discovered in the 
public realm. 
Just based on cascade of requirements, a key physical realisation property of the mechanical 
assembly in the mechatronic context is that it is compliant and complete with regards to 
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Mechatronic Technical Safety Requirements assigned to it and to the Mechanical-E/E System 
Interface Specification. As mentioned previously, these properties could be established by the use 
of test techniques in a similar way as for the E/E system. 
From the safety perspective, a key design property required of the mechanical design is that it is 
robust against the causes of systematic faults and the effects of systematic faults. To be consistent 
with the rest of the argument, this property would be established to an integrity commensurate with 
the rest of the development as indicated by the assessment of the unmitigated risk. As will 
mentioned in the discussion below, this is the prime property that we will consider in the remainder 
of the thesis. 
4CAS Example 
The primary aspect of the mechanical design from a mechatronic system perspective is the 
pneumatic system that directly interfaces to the electronic controller. The pneumatic system design 
is shown as a BDD in Figure 63 and an IBD in Figure 63. The details drawings behind these 
diagrams is outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
Figure 67: Pneumatic System BDD 
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Figure 68: Pneumatic System IBD 
Safety Argument 
The instantiation of the argument pattern is shown in Figure 69. While there are standard parts of 
the argument that can be instantiated, the artefacts are taken from the ontology given in Figure 66. 
As this is a very generic ontology, no details about design artefact are known so the argument shows 
these in an equally generic manner. The realisation artefact has been shown separately
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Figure 69: Pars 7 Mechanical System Safety Argument 
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4.3 Discussion 
At this stage in the exposition of the Pars approach we have seen that it can be applied to a 
mechatronic system. The 4CAS illustration has given some impression of what the design material 
could look like in practice.  
We have noted that hazards, which are a key factor in risk assessment, can be identified in different 
Pars, although the primary one is Pars 1 Mechatronic Item Definition and the Hazard Analysis and 
Risk Assessment. In practice, for the risk assessment of an E/E system, it has always been necessary 
to take into account the capabilities of the actuators and their potential effect on the mechanical 
components in order to assess severity and controllability. So, the Pars 1 for a mechatronic system 
is not significantly different to the equivalent for an E/E system. 
The Pars division adopted here has a Pars for Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept and another 
for E/E Technical Safety Concept. Another approach would be to a single Mechatronic Technical 
Safety Concept Pars which covers the whole of the mechatronic system design in terms of 
mechanical, hardware and software. The benefit of this approach is that when designing a 
mechatronic system it is necessary to consider the trade-offs between mechanical, hardware and 
software all at the same time. The current scheme was adopted as it is the closest approximation to 
the way the project was organised; in practice, the issue was handled by communication between 
the mechanical and E/E staff who also worked together on the mechatronic system design. 
It was highlighted in section 0 that, from the safety perspective, a key design property required of 
the mechanical design is that it is robust against the causes of systematic faults and the effects of 
systematic faults. The question arises as to how this design property can be established for the 
mechanical design. It is proposed that the design FMEA process be used to achieve this. The 
proposal is made on the basis that, in the automotive industry, the technique has universal use at the 
component level and is also widely used at the system level. There are two issues that arise with 
this proposal. 
The first issue is that to be consistent with the rest of the argument, the property would have to be 
established to an integrity commensurate with the rest of the development as indicated by the 
assessment of the unmitigated risk. For the E/E system this is achieved by the assignment of an 
ASIL value to the safety requirements and then the ISO 26262 standard providing the guidance on 
how to achieve the specified integrity. A value of ASIL cannot be assigned to safety requirements 
placed on the mechanical elements of the architecture, so this begs the question of how the concept 
of design integrity can be fed into the mechanical design process. Here we note the problem and 
address it in Chapter 6. 
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The second issue is whether the practical use of the design FMEA does, or has the potential to, 
provide the evidence we require to establish the property of robustness against the causes of 
systematic faults and the effects of systematic faults. To investigate this further a case study was 
conducted to address the question: What is the established role and practice of using FMEA in an 
automotive context and the factors that influence its judged effectiveness? In Chapter 5 we describe 
the case study and report the results. 
4.4 Summary 
We have shown that the design model can be applied to a mechatronic system and that the elements 
of the model can be mapped to design artefacts that are typically available in a practical 
development. We have also shown how safety argument structure from Chapter 3 can be recast for 
a mechatronic system. An example instantiation of safety argument for a mechatronic system, using 
the 4CAS system, is given in Appendix C. 
We have highlighted the issue of bringing the concept of integrity into the mechanical design and 
will address this in Chapter 6. 
We have also highlighted the need to understand the potential of the FMEA, as performed on 
mechanical components, to provide supporting evidence for the safety argument. This is addressed 
in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 DFMEA Usage Case Study 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4 we saw the need to investigate whether the practical use of the design FMEA, 
(DFMEA), as performed on mechanical components, has the potential to provide the evidence to 
support the mechatronic safety argument. While we have seen that the safety argument can be recast 
for a mechatronic system this will be to no avail if there is no means of providing the necessary 
evidential support from the mechanical design. Ideally we would like evidence to support the 
MISRA, [187], claim types of rationale, satisfaction, means and organisational environment. In 
this chapter we report the results of a case study into the practical use of the design DFMEA. 
An introduction to the FMEA technique was given in Chapter 2, 2.3.3, and fuller exposition is given 
in Appendix A. In the automotive industry, failures of mechanical components are managed by a 
quality process that uses the Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) technique, [159]. FMEA is an 
analysis technique that determines failures and their causes and mitigates their causes or effects by 
specifying control measures; these include product requirements and test procedures, [170], [171].  
We also saw in section 2.3.3 that the use of DFMEA is central to a number of different quality 
processes, e.g. robustness, failure mode avoidance. These primary address quality in terms of 
warranty and customer dissatisfaction. It is only for a minority of systems that are historically seen 
as being safety related, e.g. brakes steering. This makes the DFMEA a prime candidate for the 
source of the evidence necessary to extend the safety argument to the identification and mitigation 
of malfunctioning behaviour caused by the failures of mechanical components. However, at present 
the processes supporting compliance with ISO 26262, [13] are quite distinct from the DFMEA-
based quality processes, despite the fact that software control is often used to achieve the required 
performance of a mechanical component. 
To understand the extent to which the DFMEA, as practised, does, or could, produce the evidence 
necessary to support the argument pattern described above, a qualitative case study has been 
performed and reported in this thesis, to address the following research question:  
What is the established role and practice of using DFMEA in an automotive context and the 
factors that influence its judged effectiveness? 
In this study, the DFMEA had been applied to mainly mechanical components. Semi-structured 
interviews were used as the primary data collection instrument in this research. General questions 
were asked to get an understanding of what practitioners thought they were doing and why; these 
were based on a documented DFMEA-based quality process. Here, quality is used as an umbrella 
term that covers the absence of all negative customer experiences associated with the component. 
The questions were aimed at understanding if the results of the DFMEA could serve as evidence 
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for the safety argument. We were also interested to understand if the use of the DFMEA would 
benefit from it having an assurance case structure. 
It is not feasible to assess the whole of the automotive industry, therefore, the scope of the case 
study has been restricted to a single company which is a major global automotive OEM whose 
approach is representative of the industry in general. This approach produces depth rather than 
breadth of analysis. 
The FMEA technique can be applied to different aspects of the engineering process, for example to 
a concept, a design or a process. However, in this thesis, unless otherwise stated, the term DFMEA 
is used in the context of application to a design, although the distinction between a concept and a 
design is often a moot point. Failure Modes Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is also a term in 
common usage; in this thesis the term DFMEA is used as it is the one in most commonly used, but 
it does include the criticality analysis, [193]. 
5.2 Background to Case Study 
This section describes the design of the case study and the data collection method. The company in 
which the case study was conducted has a documented DFMEA process, [194], based on SAE 
J1739, [159]. As mentioned above, semi-structured interviews were used as the primary data 
collection instrument in this research. In order to answer the research question, it is necessary 
capture the views of those who are responsible for performing and reviewing DFMEA. The data to 
be captured is not quantitative and so a qualitative technique, such as semi-structured interviews, is 
appropriate. 
5.2.1 Case Study Design 
The case study looked at how the DFMEA technique is used across the whole of a single company. 
The structure of the case study is based on Yin’s Case Study Research methodology [195]. 
According to Yin’s classification, the proposed study is a Type 2: Single-case embedded design. It 
is a single-case design because it is capturing “… the circumstances and conditions of an everyday 
situation”. It is an embedded design because there are multiple units of analysis; in this case each 
person interviewed is a different unit of analysis. 
Following Yin, the preparatory work included creating an initial theory to help define the research 
propositions and evaluation criteria used in the case study. The relationships between the key terms 
of interest, taken from the standards, literature and the author’s previous training and experience, 
were captured in a diagram, Figure 70. The lines between the terms represent the relationships as 
understood before the case study was performed. Those terms considered relevant to understanding 
the traditional use of DFMEA in the context of functional safety are highlighted. 
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Figure 70: Initial Theory 
It was assumed that the purpose could be summarised as addressing the most pressing issues, which 
may include harm to people. However, the issue of harm was investigated in particular as functional 
safety is exclusively concerned with harm. How staff consider the process to be complete is of 
interest, as ISO 26262 has strong completion criteria based on the production and content of a 
defined set of work products. The constraints on effectiveness were investigated to understand to 
what extent they are inherent and to what extent they are dependent on the application of the 
process. The DFMEA process was investigated to discover how staff understood the relationship 
between failure modes, causes, effects and controls; these types of relationships are defined in detail 
in ISO 26262. The outcomes of not performing the process effectively is of interest as this is a 
possible link to functional safety; it was assumed that warranty and critical concerns would be the 
main considerations. 
Although the research question is based around role, factors and practice, the questions were 
structured around the company procedure as this was the document that all the participants were 
familiar with. A mixture of open and closed questions were used. The closed questions were 
structured around a statement with degrees of consent. The open questions were more likely to elicit 
what the participant really thought, but were harder to process. The questions are shown in 
Appendix D. Questions numbered 2.x concern the philosophy of DFMEA and are intended to elicit 
the participant’s understanding of the purpose and rationale behind the DFMEA technique. 
Questions numbered 3.x concern the practice of DFMEA and are intended to elicit what the 
participant actually does. 
As mentioned above, the unit of analysis is the individual participant and a total of 16 participants 
were interviewed. The first participants were identified by virtue of them having prominent roles in 
the organisation; further participants were identified by asking for suggestions as part of the case 
study (question 3.18 Is there anyone else that you think I should talk to?). The full complement of 
participants was chosen so as to have a spread of different roles within different departments, as 
shown in Table 13 and Table 14. The final set of participants is a good and representative sample 
because it includes staff from departments across the company and includes both practitioners, who 
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perform DFMEAs as just one task in the development of their component, and also experts who 
use the technique on a daily basis. 
The study had the ethics approval from Physical Sciences Ethics Committee at the University of 
York. 
Quality Engineer 7 
Six Sigma Master Black Belt 5 
Engineer 3 
Quality Manager 1 
Table 13: Participant by role 
Body 5 
Powertrain 5 
Chassis 2 
Electrical 2 
Research 1 
Quality 1 
Table 14: Participant by department 
5.2.2 Data collection 
The interviews were conducted over a six- month period starting in February 2015 with the last one 
conducted in July 2015. Each person was interviewed separately and the interview lasted about one 
hour. The answers given were recorded by hand on a hardcopy of the questionnaire template. If the 
participant made side remarks or gave other information not directly related to the question, this 
was recorded on a separate piece of paper. The results of each interview were transferred to 
electronic media, i.e. a spreadsheet, within 48 hours of the interview. When transferring the results, 
errors in grammar and punctuation in the handwritten notes were corrected. 
5.2.3 Data Analysis 
The open questions were intended to provoke comments; some participants only gave minimal 
answers while others made comments even when answering closed questions. All the comments 
from all participants were listed; where a comment made several points, each point was listed as a 
separate comment. The questions that produced comments and the number of comments associated 
with each question, 165 in total, are shown in Table 15. 
Questions Q2.9 Q2.8 Q2.11 Q3.13 Q2.5 Q3.17 Q2.1 Q2.12 Q3.9 Q3.11 Q2.3 Q2.10 
Comments 36 30 24 24 16 9 8 7 7 2 1 1 
Table 15: Comments versus Questions 
The comments were processed using the principles of thematic analysis, [196]. First, they were 
grouped under the research subject matter topics of role, practice and factors. The grouping was 
based on the content of the comment with most comments clearly falling into just one of the topics. 
Where this was not the case, then the comment was included in the grouping of more than one topic. 
Within each topic group the comments were grouped further as themes. Some themes were inherent 
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in the original construction of the questionnaire while others were identified on the basis of the 
number of times the subject was mentioned or the number of closely-related comments. For 
example, many comments were made about the characteristics of a well- performed DFMEA, see 
below. The results are presented in the next section under the headings of role, practice, effort 
expended and factors. 
5.3 Case Study Results 
5.3.1 Role 
The participants were directly asked what they thought the purpose of the DFMEA was, question 
Q2.1, and the author’s preconceived idea was explored in question Q2.2. Their view on the use of 
the DFMEA as a means to avoid harm was explored in question Q2.3. In response to questions Q2.2 
and Q2.3, all but one of the participants either Agreed or Strongly Agreed that the purpose of a 
DFMEA included improving the component being analysed by addressing its most pressing issues 
and preventing the product from causing harm. One participant Disagreed with the statement in 
question Q2.3 on the basis that with most systems it is difficult to change the effect and so the 
potential for harm cannot be avoided, therefore the focus is on addressing the cause. Comments 
made when answering other questions also revealed the participant’s view of the role of the 
DFMEA; the main themes are shown in Table 16. 
Id Purpose 
1 Prevent failures by identifying the necessary controls 
2 Assess risk of failure 
3 Identify failure modes 
4 Understand the design better and record this understanding 
5 Provide a systematic analysis process as part of systems engineering 
Table 16: Purpose of Performing an DFMEA 
The majority of the participants highlighted the role of the DFMEA in identifying controls which 
minimise the occurrence, or maximise the detection, of failure modes and their causes. Controls 
related to testing were mentioned most often. Several participants also mentioned updating internal 
design standards and internal test procedures based on lessons learnt from previous experience, as 
represented by item 4. 
In mentioning Risk, Id 2, participants were indicating that understanding the risk associated with 
the failure modes was a key aspect of the process and that the risk determined the priority given to 
putting controls in place to prevent failure modes escaping. This is supported by the response to 
question Q2.2, where all participants Agreed or Strongly Agreed that one purpose of a DFMEA is 
to improve the component being analysed by addressing its most pressing issues. Risk in this context 
refers predominantly to negative effects relating to customer satisfaction and experience, survey 
results, warranty figures and recalls. However, of the 16 participants, 15 Agreed or Strongly Agreed 
that one purpose of a DFMEA is to prevent the product from causing harm, where, in the context 
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of this question, harm does refer to physical injury to people. This is reinforced by the response to 
question Q2.6 where 15 out of 16 agreed that performing an DFMEA could avoid Critical Concerns; 
these are issues experienced in the field with a potential to cause harm. The dissenting participant 
took the harm to be a consequence of the effect and reasoned that to prevent harm it is necessary to 
have a different effect; the effect is inherent in the design being analysed, so performing a DFMEA 
will not change this. They saw the focus of the DFMEA to be on prevention by addressing the 
cause. This is in effect the same understanding as the other 15 participants. All but two of the 
participants Agreed or Strongly Agreed that the concept of risk associated with the product causing 
harm to someone is common across all engineering disciplines. The other two participants took the 
question to refer to the commonality of severity across different vehicle components and responded 
that different components have different failure modes with different severities. 
In mentioning Design, Id 4, participants were highlighting the role that the DFMEA plays in 
developing a robust design that is free from what would otherwise be overlooked failure modes, Id 
3. The fact that the DFMEA process is systematic, Id 5, and could be used to record the design 
rationale and capture the previous experience, Id 4, was also appreciated. Mention was also made 
of the role of the DFMEA in delivering customer satisfaction and documenting requirements. 
The most common term used to refer to issues relating to the product injuring people, Q2.4, was 
severity. In response to question Q2.13, all but two of the participants Agreed or Strongly Agreed 
that the concept of risk associated with the product causing harm to someone is common across all 
engineering disciplines. This was based on the fact that a common scoring system is used for all 
components and that the customer experience at the vehicle level is independent of the underlying 
technologies. Some participants observed that the common scoring system has some difficulties in 
that the severity ranges from irritation to serious injury and questioned whether such a single scale 
was appropriate. Some participants took the view that DFMEA only considered business risk and 
only defined outcomes in engineering terms. 
5.3.2 Practice 
The actual practice of the DFMEA authors and reviewers is presented in this section. It is largely 
based on the structure of the survey questions, but some of the responses to the open questions 
produced answers that can be taken as characteristics of a well-performed DFMEA. 
Characteristics of a well-performed DFMEA 
Combining answers from a number of questions, Table 17 presents the characteristics of what the 
participants consider to be a well-performed DFMEA. 
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There is evidence of stakeholder engagement 
Everything based around functions with a good functional breakdown in a logical sequence 
Functions are related to customer requirements 
Function definitions are specific to the component and defined in scientific or engineering terms 
All different types of failure modes are analysed 
Many causes for each failure mode are considered 
The causes are in the scope of the analysis 
There are not an excessive number of low scores 
Appropriate standards are specified as controls for each line of analysis 
Prevention controls are linked to the design requirements specification 
Test standards specified as controls represent a coherent series 
Is consistent and has the appropriate level of detail that documents the thinking behind the product development 
Does not have gaps and is not too repetitious 
Table 17: Characteristics of a well performed DFMEA 
Completion criteria 
The participants were asked directly, Q2.5, what completion criteria they used and, in particular, 
the extent to which completion of the analysis is based on judgement or on financial considerations, 
e.g. the warranty costs. 13 of the participants Agreed or Strongly Agreed that completion was a 
judgement made by the leader, or the whole team, based on their experience. The participants were 
split, 10 (Disagree) and 7 (Agree), on whether financial considerations were taken into account 
when making the judgement. Those who disagreed mentioned the use of DFMEA assessment 
criteria; see Judgement of quality in section 5.3.4. A number of other criteria were also mentioned, 
see Table 18. 
Check that all the correct controls are in place and actioned 
Check that the risk assessment scores cannot be reduced more, particularly high severity scores 
Check the analysis has been performed to the appropriate depth 
Perform a system review 
Take programme timing into account 
Table 18: Completion Criteria 
Causal analysis 
One step of the DFMEA it to determine the cause of the failure. There is a hierarchy of causes 
starting from the failure, and the level at which the analysis stops is to a degree arbitrary. The 
company guidelines acknowledge a first level cause and a root cause. The determination of the 
cause can be performed informally, as a mental exercise; there are also more formal techniques, 
referred to as root cause analysis. Typical root cause analysis techniques used are the 8-D process, 
[197], and applying the 5-Whys method, [198], to an Ishikawa Diagram, [140]. The 5-Whys 
technique may be performed in the meeting but not formally documented. The participants were 
asked directly, Q3.12, how often they performed this analysis. The results, Figure 71, show that 
there was a wide range of responses; this is due to the different roles of the participants. In normal 
product development it is not used often, whereas for trouble-shooting it is often used. 
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Figure 71: Use of Root Cause Analysis 
The participants were asked, Q2.12, what factors they take into consideration when deciding to 
perform root cause analysis. For a new development, participants take into account known bad 
experiences from previous vehicle programs, while drawing a balance between analysing 
everything and working within set timescales. They also take account of the severity and occurrence 
rankings. For a production item that is exhibiting a problem, the decision to use root cause analysis 
is based on the magnitude of the problem as judged by the warranty costs being incurred, the level 
of customer dissatisfaction and any white alerts. Root cause analysis may also be used in response 
to an official problem report raised against a component. Some participants also said that the 
decision to perform root cause analysis is influenced by the analysis itself. For example, it is more 
likely to be performed if the noise factors are not understood or if three or four different noise 
factors affect the same function. It is also used when it is not obvious what controls should be 
specified, because the current identified cause is not at a level that can be acted upon. 
The participants were asked, Q3.13, what they considered the most common root causes to be. The 
answers related to either the process, Table 19 or the product, Table 20. Those topics given as 
process root causes lead to the product root causes. 
 Design Manufacturing 
Poorly performed DFMEA y  
Staff not given the necessary training y  
Occurrence of design errors across boundaries of responsibilities y  
Incorrect original requirement y  
Incorrect understanding of how related parts function y  
Incorrect or undefined interfaces y  
Poor or missing standards y  
Poor requirement cascade y  
Poor communication between design and manufacturing y  
Analysis not revised when changes to the component made y  
Batch errors  y 
Incorrect part has been fitted  y 
Incorrect process has been used  y 
Table 19: Common Process Root Causes 
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Effect due to extremes of the 5 noise categories 
System level/component level interactions 
Use of the wrong material 
Use of the wrong material for a given market 
Bulk failures 
Unsuitable surface finishes 
Unanticipated load or torque values 
Tolerance stacks 
Environmental effects 
Table 20: Common Product Root Causes 
5.3.3 Effort expended 
The participants were asked directly, Q2.14, whether the effort they expended on understanding 
risk, mitigating risk and gaining confidence in risk mitigation depended on the magnitude of the 
risk or the criticality of the product failure. All but two of the participants Agreed or Strongly Agreed 
that this was the case. The general consensus conformed to the view of one participant that there is 
a descending hierarchy of risk, e.g. injury, legal, fit/finish and customer irritation, with more 
attention being given to issues the higher up the hierarchy they were. However, one participant, 
while acknowledging this, suggested that it was not necessarily the right approach as the customer 
is still inconvenienced, even by low-severity issues. There was agreement that effects given a YC 
classification, see section 4.3.2, have the top priority; this was reinforced by the perception that the 
DFMEA is a legal document and so there is legal liability if higher risks were not dealt with 
properly. 
One participant Disagreed, on the basis that lower severity effects are more common and cause the 
majority of the customer complaints, so they are addressed with the same effort as high severity 
affects. Another participant Strongly Disagreed, believing that severity only influences effort if a 
high severity event occurs in the field. One can see from these that in the minds of the participants, 
risk is often equated to severity. 
Scoring2 
The assignment of an Occurrence Ranking Number and a Detection Ranking Number were 
addressed in questions Q3.2 and Q3.3 (On what basis do you decide the prevention/occurrence 
score of an effect?). The author made a mistake when preparing the questions; the occurrence score 
is an assessment of the effectiveness of the prevention design control and there is no separate score 
for prevention; this error was pointed out by many of the participants. Question Q3.2 should have 
been about the Detection Ranking Number. For the purposes of this analysis the answers for Q3.2 
and Q3.3 have been combined as occurrence and shown in Figure 72. 
                                                     
2 While the standards use the term ranking for assessing severity, detection and prevention, the company procedure uses 
the term score. 
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Figure 72: Q3.2, Q3.3 Basis of Severity and Occurrence Scores 
The most common basis for the assessments is the standard company score guideline followed by 
judgement. The use of standards and other controls is a significant factor along with feedback from 
the field in the form of warranty or general quality history. It is unlikely that the mistake in 
formulating question Q3.2 has made a significant difference to the answers given. In practice, all 
the Ranking Number assignments, including those for severity, are judgements and many 
participants acknowledged this. This does not mean that those who did not make this comment did 
not understand that this was the case. The answers to questions Q3.9 and Q3.10 concerning the 
adequacy of design controls show that judgement plays the largest part, with only a few mentions 
of simulation and test representing something more objective. 
Significance of a YC Classification 
The company guidelines deprecate the use of RPN and prefer the use of a Severity Classification 
(YC), a Severity/Occurrence classification (YS) and a Detection Ranking criterion. A failure mode 
with a Severity Ranking Number of 9 or 10 is designated as a YC on the basis that it affects safe 
vehicle or product function and/or compliance with government regulations. A failure mode with a 
Severity Ranking Number between 5 and 10 associated with a cause that has an Occurrence 
Ranking Number of less than 3 is designated a YS if it has not already been designated as a YC. The 
guidelines require that each line of analysis in the DFMEA with a YC or YS designation has an 
action associated with it. An action may relate to a design change, the use of Prevention or Detection 
Design Controls, or the need to alert others to particular issues e.g. manufacturing, assembly, 
supplier, shipping. If neither designation has been assigned, an action is also required if the line has 
a Detection Ranking Number greater than 3. The interviews only investigated the use of the YC 
classification because this may relate to issues considered safety related and so was relevant to the 
case study. The relevant questions are Q3.4, Q3.5, Q3.6, Q3.7 and Q3.11. 
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Most participants agreed that the nature of an effect is an inherent property of the item being 
analysed because it was the working principle being exploited in the design, e.g. a hose containing 
fluid under pressure will always have being blown off as a potential failure mode. So only rarely 
could an effect labelled YC be designed out, and there was common agreement that in the majority 
of cases an effect labelled YC had to be mitigated by the use of controls. 
There was some indication that effects labelled YC are given the highest priority, with two 
participants explicitly stating that those effects with a YC designation were the top priority. This 
included greater scrutiny of both Prevention and Detection controls to ensure effectiveness, with 
perhaps a greater emphasis on the Detection controls, and more involvement of senior management. 
Following industry practice as a guide for what can be accepted was also mentioned. 
However, although effects labelled as YC are notionally more important than those not so labelled, 
in practice all effects are treated very similarly. This is because the effects that cause the majority 
of customer complaints and warranty returns are not labelled YC, and it is these issues that the 
DFMEA is used to address. Hence, most controls are associated with effects not labelled YC. One 
participant, commenting on the Occurrence Ranking Number, said that the score may be increased 
in order to produce a YC categorisation so that a control can be cascaded to the supplier or 
manufacturing. This is supported by the fact that most participants were of the view that deciding 
the sufficiency of the controls was unaffected by whether or not the effect had been given a YC 
designation, question Q3.11. 
Failure Modes 
The company guidelines advised the use of the five standard types of potential failure modes (No 
Function, Partial – Over/Under Function, Degraded Over Time, Intermittent Function, Unintended 
Function). All were considered equally appropriate and, of these, Intermittent Function and 
Unintended Function were generally considered to be the most difficult to assess, Figure 73. One 
participant commented that Degraded Over Time and Intermittent Function are really just the other 
types of failure mode arising in different circumstances. This practice is in line with the standards. 
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Figure 73: Use of standard failure mode types 
Countermeasure sufficiency 
The participants were asked directly, Q3.9 and Q3.10, how they decided that sufficient Design 
Prevention and Detection Controls had been specified. One participant commented that question 
Q3.9 was badly formed because countermeasures are linked to occurrence, not severity. Again, 
Q3.10 should have said Occurrence rather than Prevention. Despite these errors in the questions, 
the majority of participants answered the questions and a number of factors were mentioned, see 
Table 21. 
Previous in-service experience of a similar product 
The existence and quality of the standards specified as controls 
The evaluation of the design to assess the effectiveness of the controls, e.g. by review, simulation, test 
The consensus of the team based on their previous experience 
The coverage of causes by controls 
The nature of effect, e.g. injury, legal, degree of customer dissatisfaction 
Reassessment of Occurrence Ranking in light of specified Prevention Control 
The degree to which the functions and use cases have been covered 
Table 21: Factors considered when deciding if sufficient controls have been specified 
When and why are DFMEA reviews held? 
Question Q3.14 was related to DFMEA reviews. Existing components have a foundation DFMEA 
which is used as a record of the learning from previous work on the component. These foundation 
DFMEAs are reviewed yearly, or on a rolling basis, so that a review is completed every 12 months. 
The purpose of the review is to check that all the previously identified issues have been addressed 
and that the DFMEA is up-to-date with the latest design. A DFMEA review is also performed for 
the deployment or further development of a component on a vehicle programme. Performing a 
DFMEA is part of the development process; the DFMEA is reviewed at the start of the development 
and then prior to each programme gateway to ensure that the DFMEA is complete and that the 
controls are in place and avoid late design changes. The last review ensures that the launch issues 
have been captured. A number of participants mentioned problems with modified components that 
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they attributed to a review of the DFMEA not being performed. The failure to review supplier 
DFMEAs was also mentioned as a source of some issues. 
5.3.4 Factors 
From the answers to the open questions it has been possible to get some insight into what factors 
are taken into account by the authors and reviewers of DFMEAs. The factors are presented as: 
outcomes to be avoided which affect the effort and judgement of completion, factors that hamper 
the process and have to be worked around, and how people consciously decide the quality of the 
DFMEA. 
Outcomes to be avoided 
The participants were asked directly, Q2.6, what would be the outcome if the DFMEA was not 
performed properly, with the suggestion that higher warranty figures and more critical concerns 
would result. All but one participant Agreed or Strongly Agreed that this would be the case. When 
asked what other negative outcomes may arise, a large number of issues were mentioned which can 
be grouped as pre-production indicators, Table 22, and post-production indicators, Table 23. The 
post-production issues can be further categorised as affecting cost, legal obligations or reputation, 
with anything that the customer is aware of having an adverse effect on the reputation of the brand. 
More manufacturing and launch issues 
Poor specifications and design 
More late change resulting in longer development times 
Increased cost 
More problems with systems interaction 
Table 22: Pre-production issues 
 Cost Legal Reputation 
Increased warranty costs y  y 
Ongoing issues   y 
White Alerts and Recalls  y  
Customer dissatisfaction   y 
More service issues y  y 
Poor results in external Surveys   y 
Non-compliance with regulations  y  
Table 23: Post-production issues 
Factors that hamper the DFMEA Process 
The participants were asked how effective the DFMEA was in practice at achieving its purpose, 
Q2.7, and how often something is missed which should have been found, Q2.10. The answers to 
these questions are shown in Figure 74 and Figure 75. 
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Figure 74: DFMEA effectiveness 
 
Figure 75: How often the DFMEA fails to find an issue 
Although Figure 74 shows that the majority of participants consider the DFMEA to be effective, 
many caveated their response by saying that it had the potential to be effective but was let down by 
a number of factors; this is why Figure 75 shows that participants were also aware that issues were 
missed. A number of factors were mentioned to explain why issues were missed as shown in Table 
24. These are discussed below. 
Team and organisational issues 
Failure to consider all relevant factors 
Interface issues and complexity 
Lack of resources 
Lack of feedback 
Lack of customer perspective 
Level of detail 
Misapplication 
Not reviewing supplier’s DFMEAs 
Table 24: Factors hampering the potential effectiveness of the DFMEA 
Unsurprisingly, a number of participants commented that effectiveness of performing a DFMEA 
depended to a large extent on the team, their knowledge and skills, also their motivation, 
thoroughness and willingness to put the effort in. A deficiency in knowledge and skills could be 
due to not having all the knowledgeable stakeholders represented in the team, or the team members 
not having sufficient training. In terms of team member’s skill or creativity, one participant 
observed that engineers tend not to be good at thinking of possible failure modes but better at 
thinking of mitigations once the failure modes have occurred. It was thought that team members 
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may lack motivation because they were not aware of the purpose and potential benefits of 
performing a DFMEA. Often, team members believed that there is nothing left for the DFMEA to 
find because it was performed later than it should be and the engineers believed that failure modes 
had already been taken into account informally when performing the design activity. One 
participant summed it up as a cultural problem. The involvement of senior staff in reviews was 
thought to help counterbalance a tendency for the team to perform poorly and it also helps improve 
the culture. Effectiveness of the team was seen as being dependent on good relationships between 
team members; personality clashes were mentioned as being particularly detrimental. 
Participants commented on the problems caused by responsibilities being split across internal and 
external organisational boundaries, which led to failures in communicating actions to others and in 
ensuring that the actions are carried out. As an example, the DFMEA process requires that 
manufacturing be informed that the DFMEA for a particular component had identified critical or 
significant characteristics (YCs or YSs) because this information should be used by manufacturing 
in their process DFMEA. Failure to do this was mentioned by two participants. 
Failures to consider all relevant factors include not taking into account previous experience and 
changes to the component, and the effects these changes have on other components. Other factors 
include not considering the potential issues related to the materials used, to durability issues or to 
the effects of manufacturing tolerance. 
Many participants mentioned interfaces to systems outside of the item boundary and the interactions 
between the item and these other systems. Comments were made that the interfaces were not 
correctly defined, or that interfaces were missing, or that the interfaces and resulting interaction 
were not properly analysed. The comments implied that these deficiencies arose because of the 
difficulty that the engineers had in handling interfaces and interactions, sometimes because the 
DFMEA was performed at too low a level of abstraction, e.g. at the component level. It was also 
commented that the DFMEA is less effective the more complicated the system is. 
A number of participants commented that effectiveness was affected by the planning of the 
DFMEA. Ideally the plan should allocate sufficient time and the appropriate staff so that the 
DFMEA can be completed for the required programme milestone. Several comments were made to 
the effect that this ideal was often not met. As noted above, inadequacies in planning have a 
detrimental effect on team performance. 
In order to judge whether an issue in the field should have been anticipated and prevented by the 
DFMEA, it is necessary to determine if there is a point in the DFMEA process where this failed to 
happen. A number of participants commented that this was not done on a systematic basis, which 
meant that they did not have an objective view on how effective the DFMEA process is at achieving 
its purpose. 
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The customer’s perspective in terms of usage and performance was often not adequately considered, 
e.g. not considering all of the potential customer usage scenarios, or not verifying what the customer 
would accept as a satisfactory performance level. 
Participants commented that they had seen DFMEAs performed at the wrong level of abstraction 
or DFMEAs where the analysis had not considered the design in sufficient detail 
Examples of what was considered misapplication of the technique were mentioned, such as 
reasoning through several layers of cause-and-affect all the way through to accident sequences. If 
it is then decided that an accident may occur, the severity is ranked as 10. This can lead to everything 
being ranked as severity 10, e.g. a sun visor screw falls off into the driver’s lap and they get 
distracted such that they lose control of the vehicle and an accident occurs. 
The lack of visibility of supplier DFMEAs, or not reviewing the supplier’s DFMEAs, was also 
mentioned as a source of missed issues. 
Judgement of quality 
When asked about how the quality of an DFMEA could be assessed, all agreed that it was a 
judgement rather than an assessment against hard criteria. Several participants mentioned 
assessment schemes that had been tried based on criteria such as the number of causes listed per 
failure mode. Some commented that these were both too detailed and too simplistic, and that a more 
basic assessment of the extent the process had been followed would be more useful, e.g. was quality 
history considered? The difficulty of assessing the quality of a DFMEA was highlighted by the 
example of one that was reviewed by senior staff, and considered to be a good example, however 
the corresponding component later experienced many field issues due to many customer usage 
scenarios not having been considered. 
In practice, it appears that the judgement is based on inspection of the DFMEA work sheet based 
on ad hoc criteria, Table 25, and considering the previous experience of the product in the case of 
a reapplication, Table 26. 
Are functions related to customer requirements? 
Have obvious failure modes been missed? 
Are the standards specified as controls appropriate? 
Have the standards specified as controls been effective in the past 
Does the worksheet capture learning about the product 
Table 25: Questions asked of the DFMEA Worksheet 
Warranty 
Field issues 
Problems before production 
Test & validation results 
Table 26: Previous product experience considered 
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It was acknowledged that the judgement is influenced by the risk assessment scores, in that higher 
risk scores are judged against stricter criteria. The judgement is also influenced by the quality of 
the overall presentation, for example, the level of detail, the consistency of the analysis, the presence 
of obvious mistakes, and the degree of repetition.  
5.4 Discussion 
The research question explored here has aimed to understand the established role and practice of 
using DFMEA in an automotive context and examine the factors that influence its judged 
effectiveness. The question arose from a desire to extend the safety case required by ISO 26262 to 
a mechatronic system by including the mechanical causes of the malfunctioning behaviour of the 
Item identified by the ISO 26262 hazard and risk assessment process. The DFMEA technique was 
chosen because this is at the core of the quality processes used by the automotive industry to address 
negative customer experiences associated with mechanical components. 
So, the first result of interest is whether or not the practitioners of DFMEA view its role in a way 
that is amenable to being used to support an extended ISO 26262 safety argument. As recorded in 
Table 16, a number of common themes were apparent when the participants considered the role of 
the DFMEA which are all supportive of identifying and mitigating failures. 
For the DFMEA to properly fulfil the new role it will have to supply evidence that, for mechanical 
causes of malfunctioning behaviour, a complete set of requirements have been identified, the 
controls are sufficient mitigation for the causes and/or effects, the product satisfies the requirements 
and that the process and people are appropriate. 
In DFMEA terms, the requirements are the prevention and detection controls. To claim that a 
complete set of requirements has been identified, it is necessary to argue that the coverage of 
functions, interfaces, causes and effects is sufficient. Any criteria, evidence, reasoning, etc that 
supports this claim is something that could potentially be used to support an argument. Many of the 
answers given could provide such support. For example, many of the characteristics of a well- 
performed DFMEA, listed in Table 17, are topics that could directly support a completeness claim. 
One characteristic mentioned is that everything should be based around functions with a good 
functional breakdown in a logical sequence; this can be phrased as a claim such as “The item is 
analysed using a logical functional decomposition”. The evidence to support such a claim could be 
a diagram showing a systematic breakdown of the functions of the item. Other characteristics 
mentioned could give confidence in the results. For example, the involvement of stakeholders can 
be phrased as a claim such as “All relevant stakeholders were involved in performing the DFMEA”. 
The evidence to support such a claim could be the list of team members, their roles and the 
departments they represent. 
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To claim that the controls specified are sufficient mitigation for the causes and/or effects it is 
necessary to argue that the controls will be effective. To the extent that the specification of controls 
is dependent on the scores and classification, these also need to be justified. Some of the answers 
recorded in Table 25 and Table 26 are topics that could support a claim of sufficient mitigation. For 
example, previous experience with standards could become a claim that “The standards specified 
as controls have been effective in the past” and evidence to support such a claim could be warranty 
records or problem reports on products were the controls have been used previously. 
To claim that the product satisfies the requirements it is necessary to argue that controls in the form 
of design standards, verification methods and cascaded requirements have been followed and 
implemented in the final product; this includes the specification, and successful completion, of tests 
or other verification activities. An example of the claim that we would like to make is “All controls 
have been implemented in the final product and all cascaded requirements have been properly 
acted upon”. While the answers given did not mention topics that could directly support such a 
claim, where the specified controls took the form of design standards with associated verification 
activities, the reports of the latter would provide relevant evidence.  
5.5 Summary 
In Chapter 4 we raised two issues. One issue was whether the DFMEA, as actually practiced, would 
be able to provide the evidence we require. From the results of the case study it can be seen that it 
does have the potential, but, for this potential to be realised, strong governance is required to avoid 
the issues highlighted in section 5.3.4. Possible extensions to this case study are discussed in 7.7.3. 
We mentioned in section 5.1 that we were also interested to understand if the use of the DFMEA 
would benefit from having an assurance case structure. The study has revealed that there is variation 
in the understanding of role and of the completion criteria. There are also numerous factors 
mentioned that affect a successful outcome. Up to now this does not seem to have been too 
detrimental, perhaps because the majority of the systems were not safety related or that complex. 
However, systems are now becoming more complex especially with the addition of E/E system 
control. So, there may well be benefit to be gained by having a more structured way to record the 
results and the reasoning. 
The second issue was how the concept of design integrity could be fed into the mechanical design 
process. This problem is now addressed in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 Relating Mechatronic Safety Evidence 
As discussed in, Chapter 2, section 2.4 Safety Arguments, a generic safety argument is based on: 
 an assessment of unmitigated risk 
 the derivation of safety behavioural requirements 
 the implementation of safety requirements with an integrity commensurate with the 
unmitigated risk 
In this chapter we propose a means of separating out the two meanings of the ISO 26262 term ASIL 
which are: an indication of the assessed unmitigated risk, and the integrity with which safety 
requirements are to be implemented. This is necessary to allow us to feed the concept of integrity 
into the mechanical design. We do this based on a conditional probability risk model; this allows 
us to show how safety requirements, with assigned integrity values, can flow down from the highest 
level of system description to the implementation. We also propose the use of special 
characteristics as a means of feeding integrity values into the DFMEA quality-based processes used 
in mechanical engineering. 
6.1 Conditional Probability Risk Model 
A conditional probability risk model is presented which will be used to describe the assessment of 
unmitigated risk and the provision of risk mitigation in the context of ISO 26262. 
When a machine fails in a way that leads to harm to a person, there is a chain of cause and effect 
from an initial fault to the resultant harm to the person. The risk associated with this event is 
assessed by considering two factors: the likelihood that the harm will occur, and the severity of that 
harm. The likelihood that the harm will occur can be broken down into a number of cause-effect 
factors, for example: 
 The likelihood that the fault will occur 
 The likelihood that the fault will propagate so as to affect the behaviour of the machine 
 The likelihood that the behaviour of the machine will interact with the environment and 
people, such that people are harmed 
We can model the probability3 of harm, Pharm, mathematically as the product of the conditional 
probabilities for each cause-effect factor: 
Pharm = Pfault * P[faulty-machine-behaviour | fault] * P[harm | faulty-machine-behaviour] 
With this understanding, we can draw a generic bow-tie diagram, Figure 76. 
                                                     
3 We are using the terminology of probability to explain a concept. Numbers will not be assigned to any of 
these probabilities. 
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Figure 76: Fault to harm model 
The faulty-machine-behaviour is in the middle. The left-hand side represents the fact that there may 
be many initial faults that propagate through to a particular faulty-machine-behaviour; this accounts 
for the Pfault * P[faulty-machine-behaviour | fault] terms in our mathematical model. The right-hand 
side represents the fact that the faulty-machine-behaviour may interact with the environment and 
people in many different ways leading to different harms; this accounts for the P[harm | faulty-
machine-behaviour] term in our mathematical model. The severity of harm associated with the 
faulty-machine-behaviour is taken to be the worst case of all the possible outcomes of the faulty-
machine-behaviour interaction with the environment and people. 
6.2 Unmitigated Risk Assessment 
We propose that the ISO 26262 scheme for assessing the unmitigated risk of an E/E system is also 
used to assess the unmitigated risk of a mechatronic system. For ISO 26262, the faulty-machine-
behaviour is the hazard, and the hazard and risk assessment assumes that the hazard has occurred 
and assesses the consequent risk. In terms of the mathematical model, Pfault * P[hazard | fault] is 
assigned a value of 1, and the value of P[harm | faulty-machine-behaviour] is assessed. The 
assessment is made by considering the consequences of the hazard in a number of operational 
situations. Each combination of a hazard and an operational situation is referred to as a hazardous 
event. Each consequence is assigned a severity rating. The probability of the vehicle entering the 
operational situation is assigned an exposure rating and the probability that human actions can 
avoid the harm associated with the consequence is assigned a controllability rating. The result of 
the assessment is the tuple {exposure, controllability, severity} where exposure takes values of E0 
to E4, controllability takes values of C0 to C3, and severity takes values of S0 to S3. Using the 
ISO 26262 risk table, this gives the assessment of the unmitigated risk as one of the following 
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values: QM, ASILA, ASILB, ASILC and ASILD. These values have a universal interpretation in the 
context of a development conforming to ISO 26262. 
Our justification for using the ISO 26262 scheme risk to assess a mechatronic system is that in 
practice the assessment of the E/E system has always had to take into account the capabilities of the 
actuators, or their assumed capabilities, and their effects on the mechanical components. The 
magnitude of these effects (e.g. torque output, force exerted, speed of operation, brightness, 
loudness), or their estimates, are necessary to determine values of severity and controllability. 
In the mechatronic example given in Chapter 4, the assessment of unmitigated risk is the subject 
matter of Pars 1, and design artefacts produced are the same as for an E/E system except for a name 
change. 
6.3 Integrity levels 
The Pfault term in the conditional probability risk model is handled by ISO 26262 with the concept 
of an integrity level, Chapter 22.3.3 Product Safety – Levels, which is assigned to safety 
requirements. The Pfault term includes the probability of occurrence of both systematic and random 
causes of faults. By assigning an integrity level to the safety requirements, ISO 26262 is indirectly 
specifying process measures, referred to here as process tailoring, whose aim is to reduce Pfault to 
an acceptable value, although this is never expressed as a number. Process tailoring is discussed 
further in section 6.5. ISO 26262 uses the same term, ASIL, to indicate both the unmitigated risk 
associated with the item and the integrity with which a safety requirement is to be implemented.  
However, as noted in Chapter 4, there is a problem in applying the ISO 26262 framework to a 
mechatronic system because a value of ASIL cannot be assigned to safety requirements placed on 
the mechanical elements of the architecture. We now start to describe a proposed solution to this 
problem. The first step is to replace the use of ASIL to indicate the value of the unmitigated risk 
with a more generic term, RUm, so the ISO 26262 risk table (part-3, Table 4), is now as shown in 
Table 27. This approach is similar to that used in the MISRA Safety Analysis Guidelines, [52]. It 
is also used in edition 2 of ISO 26262, where the unmitigated risk of a motorcycle hazard is assigned 
an MSIL value and this is then mapped to a value of ASIL to indicate the integrity required of the 
mitigation measures required. The use of the RUm terms will be explained in the following sections. 
Note, the values of S0, E0 and C0 do not appear in the table because ISO 26262 does not complete 
a risk assessment if one of these values is assigned. 
6.4 Risk Mitigation Strategy 
The first stage in risk mitigation is to define a strategy for handling the right-hand side of the bow-
tie diagram. Risk mitigation may be achieved by addressing the P[harm | faulty-machine-
behaviour] term of the risk model or by addressing the severity of the consequence. Adapting the 
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terminology of ISO 26262, this involves the definition of a mechatronic safety goal followed by 
the specification of a mechatronic functional safety concept. Following the ISO 26262 approach, 
the concept of process tailoring is not applied when defining the risk mitigation strategy and the 
same process is followed irrespective of the RUm values assigned to the mechatronic safety goals. 
 
Severity 
Class 
Exposure 
Class 
Controllability Class 
C1 C2 C3 
S1 E1 RUm1 RUm1 RUm1 
E2 RUm1 RUm1 RUm1 
E3 RUm1 RUm1 RUm2 
E4 RUm1 RUm2 RUm3 
S2 E1 RUm1 RUm1 RUm1 
E2 RUm1 RUm1 RUm2 
E3 RUm1 RUm2 RUm3 
E4 RUm2 RUm3 RUm4 
S3 E1 RUm1 RUm1 RUm2 
E2 RUm1 RUm2 RUm3 
E3 RUm2 RUm3 RUm4 
E4 RUm3 RUm4 RUm5 
Table 27: Redrafted ISO 26262 Risk Table 
6.4.1 Mechatronic Safety Goals 
A mechatronic safety goal is a top-level safety requirement associated with one or more hazardous 
events. If it is met, then the potential for unreasonable risk of its associated hazardous events is 
avoided. It is expressed as a functional objective and is the basis on which functional safety 
requirements are determined. In practice, there are two styles of defining these goals; one is in terms 
of system behaviour, for example, entering a safe state or constraining nominal behaviour and the 
other is defining the goal as a statement that unreasonable risk shall be avoided. The significance 
of this is discussed below. The mechatronic safety goals are assigned a value of RUm which is taken 
as the worst case value from their associated hazardous events. In the Chapter 4 example, the 
mechatronic safety goals are defined in Pars 1. The process and design artefacts required by ISO 
26262 are applicable to the mechatronic system. 
6.4.2 Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept 
A mechatronic functional safety concept is intended to achieve the mechatronic safety goals with 
which it is associated. It may be based on entering a safe state or constraining nominal behaviour, 
for example: 
 Warnings to the driver to prompt actions to maintain control which reduce the value of 
controllability 
 Changes to vehicle behaviour to allow the driver to maintain control which reduce the value 
of controllability 
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 Changes to vehicle behaviour to prevent entry into, or to exit from, the hazardous event 
which reduce the value of exposure 
 Reduction of the magnitude of the effect to reduce the value of severity 
The concept is defined by allocating mechatronic functional safety requirements to elements of the 
mechatronic system architecture. The significant change for the mechatronic system is that the 
concept now explicitly includes the mechanical design as described as a function structure in the 
Mechanical Architecture, see Chapter 2, section 2.1.4 Mechanical Design. The established 
mechanical engineering design approaches to safety, as described in Chapter 2, section 2.3.3Product 
Safety - Mechanical Design, are now considered to be part of the mechatronic functional safety 
concept. This is not the case for an E/E system development where any relevant mechanical aspects 
would only have been documented in the item definition. The mechatronic functional safety 
requirements are assigned a value of RUm which is taken as the worst case value from their 
associated mechatronic safety goals. The mechatronic functional safety concept can still allocate 
safety requirements to external measures which can be an E/E system or non-E/E technology. The 
latter do not have a RUm value associated with them, so the sense of integrity required of the design 
and implementation of the measures is not considered as it is out of scope. 
In the Chapter 4 example, the mechatronic functional safety concept is defined in Pars 2. The 
process and design artefacts required by ISO 26262 are applicable to the mechatronic system; some 
of the artefacts have been renamed but the content has not substantively changed.  
The aim of the risk mitigation strategy is to avoid any unreasonable risk which was identified by 
the assessment of the unmitigated risk. Therefore, the sufficiency of the risk mitigation strategy has 
to be argued based on its ability to avoid unreasonable risk. The argument may be based on the 
definition of the mechatronic safety goals if these are defined in terms of system behaviour. If the 
goals are a statement that unreasonable risk shall be avoided, then the argument has to be based on 
the mechatronic functional safety concept. In the MISRA framework, [200], the argument is made 
for the safety goals which define the required top level system behaviour. The sufficiency of the 
risk mitigation is demonstrated by using the ISO 26262 risk assessment scheme to assess the 
residual risk associated with the item, assuming that the top level system behaviour has been 
achieved. This approach is adopted here for the mechatronic system. 
6.5 Risk Mitigation Implementation 
The design proceeds by the derivation and implementation of the safety requirements at the different 
design levels and across the different technologies so that together they result in the defined strategy 
being achieved. In the mechatronic example of Chapter 4, these are Pars 3 Mechatronic Technical 
Safety Concept, Pars 4: E/E System Technical Safety Concept, Pars 5 Hardware Design, Pars 6 
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Software Design and Pars 7 Mechanical Design. The safety requirements in each Pars are derived 
from the information cascaded to them from other Partes and from analysis of the design performed 
in the Pars. 
Systematic faults may occur in the derivation and implementation of the safety requirements. 
Random faults may occur due to hardware failures. In terms of the conditional probability risk 
model, we are considering the left-hand side of the bow-tie diagram, Pfault * P[hazard | fault]. The 
Pfault term covers the occurrence of both the systematic and random faults; this is addressed by the 
concept of integrity levels as described above. The P[hazard | fault] covers the possibility of a fault 
resulting in a hazard; this is addressed by an analysis of the design at each level to understand how 
faults result in failures which cascade from one element of the design to another. Based on this 
understanding, safety requirements are specified for the detection of faults, or failures, and for a 
system response in compliance with the mechatronic functional safety concept. 
To apply the ISO 26262 process tailoring to the E/E system-related Partes (4, 5 and 6) we need to 
map the values of RUm to ASILs, representing the integrity with which the safety requirements are 
implemented. This allows the Pfault term to be addressed for these Partes. This a trivial task as the 
RUm values were defined as direct replacements for the ASIL values in the ISO 26262 table, where 
they are first defined as an indication of the unmitigated risk. 
For Pars 7 mechanical design, we have the problem highlighted in Chapter 4. The challenge is to 
have a practical means of including the concept of integrity in the DFMEA quality-based processes 
used in mechanical engineering. There are two issues, a means of communicating a value of 
integrity and an interpretation of the value it a manner that can be acted upon in the context of the 
DFMEA. The latter is a challenge because of the range of technologies, their failure modes and 
their associated design practices. Any proposed scheme has to be sufficient general to allow it to be 
applicable to a wide range of technologies. Our approach is to use a very general scheme. 
Our proposed means of addressing the first issue to use special characteristics. A DFMEA is 
usually a means of identifying a special characteristic, here we propose a different use whereby the 
special characteristic is identified by the assessment of the unmitigated risk. As an example, we 
propose a mapping from RUm values to an arbitrary set of special characteristics (SSSC1, SSSC2, 
SSSC3, SSSC4, SSSC5) as shown in Table 28, along with the mapping of RUm values to ASIL values. 
Five special characteristics have been designated to match the five values of unmitigated risk. The 
proposed use of these designations is explained in section 6.5.3. 
6.5.1 Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept 
The specification of a mechatronic technical safety concept is a new stage that we introduced in the 
Chapter 4 example to allow the mechatronic functional requirements to be allocated to elements of 
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the mechanical and E/E designs. The significance of the change is that safety requirements are 
explicitly cascaded to the mechanical design, whereas for an E/E system the item definition only 
records any relevant assumptions about the mechanical design. The mechatronic technical safety 
requirements are assigned a value of RUm which is taken as the worst case value from their 
associated mechatronic technical safety requirements.  
Inherent Conceptual 
Operational Risk 
E/E System Requirement 
Integrity Attribute 
Mechanical Component Design 
DFMEA Special Characteristics 
RUm1 QM SSSC1 
RUm2 ASILA SSSC2 
RUm3 ASILB SSSC3 
RUm4 ASILC SSSC4 
RUm5 ASILD SSSC5 
Table 28: Mapping Risk to Integrity requirements 
Although there is not direct equivalent in ISO 26262, it was possible to reapply the artefacts and 
properties from E/E system design. While ISO 26262 does support process tailoring for the E/E 
system design, we do not attempt to define any tailoring here as the result would be purely arbitrary. 
However, some of the system testing that is performed in the E/E system Pars will now be 
performed in the mechatronic technical safety concept Pars; this testing is tailored so this could 
form the basis on which tailoring is brought into this Pars. We do not advocate tailoring for 
derivation of the mechatronic technical safety requirements as these are seen as being just as 
significant for the overall safety case as the mechatronic functional safety requirements for which 
there is no process tailoring. 
6.5.2 E/E System Design 
In Chapter 4 we saw that Pars 4, Pars 5 and Pars 6 are similar to the equivalents for an E/E system. 
Therefore, the process, artefacts and properties defined by ISO 26262 can all be reused in this 
context. The process tailoring to achieve the required integrity, as indicated by the ASIL value 
assigned to the safety requirements, is defined in the relevant parts of ISO 26262. The process 
requirements of ISO 26262 achieve the required integrity by being tailored depending on the ASIL 
value of the safety requirements that they are handling. The tailoring works by having some of the 
clauses of the standard only applicable to higher values of ASILs, or by having the strength of the 
recommendation to use particular techniques, to establish the properties of artefact, dependent of 
the value of ASIL.  
6.5.3 Mechanical Design 
In Chapter 4 for Pars 7 Mechanical Design, we identified robustness as a key property pertinent to 
the safety argument. The robustness property will be established by the use of the DFMEA, or 
broader failure mode avoidance process based on the DFMEA, see Chapter 2, section 2.3.2 Product 
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Quality. In this section we will describe how the concept of integrity can be brought into the 
DMFEA process through the use of special characteristics. 
First, we contrast our proposal for the mechanical design with that of the E/E system design. For an 
E/E system, safety requirements, with assigned integrity values, are allocated to an element of the 
architecture. These are then implemented and verified in a design using a process consistent with 
the integrity values of the safety requirements. For a mechanical design, safety requirements, with 
assigned integrity values, are allocated to a mechanical element of the architecture. These are then 
implemented in a design and the design analysed using a DFMEA. For those failure modes that 
would cause a safety requirement not to be met, design controls are applied in accordance with the 
integrity value of the safety requirement that would be violated. 
Pars 7 has mechatronic technical safety requirements cascaded to it. We propose that these safety 
requirements have values of RUm assigned to them. A mechanical design is created to fulfil both the 
nominal behaviour requirements and the mechatronic technical safety requirements. The design is 
analysed using a DFMEA. 
Below we describe how the use of the DFMEA fits in with the condition probability risk model and 
how special characteristics could be used as a means to bring the concept of integrity into the 
DFMEA process. A fuller description of special characteristics in general is given along with 
suggestions for defining a meaningful interpretation of them for achieving integrity. 
DFMEA and the conditional probability risk model 
As described in Appendix A, the DFMEA models the subject of analysis as a set of functions; for 
each function it assesses the effects of each of its failure modes and determines possible causes of 
the failure mode. In the bow-tie diagram, Figure 76, the effect is the faulty-machine-behaviour. The 
likelihood of the effect occurring is assessed by assigning an occurrence ranking to the cause of the 
failure mode and a detection ranking to the cause of the failure mode and/or the failure mode itself. 
These rankings are effectively estimating Pfault * P[Effect | fault], but this estimation is not an 
absolute value, but rather is a value that is relative to the subject of analysis. This accounts for the 
Pfault * P[faulty-machine-behaviour | fault] term in our mathematical model, 6.1. 
The P[harm | effect] term is not formally evaluated in the DFMEA. A binary decision is made as 
to whether or not the effect has the capacity to cause harm based on a consideration of the severity 
ranking, with a value of 10 being assigned if the team consider that the effect meets the criteria 
given, e.g. potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation, [159]. Unlike the ISO 26262 
scheme, this is no systematic analysis of the failure mode in different operating situations, this 
means that consequences with lower values of unmitigated risk may not be identified.  The value 
may be reduced to 9 if the driver is warned of the effect or failure and it is deemed that they have 
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time to act to prevent the harm occurring. So in the evaluation of Pharm, Pfault * P[effect | fault] is 
represented by a tuple {occurrence ranking, detection ranking} and P[harm | effect] is assigned a 
value of 0 or 1. The occurrence ranking and detection ranking take values of 1 to 10, but these have 
no universal interpretation as the rankings are relative to the subject of the analysis. 
The DFMEA seeks to reduce the Pfault and P[effect | fault] terms by the use of Prevention Design 
Controls and Detection Design Controls. Prevention Design Controls can include means to detect 
and manage causes or failure modes during normal operation; adapting the ISO 26262 terminology, 
these are part of the mechatronic functional safety concept. The severity ranking can be changed if 
the cause or the failure mode can be eliminated by the Prevention Design Controls and Detection 
Design Controls. 
As has been noted, in most instances the DFMEA is revealing issues related to customer 
convenience rather that customer safety. There will be times when the safety and customer 
convenience arguments will be in conflict with each other, for example the use of an interlock to 
prevent vehicle movement if a seat belt is not being used. The debates around such issues are 
legitimate and the fact that, under our proposal, the safety aspects will be made more visible will 
only lead to a more informed debate. 
Relating the DFMEA Results to the Assessment of Unmitigated Risk 
We propose two linking mechanisms for relating the results of the DFMEA to the assessment of 
the unmitigated risk. 
The DFMEA identifies failure modes, their effects and their causes. The effects will be identified at 
the boundary of the design and also on the final product, in this case the vehicle. The effects will be 
assigned a severity ranking, a vehicle level effect that is deemed to be safety related which will be 
assigned value of 9 or 10. A value of 10 may be designated as a critical characteristic which is an 
example of the normal use of a special characteristic. In our proposal, such vehicle level effects 
would be cascaded to Pars 1 for comparison with the set of identified hazards. If the effect 
represents a new hazard, then the risk assessment is updated and, if necessary, revised mechatronic 
safety goals are cascaded to Pars 2. This is the first proposed mechanism for relating the results of 
the DFMEA to the assessment of the unmitigated risk. 
We also propose that the effects identified by the DFMEA at the boundary of the design be related 
to the mechatronic technical safety requirements implemented by the design. If an effect causes one 
of the safety requirements to be violated then the severity ranking of the effect would be set to a 
value of 10 regardless of the ranking assigned in the DFMEA. In these cases it is more appropriate 
for the severity to be defined top-down rather than inductively from the component; this would 
ensure a level of consistency that is not traditionally sort. The value of the unmitigated risk assigned 
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to the safety requirements would be translated into a SSSC value. This value would mandate the use 
of defined prevention controls and detection controls as described in the next section. 
Special Characteristics 
The quality standard, IATF 16949:2016, [143] is universally used in the automotive industry and 
certification by external auditors is usually obtained. It requires the use of FMEA and it also calls 
for special characteristics to be identified and acted on. Special characteristics are defined as 
“those characteristics of the design that are crucial to the safe and proper functioning of the 
product” and the use of FMEA is acknowledged as a technique by which they can be identified. 
SAE J1739, [159], and the VDA standard, [172], also acknowledge that the technique can be used 
to identify special characteristics. ISO 26262 also recognises safety-related special characteristics 
which defines as a “characteristic of an item or an element, or else their production process, for 
which reasonably foreseeable deviation could impact, contribute to, or cause any potential 
reduction of functional safety”. 
Given the definition of a special characteristic, it seems eminently suitable as a means of linking 
the concept of integrity from the functional safety process into the quality management process. 
Special characteristics are normally created by a DFMEA, see Appendix A, but in this proposed 
usage, they are created by design and feed into the DFMEA. 
Interpreting Special Characterises as Integrity 
In Table 28, five different special characteristics are listed, but in practice each organisation would 
decide how many they needed and how they mapped to values of RUm. Although five have been 
listed to match the number of levels of unmitigated risk, in practice it is unlikely that it would be 
practical to define five different levels of integrity in every circumstance. 
In our proposal, each special characteristic would be defined to state criteria against which the 
sufficiency of the Prevention Design Controls and Detection Design Controls could be judged. The 
use of the design controls in this way is our proposed way of introducing the concept of integrity 
into the mechanical domain. In this way we are avoiding the functional safety approach of the 
having a whole process defined in terms of different integrity values and we are building on what 
is already established practice. 
Defining the criteria for each special characteristic would not be a simple task. One approach could 
be based on comparing the mechanical practice for those systems that have always been seen as 
safety related, e.g. brakes and steering, and relating this to the ASIL value of the associated E/E 
controller. This could then be taken as a benchmark for other mechanical systems whose E/E 
controllers have the same ASIL value. 
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It may be possible to abstract out certain aspects of the development that are common to both the 
mechanical design and the E/E system design, e.g. testing. The requirements of the ASIL value 
should be consistent with those of the associated special characteristic, in the case of the testing, 
we would expect both domains to be performing comparable levels of testing. 
The FMEA standards provide examples of design controls. SAE J1739, [159], gives the example 
design controls shown in Table 29. One can see that the standards used, or the rigour with which 
the techniques are applied could be varied to provide different levels of integrity. 
Prevention Controls Detection Controls 
Use of published design standards Use of finite Element Analysis 
Use of heat treatment specification Use of CAE analytics 
Use of redundant design measures, e.g. sensor shield Use of tolerance stack analysis 
Use of corporate best practice standard designs Use of validation testing (fatigue, water intrusion, 
vibration, ride and handling, etc.) 
Use of system detection and driver notification for 
servicing 
 
Use of system detection and operational status display to 
driver 
 
Table 29: SAE J1739 Example Design Controls 
The VDA standard, [172], gives the use of simulation and tolerance calculation as examples of 
Preventative Actions. For Detection Actions it gives examples of the use of simulation, test plan 
rigour and the rigor of the drawing checks. Again, one can see that varying the rigour with which 
the techniques are applied could be used to provide different levels of integrity. 
The results of the DFMEA case study may also provide criteria that could be used in the definition 
of the special characteristics. Table 17 listed the characteristics of a well performed DFMEA, from 
these, potential subjects that could be used as the basis for defining different levels of integrity are 
shown in Table 30 
Requirements for stakeholder involvement 
The rigour with which the functions are defined through logical decomposition 
The rigour with which functions are related to customer requirements 
The degree to which the function definitions are defined in scientific or engineering terms specific to the component 
The use of the different failure mode types 
The number of cause that have to be considered for each failure mode 
The mandatory use of design standards as controls 
The rigour with which Prevention Controls are linked to the design requirements specification 
The use of test standards as controls 
The rigour with which the product development is documented 
Table 30: Potential Integrity Subjects based on a well performed DFMEA 
 Table 18 lists completion criteria; from these, the rigour of the review could be used as the basis 
for defining different levels of integrity are shown in Table 31. Some of these may be a binary 
decision to perform the check or not. 
Check that all the correct controls are in place and actioned 
Check that the risk assessment scores 
Check the analysis has been performed to the appropriate depth 
Perform a system review 
Table 31: Potential Integrity Subjects based on a Complete Review 
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It may also be possible use the special characteristic definitions to prescribe the rigour with which 
the quality processes mentioned in Chapter 2, section 2.3.2 Product Quality, are applied. It may also 
be possible use the special characteristic definitions to specify the use of safety factors in the 
mechanical design, see Chapter 2, section 2.3.3 Product Safety. 
The use of subjects like those mentioned above to define integrity would need to be carefully 
calibrated to achieve the required integrity while remaining practical. This calibration would have 
to be established over a period of time by feeding back actual experience into the process. We 
should stress that this proposal is an example scheme. 
A diagram showing the flow of requirements and their integrity values is shown in Figure 77. 
 
Figure 77: Cascade of requirements and integrity values 
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6.6 Alternative sufficiency criteria 
Given that reliability engineering is well-established in the mechanical design, [177], [176], the 
question arises as to why this is not used as a sufficiency criteria. There are two issues regarding its 
use. One is that the functional safety approach is not based on meeting a probabilistic occurrence 
value for a safety goal; even the ISO 26262 target values for hardware metrics are chosen by the 
designer. The other is the general understanding that for complex software-based systems, errors in 
the derivation and implementation of safety requirements are just as significant, if not more, than 
the random failures covered by reliability engineering. As we saw in Chapter 2, the use of 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been strongly criticised by Leveson, [75]. 
6.7 Summary of overall scheme 
In this chapter we have proposed a scheme for flowing down safety requirements, with assigned 
integrity values, from the highest level of system description to the implementation, Figure 77. We 
have shown how the risk assessment of the functional safety process relates to that of the DFMEA 
through the conditional probability risk model. We have separated out the two meanings of the ISO 
26262 ASIL, which has allowed us to feed integrity values, derived from the risk assessment, into 
the DFMEA quality-based processes used in mechanical engineering. 
There are steps in the process that have not been fully worked out. We have not proposed any 
process tailoring for the Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept, Pars 3, although to be consistent 
with ISO 26262 the testing performed here would have some tailoring based on the require integrity. 
We have only suggested possible sources for the definition of the SSSC values and it will be a non-
trivial task to define these. 
In practice, it is unlikely that the RUm terminology would be adopted because the language of ASIL 
is now so deeply entrenched within the automotive industry. This does not invalidate the scheme as 
ASIL values can still be mapped to SSSC values 
175 
 
Chapter 7 Evaluation 
7.1 Introduction 
The research objective stated in Chapter 1 is to establish a uniform approach to justifying that an 
automotive mechatronic system is fit to be put into production from a “functional safety” 
perspective. The intention is to extend the existing work on automotive safety arguments for E/E 
systems which is based around a product requirements decomposition over a generic view of the 
system design through levels of design abstraction. Consequently, it was necessary to have a 
mechatronic system equivalent of the generic E/E system levels of design abstraction which can be 
used as the basis for requirements decomposition, and on which a safety argument can be 
constructed that includes the design of the mechanical elements of the system. A number of specific 
thesis objectives were defined to achieve this: 
 TO1: To establish a design representation upon which a safety argument can be based 
 TO2: To establish a safety argument pattern based on the design representation  
 TO3: To establish a linkage of functional safety integrity to mechanical development 
 TO4: To establish a means of providing evidence to support claims related to mechanical 
development 
In this chapter we describe and evaluate work done on each of these thesis objectives in turn. We 
describe the further evaluation that can be performed and finally state what contributions have been 
achieved in this work. 
7.2 TO1: To establish a design representation 
Research Approach 
The motivation was to have a pattern for representing levels of mechatronic system design 
abstraction that was not just an extension of existing patterns for an E/E system, e.g. the MISRA 
framework, [200]. We were conscious that in practice the work would be divided between many 
different parties, e.g. departments, companies, and that a pattern would have to be based on 
something that recognised this division. This led naturally to this first thesis objective to find a 
suitable pattern for representing the division of work for the development of a mechatronic system. 
The initial approach to finding a suitable pattern was to review the literature on general systems 
engineering, mechatronic systems, mechanical design and E/E system design. However, we were 
unable to find a suitable means of describing a system as a decomposition through levels of design 
abstraction upon which a safety argument could be constructed. The literature review also 
confirmed that there is no equivalent in the mechanical design process of the concept of integrity 
levels, which is fundamental to the functional safety standards. 
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Consequently, it was necessary to produce our own description, which we term the Pars approach. 
The development of this is explained in section 3.1 onwards. The Pars approach is based on 
defining a generic model for engineering development that can be applied at any level of 
abstraction. The model consists of an ontology, a process and an argument pattern. The ontology 
defines logical entities, physical entities and their relationships. To use the Pars approach, system 
development is divided into a set of appropriate abstraction levels and an ontology for a Pars is 
defined at each abstraction level based on the generic model. The process covers the production of 
the entities defined by the ontology. 
Note, although we are using the phrase “abstraction levels” as the means to divide system 
development, as noted in section 3.2.2, in practice the division may be at the same level of 
abstraction but cover different technologies, e.g. E/E system development and mechanical 
development. 
In our usage of the Pars approach, a set of Partes is first defined for a generic system, e.g. E/E 
system, mechatronic system, and then the generic system set of Partes is instantiated for a particular 
system. In our example we have instantiated the generic mechatronic system set of Partes for a Four 
Corner Air Suspension system. 
Evaluation 
The Pars approach is a theoretical conjecture whose validity can be contested. For example, are the 
entities defined in the ontology sufficient to describe a real system that has been divided into a set 
of abstraction levels? Also, are the relationships the right ones and do they hold in practice? To 
provide some confidence that the Pars approach works in practice a number of evaluations were 
performed: 
 Evaluation of the practicality of the Pars approach (Case Study 2) 
 Evaluation of Pars ability to model an E/E System 
 Evaluation of the ability of a mechatronic system represented as a set of Partes to map to 
design artefacts from an existing project, 4CAS 
To evaluate the practicality of the Pars approach, a short case study was performed based on an 
example of Four Corner Air Suspension. Potential issues with the use of this example are discussed 
in 7.4 below. The purpose of the case study was to ascertain: 
 What potential does the Pars approach have for accurately capturing all the information? 
 What potential does the Pars approach have to increase overall understanding of the 
system? 
 How practical is the Pars approach? 
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A qualitative technique of semi-structured interviews was used as the data collection instrument, 
[195]. General questions were asked to get an understanding of what the practitioners thought of 
the approach. The case study is written up in Appendix D. The overall result was positive. Staff 
responsible for the E/E system design and the mechanical system design could relate to the system 
described as a set of Partes; such an explicit representation of the development as a mechatronic 
system was seen as an improvement over current practice. Although the outcome was positive, there 
are limitations to the results of the case study. The sample size is small as it is necessarily restricted 
to staff still in the company who had worked on the project. A number of points are worth noting:  
 The set of Partes used was a simplified version of that described in Chapter 4, so is not 
fully representative 
 There were some practical concerns about the availability of the documents and the fact 
that the interplay between the different development streams is not explicitly shown on the 
diagram 
 The cascading of a specification from one Pars to another was seen as being a little 
artificial, as it may be the same staff who produce both the initial version of the specification 
and also the final one 
 The fact that requirements often change as a result of feedback between the Partes is not 
represented well 
To determine if the entities and relationships defined in the Pars ontology are sufficient to capture 
the generic descriptions of systems given in the literature, we first applied the approach to an E/E 
system by defining a set of Partes based on the abstraction levels given in ISO 26262, [13], i.e. Item 
definition & HARA (including safety goals), Functional Safety Concept, Technical Safety Concept, 
hardware development and software development. This is described in section 3.4, and 
demonstrated that all the major concepts of ISO 26262, see Appendix B, could be adequately 
represented. That this is the case is not surprising as this model is deeply ingrained in the author’s 
mind due to many years involvement in writing, and then applying, the standard. 
A second exercise, described in section 4.2, was then performed to further assess the adequacy of 
the entities and relationships defined in the Pars ontology. In this exercise, the Pars approach was 
applied to a mechatronic system by defining a set of Partes based on the abstraction levels given in 
ISO 26262, [13], with the addition of one for mechanical development. Some of the ISO 26262 
abstraction levels were reinterpreted for a mechatronic system, i.e. Mechatronic Item Definition & 
HARA (including mechatronic safety goals), Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept, Mechatronic 
Technical Safety Concept, E/E Technical Safety Concept. It was not necessary to change the 
definition of the Pars for hardware development and software development from those used to 
represent an E/E system. The definition of the Pars ontology for the mechanical development was 
based on a description given in Pahl and Beitz, [48]. The exercise demonstrated that Partes, 
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reinterpreted from their ISO 26262 equivalents, could adequately represent our division of a 
mechatronic system. The definition of the mechanical development Pars is more speculative and 
has not been subject to a review by a mechanical development specialist.  
To further test the Pars approach, some of the Partes in the set for the mechatronic system were 
instantiated using the 4CAS example, i.e. the entities of the ontologies were mapped to existing 
design artefacts of the 4CAS project. This is described in section 4.2. Potential issues with the use 
of the 4CAS example are discussed in 7.6 below. The ontology was instantiated for the following 
Partes, Mechatronic Item Definition & HARA (including mechatronic safety goals), Mechatronic 
Functional Safety Concept, Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept, E/E Technical Safety Concept 
and the mechanical development. The evaluation using the 4CAS example in only a partial exercise; 
the coverage achieved against the Pars model is shown in Table 1Table 32 where the shaded cells 
indicate what was covered. 
 
Table 32: Coverage of Mechatronic Parts by 4CAS example 
Coverage was limited because most of the ontology entities do not have associated 4CAS 
documentation. In some instances the necessary document did not exist, in others, e.g. requirements, 
the documentation is large and stored in databases that are not easy to portray in a text document. 
Also, the development was not planned to follow the Pars approach and so not all the 
documentation included in Partes ontologies would be produced by the process that was followed 
at the time. So, the exercise only gives a flavour of how an instantiation may look. However, it did 
show that, for the Partes involved, the existing project document could be mapped to entities of the 
ontology. Although not conclusive, the approach shows promise, and nothing has been revealed 
that shows it could not be made to work. The generic Pars process, given in section 3.3.2, has not 
been subject to any evaluation. 
Conclusion 
While the evaluations of the Pars ontology approach to representing a mechatronic system 
performed to date are only partial and not conclusive, the overall approach has not yet encountered 
any major obstacles to its application from a user’s practicality perspective or from the partial 
Pars 1 Pars 2 Pars 3 Pars 4 Pars 5 Pars 6 Pars 7
B1 Pars Design Description
B2 Pars Design
B3 Pars Design Choice
B4 Property
B5 Verification
B6 Aspect Cascaded to other Partes
B7 Aspect Realized in current Pars
B9 Physical Part Realization
B10 Related Physical Part
Generic Pars
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instantiations. We note that the Pars approach does not improve the situation regarding the 
composition of modular arguments as described in 3.3.1. Further evaluation is discussed in 7.7.1. 
The Pars approach has some similarities with the use of a work package in project management. In 
project management, a work package is an independently deliverable unit linked to an organization 
with clear relationships to other work packages, [201]. This adds weight to the practicality of the 
Pars approach. 
As mentioned in Appendix B, ISO 26262 requires that a Functional Safety Assessment be 
performed to demonstrate that functional safety has been achieved by the item. The standard implies 
that the assessment is performed by the owner of the item on the whole development. It does not 
address the fact that the development is always divided between different organisations, except for 
recognising the need for a distributed interface agreement and a hardware-software interface 
specification. In practice, each organisation defines its own scope for this activity and then performs 
a Functional Safety Assessment based on their scope. The owner of the item has the task of piecing 
together the different results to produce the overall assessment. The Pars concept was developed to 
explicitly acknowledge the division between organisations and should help facilitate the production 
of the overall assessment by having made the links between different aspects of the development 
explicit. 
The Pars approach result is very generic and potentially can be applied more widely than its use in 
this thesis, but evaluation exercises have only been performed within the limited scope of E/E 
systems and mechatronic systems. 
7.3 TO2: To establish a safety argument pattern 
Research Approach 
An argument pattern was developed as part of the development of the Pars approach, i.e. the 
argument is based around the Pars design ontology. This is explained in sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4. 
The argument pattern is for the design, but our use of the pattern is for safety. The Pars approach 
requires a system development to be divided into a set of appropriate abstraction levels and a Pars 
ontology defined for each one. The Pars argument pattern is applied at each abstraction level, based 
on the corresponding design Pars ontology for that level. This allows us to adopt the MISRA 
cascade of safety requirements approach for the mechatronic safety argument framework while 
basing it on a more generic system decomposition than the ISO 26262 safety requirements cascade 
used by MISRA. Several papers on the MISRA framework have been presented, [200], [187], and 
a draft copy of the guidelines was issued for public review, [189]. The approach of basing the 
argument around the cascade of safety requirements across levels of abstraction has not been 
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challenged. This approach is accommodated by the Pars argument pattern because it is based on 
the more generic concept of properties that includes compliance with safety requirements. 
In the same way that we did for the ontologies, we have defined a set of argument patterns 
corresponding to the Partes for a generic system, e.g. E/E system, mechatronic system. These then 
have to be instantiated for a particular system, e.g. Four Corner Air Suspension. 
Evaluation 
The Pars safety argument pattern is only valid if the Pars design ontology is valid. We have 
evaluated the safety argument pattern assuming that the Pars design ontology is valid, but this 
validity has only been partially established. Even assuming that the Pars ontology is valid, the Pars 
argument pattern is a theoretical conjecture whose validity can be contested. To provide some 
confidence in the validity of the Pars argument, two evaluation exercises were performed based on 
a mechatronic system: 
 Evaluation of the Pars argument pattern’s ability to represent a safety argument for a 
generic mechatronic system 
 Evaluation of the Pars argument pattern’s ability to represent a safety argument for a 
particular instantiation of a mechatronic system based on an existing project, 4CAS 
As described in 4.2, a set of Partes for a generic mechatronic system were defined based on the 
abstraction levels given in ISO 26262, [13], with the addition of one for mechanical development. 
For the first evaluation exercise, also described in 4.2, the corresponding argument pattern was 
instantiated for each of the generic mechatronic system Partes. The exercise demonstrated that it is 
possible to construct a set of claims for each of the generic mechatronic system Partes and link 
them together using common context symbols. However, the instantiation of the argument pattern 
follows directly from the definition of the ontology, so the result is not surprising and not 
particularly significant. 
For the second evaluation exercise, the argument patterns for a generic mechatronic system were 
instantiated for some of the Partes, as presented in Appendix C. The instantiation used material 
from a previous mechatronic project, 4CAS. Potential issues with the use of the 4CAS example are 
discussed in 7.6 below. The exercise showed that all the argument contexts and claims could be 
instantiated with relevant 4CAS related documentation. All of the properties, stated as contexts, 
that had to be demonstrated were adapted from the corresponding ISO 26262 requirements. The 
design artefacts, stated as contexts, were instantiated in a number of ways. Sometimes, 4CAS 
project data was quoted directly, e.g. a named hazardous event. Sometimes, a direct reference was 
made to 4CAS project documentation that is given in Chapter 4. In some instances, reference was 
made to 4CAS documentation not given in the thesis, e.g. requirements database. For the 4CAS 
physical parts, a general reference was made. In terms of the GSN, the claims were not developed 
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further than the level given in the generic argument pattern. The claims were argued at that level in 
a number of ways. In one instance the type of argument required was discussed but not given. In 
some instances 4CAS project data was quoted directly. In some instances a reference was made to 
4CAS project documentation not given in the thesis, although in some cases it was summarised. In 
some instances a reference was made to documentation that was not produced by the 4CAS project, 
although there is no reason why such documentation could not be produced. In some instances 
reference was made to MISRA guidelines, [189], for suggestions of topics which could be argued 
over to support the claim. Finally, in some instances reference was made to material produced in 
other Pars as this reflects the structure of the complete argument. The exercise did not reveal the 
need for documentation or rationale that could not in principle be produced. 
Although the evaluation exercise did not reveal any reasons why the argument pattern could not be 
implemented, it is recognised that this was only a partial evaluation as it only involved three out of 
the seven Partes which define the generic mechatronic system. The lack of coverage of the Pars 4, 
E/E system design, Pars 5, hardware design and Pars 6, software design, is not so significant as this 
is subject to other work by MISRA, [189]. However, the fact that Pars 7, mechanical design, was 
not included represents a significant gap in the evaluation. Although the evaluation was only based 
on a single hazardous event, there is no reason to suppose that other hazardous events would reveal 
unsurmountable difficulties. 
Conclusion 
We have gone some way towards showing that the Pars safety pattern can be used in practice as a 
means of structuring a mechatronic safety argument. We acknowledge that the argument pattern is 
only partially evaluated, with the absence of any evaluation of the mechanical Pars being 
particularly serious. We also acknowledge that the Pars safety pattern is based on a partially 
evaluated Pars ontology. Nevertheless, the approach shows promise. Further evaluation is 
discussed in 7.7.1. 
Our approach of basing a safety argument on a design pattern, and only arguing over the safety 
related artefacts and properties, has been shown to work in practice. While it was necessary to 
define some new safety artefacts specifically for the mechatronic system, e.g. the Mechatronic 
Functional Safety Concept, basing them on their equivalents in ISO 26262 meant that this was 
easily accomplished.  
We believe that basing the argument pattern on the ontology is a novel approach. The composition 
of the different arguments of each Pars into an argument for the whole system is not entirely novel, 
as the concept of modular safety case is well established, [202]. In practice, it will be a management 
challenge to collate the information from multiple sources and ensure the material is at the correct 
version and is consistent. 
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The argument pattern requires that claims for each design artefact be made and supported by 
evidence. In practice, there may be many design artefacts; documenting and supporting claims for 
all of them may be impractical, in which case it is necessary to make decisions about which claims 
to fully document. Such decisions could be informed by the criticality of the safety requirements 
being implemented, the novelty of the design or the complexity of the design. More guidance on 
this topic is given the MISRA document, [189].  
7.4 TO3: To establish a linkage of integrity to mechanical development 
7.4.1 Introduction 
As explained in the section on levels in 2.3.3, the concept of integrity is key to E/E system functional 
safety standards. In ISO 26262 this is represented by the ASIL value. It starts with an assessment of 
the unmitigated risk which, as we reasoned in section 4.4, is as applicable to a mechatronic system 
as to an E/E system. It then translates into the rigour needed to implement the safety requirements 
necessary to mitigate the assessed unmitigated risk. The degree of rigour4 applied is then used to 
justify a claim concerning the integrity of the developed product. This concept is not present in 
mechanical engineering. 
We have decided to use the DFMEA process as a means to establish a link between the assessed 
unmitigated risk and the integrity required of the mechanical engineering development. To establish 
this link the following are necessary: 
1. The failure modes of the DFMEA have to be associated with the relevant mechatronic 
technical safety requirements that would be affected by the failure mode 
2. For those failures modes that are so associated, the integrity of the safety requirement has 
to be assigned to the failure mode 
3. The meaning of the integrity, in terms of the choice of prevention controls and detection 
controls used to mitigate the failure mode, has to be defined 
The first of these is achieved by defining the boundary of the DFMEA such that the relationship to 
the mechatronic technical safety requirements is clearly documented. The DFMEA step of 
determining the effect at the boundary, see A.6, will then establish the necessary link. 
To achieve the second, we first proposed a means by which the two aspects of the ASIL value, risk 
assessment and required process rigour, could be separated. This is described in sections 6.4 and 
6.5. The ISO 26262 risk assessment is applied to a mechatronic system, but, instead of the result 
being assigned a value of ASIL, it is assigned a value of unmitigated risk RUn. The value of RUn is 
assigned to all the safety requirements derived to mitigate the risk. In order to determine the process 
                                                     
4 It is acknowledged that the integrity of the developed product may also be justified based on design 
considerations, but we confine ourselves to only process rigout in this discussion. 
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rigour needed to implement the safety requirements, the value of RUn is mapped to two other values. 
One is an ASIL value which indicates the requirements from ISO 26262 that are applicable to the 
Mechatronic Item Definition & HARA (including mechatronic safety goals), the Mechatronic 
Functional Safety Concept, the Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept, the E/E Technical Safety 
Concept, the hardware development and the software development. The other is a SSSC value which 
becomes associated with the DFMEA failure modes via the effect at the boundary, as described 
above. The flow of values of RUn, ASIL and SSSC across the mechatronic Partes is shown in Figure 
77.  These proposals, while having a degree of face validity, have not been subject to any evaluation 
exercises. The topic of evaluation is discussed in 7.7.2. 
Defining the meaning of the integrity in terms of the choice of prevention and detection controls is 
discussed below in 7.7.3, but we first discuss the topic of special characteristics upon which the 
concept of SSSC values is based. 
7.4.2 The Use of Special Characteristics 
The proposal is to use the new concept of SSSC values to feed the concept of integrity into the 
development of mechanical components via the DFMEA, as described above. Our intention is to 
use mechanisms that are already accepted practice rather than proposing something entirely new. 
The introduction of something new may well meet with resistance and would take longer for it to 
become accepted practice. The use of special characteristics is already established practice in the 
automotive industry and is required by IATF 16949:2016, [143], which defines them as “those 
characteristics of the design that are crucial to the safe and proper functioning of the product”. So, 
while the normal process is for the DFMEA to determine the special characteristics, our proposed 
alternative usage, as a means to feed safety-related information, is consistent with the spirit of the 
standard. IATF 16949:2016 is universally used in the automotive industry and certification by 
external auditors is usually obtained. If our proposal was accepted, and this usage was in the scope 
of the external audit, it would then become institutionalised within organisations. 
7.4.3 Defining Integrity in the Mechanical Process 
We mentioned in Chapter 6 the daunting challenge of introducing the concept of integrity into the 
mechanical design process which requires the calibration of the SSSC values. The mechanical 
domain itself embraces a range of different technologies, e.g. pneumatic, hydraulic. Each of these 
have their own body of theory and practice as defined in standards and text books. The use of the 
DFMEA technique is likely to be adapted to the particular technology, and likewise the design 
controls used maybe technology-specific. By taking a very general approach we have abstracted 
the scheme from this challenge, but the challenge still remains. While some potential approaches 
to defining the meaning of special characteristics were described in Chapter 6 we recognise that 
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these are only theoretical and have not been subject to any evaluation. An evaluation of this topic 
is beyond the scope of that typical for a doctoral thesis. 
The use of special characteristics, as presented in Chapter 6, is not current practice and is an alien 
concept for mechanical engineering. From the second case study, Appendix D, it was seen that the 
current practice is to always follow one process, so having to define five variations of process would 
be a major challenge. However, functional safety standards and guidelines are application-neutral, 
and try to give guidance for any application within their unmitigated risk range results in them 
specifying different requirements depending on the assessment of the unmitigated risk, e.g. ASILA 
– ASILD. In practice, organisational units often develop only a narrow range of products that all 
tend to fall within the same place on the unmitigated risk scale. So, they have a single process that 
is carried out for all developments. The role of achieving the integrity requirements only occurs 
when the process is first defined and then when it is updated as industry practice develops. This is 
less true for a large organisation that produces electronic control units and may, within it, produce 
products for a range of values on the unmitigated risk scale and have a generic company process 
that is used for all products. However, even within the large company, there will be divisions and 
departments that specialise in a narrow range of products on the unmitigated risk scale, especially 
for products at the higher end of the unmitigated risk scale. In such large organisations it is 
customary for the generic process to be tailored for the particular products. It is also the case that 
departments and divisions specialise in particular mechanical products, especially in the high end 
of the unmitigated risk scale. So, the number of special characteristics to be defined, and the 
process variations that go with them, will be reduced. 
For an E/E system  ¸when a supplier declares that its component has been developed according to 
ISO 26262 for a particular value of ASIL, there is a common understanding in the industry of what 
this implies. This understanding is essential for the body that is responsible for integrating 
components from different suppliers, be they hardware or software. Such an understanding greatly 
aids the construction of the overall safety argument. An industry benchmark for special 
characteristics that can play a similar role for the mechanical components is necessary in order to 
ensure that a mechanical assembly is created from components which have an integrity consistent 
with that dictated by the assessed unmitigated risk and the design of the system. The need to have 
consistency of integrity between the mechanical components and the E/E control is becoming more 
important with the trend for the primary actuation of the vehicle to be allocated to smart actuators 
which then respond to actuation requests produced by centralised vehicle controllers. 
The calibration of the SSSC values is discussed further in 7.7.2. 
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7.4.4 Conditional Probability Risk Model 
Given the proposed use of the DFMEA as the link to mechanical development, there is a need to 
understand the relationship between the risk assessment it performs and the risk assessment that is 
required by the ISO 26262 standard. This understanding was gained by drawing a bow-tie diagram, 
Figure 76: Fault to harm model, and the creation of the conditional probability model based on it. 
As the ISO 26262 approach was based on the assumption that the hazard had occurred, the use of 
conditional probability was the obvious way to model this.  
The conditional probability model defined a number of terms: 
 fault – the potential cause of faulty-machine-behaviour 
 Pfault – the probability that the fault will occur 
 P[faulty-machine-behaviour | fault] – the probability that the fault will result in faulty-
machine-behaviour 
 faulty-machine-behaviour – associated with a hazard 
 Pharm – the probability that harm will occur as a result of the hazard 
 P[harm | faulty-machine-behaviour] – that the faulty-machine-behaviour will result in 
harm 
In this model, the DFMEA assesses Pfault * P[faulty-machine-behaviour | fault]. In DFMEA terms, 
the fault equates to the failure mode. It then employs prevention controls and detection controls to 
reduce Pfault to an acceptable value. 
The ISO 26262 risk assessment scheme assumes that the faulty-machine-behaviour/hazard has 
occurred and assesses P[harm | faulty-machine-behaviour]. In ISO 26262, the value of Pfault is more 
closely associated with the integrity levels; by meeting the standard’s requirements for the ASIL 
value, it may be claimed that the value of Pfault, due to systematic and random causes, is sufficiently 
low. So, for ISO 26262, P[harm | faulty-machine-behaviour] is assessed and used to determine the 
integrity necessary to claim that the value of  Pfault is sufficiently low. 
It is not unknown for conditional probability to be used as part of an FMEA. In a quantitative 
evaluation of an FMEA, a beta factor is used to represent the conditional probability that the failure 
effect will result in the identified severity classification, given that the failure mode occurs, [203]. 
This is effectively P[harm | faulty-machine-behaviour] in our model. Interestingly, the value of the 
beta factor is determined by the analyst's best judgment as to the likelihood that the loss will occur. 
The model has proved useful in understanding the relationship between the different assessments 
of the DFMEA and the ISO 26262 risk assessment. It has allowed us to build a bridge between the 
two by the use of the SSSC values. While with any model it is possible to find examples that do not 
quite fit, nevertheless the model seems to provide a broad understanding of the difference between 
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what the two risk assessments are trying to achieve. The model, while having a degree of face 
validity, has not been subject to any evaluation exercises. 
7.5 TO4: To establish evidence for claims for mechanical development 
A safety argument needs to be supported by evidence. For the mechatronic system safety argument 
most of the evidence required can be taken from ISO 26262. This can be as a reinterpretation of the 
E/E system requirements as is the case for the Mechatronic Item Definition & HARA, the 
Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept, the Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept, and the E/E 
Technical Safety Concept. In the case of hardware development and software development, the 
evidence required can be taken directly from ISO 26262. However, the question arises as to where 
the evidence to support claims regarding the mechanical development can be taken from. 
There are two types of evidence: that related to the design argument claims and that related to the 
safety argument claims. As noted when discussing properties of the mechanical design in section 
4.2.7, specific design properties are not given in the literature, only broad topics for evaluation from 
which it may be possible to derive specific properties that could be reasoned about in the argument. 
This topic of possible mechanical design properties is not expanded further, but is an area that could 
benefit from further research. As our objective is to develop a safety argument, the absence of detail 
concerning evidence to support the mechanical design argument is not an issue, i.e. we are only 
interested in arguing over the safety requirements. This is also the case for the E/E system design 
argument. 
Regarding evidence to support safety argument claims, we noted when discussing properties of the 
mechanical components in section 7.4.2, that testing is part of the mechanical design process. The 
testing objectives, means and results for design artefacts could be used to support satisfaction 
claims. Specific details have not been elucidated, but the mechanical design evaluation topics, Table 
11 and Table 12, provide a starting point for determining the relevant properties of the physical 
components. Also, noted in 4.2.7, fulfilment of cascaded requirements is a key physical realisation 
property; this includes safety requirements. This fulfilment would be a claim in the argument, and 
the evidence for this could be established by the use of test techniques in a similar way as for the 
E/E system. One of the key claims of the safety argument is that, for mechanical causes of 
malfunctioning behaviour, a complete set of safety requirements have been identified and put in 
place to sufficiently mitigate the causes and/or effects of malfunctioning behaviour.  
We have proposed a scheme by which mechanical safety requirements can be related to the 
mechatronic risk assessment, 7.4.1. In doing so, the mechanical safety requirements can have an 
assigned value of integrity, SSSC values, related to the risk assessment. The link to the mechanical 
safety requirements is via the DFMEA process, which then has to identify prevention controls and 
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detection controls which are commensurate with the integrity, based on the calibration of the SSSC 
values. In terms of a safety argument, this process has to support a claim of the form “Failures of 
mechanical components that violate mechatronic technical safety requirements have been mitigated 
by prevention and detection controls”. To support the claim, the process needs to have run and 
produced the design documentation. But evidence is also required for supporting claims regarding 
how well the process has been performed. These claims are examples of the MISRA means and 
organisational environment claims, [187]. This raises the question of whether the DFMEA process 
has the potential to support such claims. 
Research Method 
To determine if the DFMEA process has the potential to support means and organisational 
environment claims, a case study was conducted. The purpose of this was to understand the extent 
to which the DFMEA as practised does, or could, produce the evidence necessary to support claims 
related to the mechanical development. It addressed the research question, “What is the established 
role and practice of using DFMEA in an automotive context and the factors that influence its judged 
effectiveness?” 
Conclusion 
The case study is reported in Chapter 5. The conclusions from the study were that the DFMEA does 
have the potential to provide evidence to support safety claims concerning mechanical components. 
The safety requirements necessary for the claims related to the mitigation of the causes and/or 
effects of malfunctioning behaviour are captured in the prevention controls and detection controls. 
The study also highlighted themes that could be used to support claims related to the rigour with 
which the DFMEA had been performed. This is related to the concept of integrity, as mentioned 
above. One of these themes is the governance of the DFMEA process, and the study highlighted 
this as a potential weakness, 5.3.4. This topic and further evaluation are discussed in 7.7.1. 
7.6 Use of Four Corner Air Suspension for Evaluation Exercises 
The Four Corner Air Suspension system was used for three evaluation exercises: 
 Case study 2 looking at the practicality dividing a system into a set of Partes 
 An example of instantiating a set of Partes for a mechatronic system 
 An example of instantiating the safety argument pattern for a set of Partes for a 
mechatronic system 
There are a number of reasons why the 4CAS system was used for these exercises. The system is 
an in-house development which means that far more is known about the development than if a 
supplier had been responsible for delivering it. Although not published at the time of the 
development, the concepts which ISO 26262 contains were applied to the development of the 
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system which means that material we wished to use was available. It was also used as a case study 
for the DTi MOSAIC project, [186], which meant that more documentation was produced than 
would otherwise have been the case. It has been in production since 2004 and the material used in 
the evaluations is already in the public domain. The system is well-known to the author, and many 
of the staff who originally worked on it are still available to be interviewed. The system has the 
classic characteristics of a mechatronic system, in that it is the electronic software based control of 
a hydraulic system to achieve mechanical affects at the vehicle level. 
However, there are limitations in the repeated use of the same system for the different evaluation 
exercises. It represents only one particular system with one type of actuation. The range of 
automotive actuation is much broader than an hydraulic system and includes control via pneumatic 
systems, electric motors and also the generation of light and sound. Also, this is not typical of the 
majority of the systems produced by an OEM, and historically the suppliers have not been willing 
to reveal all their internal information; this would hinder the practical use of this approach. 
Much of the design documentation was already congruent with the proposed approach. While this 
was seen as an advantage for completing the evaluation exercises it also makes the results less 
representative of systems in general. 
7.7 Further Evaluation 
To achieve the thesis objectives stated in 7.1, a number of proposals have been made. These have 
all been subject to a partial evaluation. In this section we discuss the possibilities for further 
evaluation. The proposals are made regarding: 
 The Pars approach based on a design ontology and a safety argument pattern 
 The use of special characteristics to communicate integrity into mechanical development 
process via the DFMEA process 
 The use of special characteristics to calibrate the mechanical development process 
according to the integrity communicated 
 The use of the DFMEA to provide supporting evidence for the safety argument 
These proposals are discussed under the headings of: 
 The Pars approach 
 Use of Special Characteristics 
 Use of the DFMEA 
Additional comments are also made concerning All Product Lifecycle Stages, 7.7.4. 
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7.7.1 The Pars approach 
To fully evaluate the Pars approach it is necessary to plan a development with the intention of 
producing all the relevant documentation indicated by the Partes ontologies for each abstraction 
level. The extent to which this is practical depends on whether the exercise is being carried out by 
an OEM or a supplier. It would be beneficial for evaluation to be performed by both OEMs and 
suppliers as both types of organisation are necessarily involved in the development of the complete 
system. In both cases the evaluation scope needs to take into account all the parties, both within the 
organisation and external to it, who have to produce or receive the information. ISO 26262 already 
has the requirement for a distributed interface agreement to be drawn up between different 
organisations. The evaluation should investigate how this needs to be structured to accommodate 
the information exchange necessary for the Pars approach, especially for the supplier of mechanical 
components, for whom this would be a new way of working. To fully evaluate all aspects of the 
approach the development process would be based on the generic Pars process which has not been 
subject to any evaluation in this thesis. 
It would be beneficial to apply the approach to something other than a chassis system, e.g. a 
powertrain, driveline or body system. This would shed light on how widely applicable the approach 
is. The Partes division presented in this thesis need not necessarily be used as the division will be 
strongly influenced by the nature of the system and the organisation developing the system. 
However, it is recommended that the Pars defined for the Mechatronic Item Definition and the 
Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment and Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept be used. These 
have been defined in such a way as to be consistent with the MISRA framework, [189], and this is 
key to our overall approach. It is important that the mechanical development Pars is included in the 
case study as the evaluation of the ontology and argument for this Pars is particularly weak. 
Further investigations into the applicability of the Pars approach to mechanical development would 
involve: identifying specific properties of design artefacts for a given development process; 
determining if it is possible to derive claims related to these properties in terms of the MISRA 
themes of rationale, means and satisfaction, [187]; and determining if the necessary supporting 
evidence could be identified. These properties could be for design and safety, but it is safety which 
we are interested in for the safety argument. One example is testing objectives, methods and results 
for mechanical components. 
The scope of this thesis does not include any consideration of the governance of the overall process. 
To fully understand the practicality of the approach it is necessary to investigate the impact of the 
Pars approach on the requirements for project planning, project management and overall process 
control, as stated in the quality and safety standards. This could be as part of the wider study 
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discussed above. The impact may not be large, as the Pars approach is already based on the current 
practice, but it may inform the requirements for managing the interfaces between organisations.  
7.7.2 Use of Special Characteristics 
There are two aspects to our proposed use of special characteristics: 
 Linking integrity into mechanical development process via the DFMEA process 
 Calibrating the mechanical development process according to the required integrity 
A flowchart showing the proposal for linking the mechatronic risk assessment to the DFMEA 
process is shown in Figure 78. This allows the DFMEA failure modes to be related to the integrity 
values produced by the risk assessment. For a full evaluation, a trial of this complete process is 
needed, with the necessary changes made to the ISO 26262 based risk assessment and to the 
DFMEA process. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 78: Risk Assessment and DFMEA process 
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The use of special characteristics is essential for the practical use of our approach. While some 
potential approaches to defining the meaning of special characteristics were described in Chapter 
6, we recognise that these are only theoretical and have not been subject to any evaluation. There 
are two areas that need to be investigated. One is the willingness of the quality process staff to 
accept that integrity should be included in their considerations; this would be a break from many 
years of established practice. The other is the feasibility of defining different process variations for 
different special characteristics. It is not intended that mechanical development should adopt the 
ISO 26262 approach, where the majority of the development process is dictated by allocated 
integrity values.  
A full evaluation should cover a number of different organisations using different technologies 
which have control by an E/E system. Each organisation would define a number of special 
characteristics as appropriate for their technology and based on their current practice. For those 
that produced a range of products with different values of unmitigated risk, the different definitions 
of the special characteristics would be checked against the rigour of process for the E/E system 
based on the ASIL value. The results of the studies in the different organisations would then be 
compared to see if there was consistency and the reasons for any inconsistencies investigated. 
Ideally, a metrification framework would be defined to allow an objective evaluation. In doing this, 
the definition of the special characteristics would effectively be given a calibration. This calibration 
would have to be established over a period of time by feeding back actual experience into the 
process. Therefore, the study would need to be repeated after a period of time to continue to ensure 
consistency. Establishing a benchmark may take many studies over many years, as the calibration 
process, based on field experience, converges to some generally agreed position. Once such a 
position is established, the possibility of an international standard becomes a possibility. 
7.7.3 Use of the DFMEA 
While the conclusions from the study were positive, the limitations of the scope of the study, which 
focused on depth rather than breadth, have to be recognised. While the case study was conducted 
in a major global automotive OEM whose approach is not unrepresentative of the industry in 
general, it is still only a single company. Further longitudinal studies involving other OEMs and 
tier 1 suppliers are necessary for the conclusions to be generalised with confidence. Also, the study 
had a limited number of 16 participants; the roles were biased towards the DFMEA experts rather 
than the practitioners, and the coverage of the engineering disciplines was not uniform, see Table 
13 and Table 14. Future studies should involve a greater number of non-specialists in the exercise 
and should correct the author’s error in question Q3.2 as mentioned in 5.3.3. 
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We mentioned in 5.5 that it would be interesting to understand if the use of the DFMEA would 
benefit from having an assurance argument, the rationale being that a more structured way to record 
the results and the reasoning would help as systems become more complex due to the addition of 
E/E system control. An assurance argument for the use of the DFMEA as a quality measure could 
start with a top claim of the form, “All failure mode of the {item} have been identified and 
sufficiently mitigated”. An investigation into the development of these claims using the material 
from the case study performed here, or other case studies, would provide insight into the benefits 
of such an approach. By way of contrast, the assurance argument we require for the use of a DFMEA 
in a safety context could start with a top claim of the form, “All failure modes of the {item} related 
to hazardous events of {mechatronic item} have been identified and mitigated with an integrity 
commensurate with the assessed risk of the hazardous events”. This claim would involve the use of 
the SSSC values.  
7.7.4 All Product Lifecycle Stages 
The scope of this thesis does not include the update and maintenance of the safety argument during 
the stages of the mechatronic system’s lifecycle other than that of development. The maintenance 
of the safety argument during other lifecycle stages, such as operation, modification and 
decommissioning, is equally important to the overall safety record of the system. The impact of 
considering other lifecycle stages will include: change control and configuration management, 
governance, the identification of new hazards, the reassessment of the unmitigated risk, and the 
addition and/or modification of safety requirements. The integrity values of the safety requirements 
may also be affected. A study into these aspects could only be conducted once the basic Pars 
approach has been established within the product development process of an organisation. 
7.8 Summary of Evaluation 
In Chapter 1, the thesis hypothesis was stated as, “A risk-based safety argument for a complete 
mechatronic system can be constructed that enables the explicit and systematic derivation of safety 
requirements, with assigned integrity values, and that utilises evidence already produced by the 
established development practices for E/E systems and mechanical components. Based on this, the 
research objective was stated as, “To establish a uniform approach to justifying that an automotive 
mechatronic system is fit to be put into production from a “functional safety” perspective”. From 
this, four thesis objectives were derived: 
 TO1: To establish a design representation upon which a safety argument can be based 
 TO2: To establish a safety argument pattern based on the design representation  
 TO3: To establish a linkage of functional safety integrity to mechanical development 
 TO4: To establish a means of providing evidence to support claims related to mechanical 
development 
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In pursuing these thesis objectives the following contributions have been presented: 
1. A model-based approach to representing the different divisions of work necessary to create 
a multi-technology system, that honours the co-evolution of safety requirements, and which 
provides the basis for a complete risk-based safety argument for a mechatronic system 
2. A case study on the practical application of DFMEA in an automotive OEM which assesses 
the extent to which, as practised, it does, or could, produce the evidence necessary to 
support the mechatronic system safety argument 
3. The creation of a mechatronic system safety argument pattern, and its evaluation, by the 
application of the model-based approach 
Table 33 relates the contributions to the thesis objectives. 
Thesis Objective Contribution 1 Contribution 2 Contribution 3 
TO1 To establish a design representation    
TO2 To establish a safety argument pattern    
TO3 To establish a linkage of functional safety 
integrity to mechanical development 
   
TO4 To establish a means of providing evidence to 
support claims related to mechanical 
development 
   
Table 33: Sub-objectives and Contributions 
Contribution 1 is the creation of two frameworks; one for deriving safety requirements and the other 
for a mechatronic safety argument pattern, as presented in Chapter 3 and in Chapter 4. The 
evaluation of these frameworks, reported in sections 7.2 and 7.3, showed that the overall result is 
positive. The participants were able to engage with the material and the view was expressed that it 
is an improvement over current practice. There were some practical concerns about the availability 
of the documents, especially from suppliers, and the need express the interplay between the different 
development streams in a way that represents actual practice. Assent was forthcoming by both those 
involved with E/E system design and those involved with mechanical design. 
Contribution 2 is the assessment of the established use of the DFMEA process for mechanical 
components by means of a case study and is presented in Chapter 5. The conclusions from the study, 
7.5, are that the DFMEA does have the potential to provide the evidence to support a safety 
argument, but, for this potential to be realised, strong governance is required to ensure that it is 
performed fully and with sufficient rigour. 
Contribution 3 is a means of assigning integrity values to safety requirements cascaded to 
mechanical components and is presented in Chapter 6. Its evaluation is discussed in section 7.4. 
There are number of different aspects to this which we consider in turn. 
We have based the safety argument pattern on the generic design ontology of the Pars and then 
composed the overall system safety argument from the individual Pars arguments. While this has 
not been formally evaluated, there is already a precedent for a compositional approach set by the 
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work on modular safety cases, [202]. Structuring the safety argument around the cascade of safety 
requirements also has precedent set by the MISRA work, [200], [187]. A partial example of the 
instantiation of the mechatronic safety argument pattern, based on the 4CAS system, is given in 
Appendix C. 
The conditional probability risk model has no evaluation, but as presented in Chapter 6 using the 
bow-tie diagram, it has an element of face-validity. 
The use of special characteristics as a means to feed the concept of integrity into the mechanical 
process is a key aspect of the scheme but in need of a proper evaluation, as described in section 7.5. 
There are two aspects that need to be established. One is whether it will be accepted by the industry; 
there is a rationale for its use, but opinion of the industry has not been tested. The other is the 
practical matter of defining meanings for the special characteristics such that they do provide the 
valid assurance of integrity required by the overall safety argument. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion and Future Work 
8.1 Thesis Summary and Contributions 
This thesis has defined and evaluated a model-based assurance approach for constructing a safety 
argument for a mechatronic system. Establishing this assurance approach entailed producing a 
common means of representing the different parts of the system that may be the responsibility of 
different departments. It also entailed showing how these representations could be applied to a 
mechatronic system to produce a hierarchy of design which extended the requirements based on 
ISO 26262.  
To arrive at the model-based assurance approach a number of challenges had to be met. The first 
was finding an underlying uniform design model able to include both the mechanical and E/E 
aspects of a mechatronic system. Given this uniform design model, we had to understand how it 
could be used as the basis for the safety argument. We then had to see how well the design model 
and safety argument pattern would generalise to a mechatronic system. In applying it to a 
mechatronic system we had to consider the safety lifecycle for a mechatronic system and the new 
safety documentation that it would require. We also had to consider what mechanical design 
artefacts could be available as evidence to support the argument and the potential of the DFMEA 
to provide supporting evidence for the safety argument. To make use of the results of the DFMEA, 
we had to understand the relationship between the assessed unmitigated risk, determined by the 
ISO 26262 scheme, and the DFMEA risk assessment of component failure modes. From this we 
had to propose a means of conveying the integrity value, associated with safety requirements 
allocated to the mechanical system, which is derived from the unmitigated risk assessment. Lastly, 
we were faced with the challenge of giving an interpretation of integrity in the mechanical design 
process. 
The resultant model-based assurance approach provides a means for safety requirements, with 
integrity values, to be fed into the mechanical design, and for the integrity requirements to be 
integrated into the commonly used DFMEA process. In this thesis we have focused on three main 
areas of contribution, namely: 
1. A model-based approach to representing the different divisions of work necessary to create 
a multi-technology system that honours the co-evolution of safety requirements, and which 
provides the basis for a complete risk-based safety argument for a mechatronic system 
2. A case study on the practical application of DFMEA in an automotive OEM which assesses 
the extent to which, as practised, it does, or could, produce the evidence necessary to 
support the mechatronic system safety argument 
3. The creation of a mechatronic system safety argument pattern, and its evaluation, by the 
application of the model-based approach 
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There is much more to the development of a mechatronic system than what has been discussed in 
this thesis. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the overall development process is out of scope, as is the 
governance of the process, overall, and at each stage. Also, the scope only includes the safety 
argument and not the whole safety case. 
It should also be noted that it is current practice to develop a mechanical system under E/E system 
control as a mechatronic system, but this is achieved informally rather than with defined 
mechatronics documents. For example, the introduction to ISO 26262 acknowledges the increasing 
growth of mechatronic systems, but then limits its scope to the E/E system. Here we have made the 
case for a mechatronic safety argument, which then necessitates the creation of mechatronic 
documents. 
8.1.1 The division of the engineering process into Partes  
In Chapter 3, starting from the existing material on systems engineering, analysis techniques and 
argument patterns, we derived a novel representation, Pars, for a division of the product engineering 
task. A Pars is defined by a generic ontology and has an accompanying design argument pattern 
based on the ontology. A generic process description for a Pars has also been presented. We showed 
how an E/E system, developed according to ISO 26262, could be divided into a set of Partes, and 
how the requirements and work products of the standard related to the generic ontology and safety 
argument pattern of each Pars. 
While the commonly used diagrammatic representations of system development, e.g. Figure 1, 
Figure 4 and Figure 8, cannot be used to derive generic system structures that can be used as the 
basis of a safety argument pattern, they do provide a clear impression of the overall structure and 
process. With the division into Partes, this big picture view is not so apparent, and we have not 
provided an equivalent to these figures. This point was made by one of the participants in the second 
case study. 
We highlighted in section 3.3.1 that the Pars approach is still open to composition issues and could 
only offer the rigorous use of change control and configuration management as a solution. These 
are topics that are not within the scope of this thesis. 
While the intention is that a Pars can be defined based on any arbitrary division of the work, the 
evaluation has only been for one system in the narrow context of a mechatronic system aligned 
closely with ISO 26262. 
8.1.2 The application of Pars division approach to a mechatronic system  
In Chapter 4 we presented the application of the Pars approach to a mechatronic system. This 
required the division of the mechatronic system into a set of Partes and the definition of some new 
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safety design artefacts. The division was illustrated using actual design artefacts from a previously 
developed Four Corner Air Suspension system (4CAS). This division was the subject of a case 
study, presented in Chapter 7, involving the engineers who were involved in the original 4CAS 
development. The results show that the case study participants considered that the taking of a 
mechatronic perspective was an improvement over current practice and could relate their activities 
and the design artefacts to the division into Pars. It was noted that the division between the 
mechatronic Pars and the mechanical Pars was somewhat artificial as the work involved the same 
staff co-evolving both aspects at the same time. 
 In order to apply the generic model to the mechanical Pars, it was necessary to recast the generic 
design artefacts as mechanical design artefacts. There is no mechanical standard process model 
equivalent to the standard software lifecycle for describing development, e.g. V-model,  waterfall 
model, spiral model, [204]. In the absence of a standard model we used a model from a standard 
text book, [48]. In practice, the recasting of the mechanical Pars would have to be based on the 
proprietary process of each organisation. However, the safety artefacts identified are sufficient for 
our purpose of a safety argument. 
The evaluation of the Partes division report in Chapter 8 was based on only one system, 4CAS. 
This is an in-house development, which is not typical, and the application of the approach to the 
more usual tier 1 supplier-led development has not been evaluated. 
8.1.3 Practical Application of DFMEA Case Study 
In Chapter 5 we presented a case study into the industrial practice for the use of the DFMEA on 
mechanical components. This showed that the DFMEA process has the potential to provide the 
evidence required to support a safety argument. It also highlighted the need for strong governance 
over the enactment of the process. However, the issue of governance is not within the scope of this 
thesis, so there remains some practical considerations that have not been addressed. 
We also questioned whether the DFMEA quality process would benefit from having an assurance 
case structure, as not everything can be dealt with by strong governance. The case study did reveal 
a degree of variety in how a DFMEA is performed and gives the impression that current practice 
may be being stretched to the limit of its capability. As systems are becoming more complex, 
especially with the addition of E/E system control, there may well be some benefit to be gained by 
having a more structured way to record results and reasoning. 
8.1.4 An approach to creating a safety argument for a mechatronic system 
In Chapter 6 we showed a means of separating out the two meanings of the ISO 26262 term ASIL, 
which are: an indication of the assessed unmitigated risk, and the integrity with which safety 
requirements are to be implemented. This was based on a conditional probability risk model and 
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was necessary to allow the concept of integrity to be fed into the mechanical design. We then 
showed that special characteristics could be used as a means to feed integrity values into a DFMEA 
quality-based process used in mechanical engineering. We note that, even for a mechatronic system, 
it is still possible to assign safety requirements to external measures which can still include non-
E/E technology. For these to have an assigned integrity value would require the widespread 
adoption of the proposed use of special characteristics. 
We acknowledge that the proposed use of special characteristics as a means of feeding the concept 
of integrity into a DFMEA quality-based process used in mechanical engineering has had no 
evaluation. 
The construction of a complete safety argument for a mechatronic system divided into a set of Pars 
requires strong governance of the whole process, as any misuse would undermine the integrity of 
the whole safety argument. This aspect of governance is outside the scope of this thesis. 
8.2 Recommendations 
In 7.7 we presented ideas for further evaluation of the work reported in this thesis. In this section 
we make recommendations for the next steps. 
8.2.1 The Pars Approach 
A mechatronic system other than a chassis system should be evaluated and the scope kept to 
something practical. While it is not essential to use the Partes for the generic mechatronic system 
that are defined in this thesis, it is recommended that the Pars defined for the Mechatronic Item 
Definition and the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment and Mechatronic Functional Safety 
Concept be used. The other Partes could be changed as is appropriate, given the nature of the system 
and the organisation developing the system. Not every aspect of the mechatronic system need be 
included, but a Pars covering some mechanical development should be included. The aim should 
be to have a slice of ontology and argument from the risk assessment to the mechanical safety 
requirements. It is important to ensure that all participants, both within the organisation and 
externally, are willing to take part in the information exchange. 
Of particular interest is the applicability of the Pars approach to mechanical development. It is 
recommended that an exercise be performed to identify specific properties of design artefacts that 
could be used to support the instantiation of the mechanical Pars safety argument. To fully evaluate 
the Pars approach on the mechanical development, it is necessary to define a set of SSSC values with 
their corresponding process requirements. If a formal set of SSSC values has not been created, it is 
still possible to trial the approach using a nominal set defined just for that purpose. 
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For a full evaluation of the Pars approach, the exercise would include the governance of the overall 
process including the impact on project planning and project management. This is only possible 
once the Pars approach is well established in the organisation.  
8.2.2 Use of Special Characteristics 
It is recommended that the definition of a set of SSSC values, with their corresponding process 
requirements, first be trialled within a single organisation to assess the practicality and difficulty of 
the approach. If the attempt is successful, and thought to add value, then a wider trial would have 
to involve several companies in a cross industry collaborative project. 
To trial the linking of the risk assessment to the mechanical safety requirements it is recommended 
that the process given in Figure 78 be followed to establish the practicality of the proposed scheme. 
A prerequisite for this is to define a set of SSSC values with their corresponding process 
requirements. If this has not been done, then it is recommended that a nominal set is defined just 
for the purpose of the trial. 
8.2.3 DFMEA Usage 
As described in 7.7.3, it is recommended that further longitudinal studies involving other OEMs 
and tier 1 suppliers be conducted involving a greater number of non-specialists. 
Although not central to this thesis, it is recommended that the use of an assurance argument to 
provide a rationale for the result of a DFMEA be investigated. As suggested, for the use of the 
DFMEA as a quality measure, the assurance argument could start with a top claim of the form, “All 
failure modes of the {item} have been identified and sufficiently mitigated”. It is envisaged that the 
development of the argument would result in claims arguing over the types of topics identified by 
the case study performed as part of this thesis. 
8.3 Concluding Remarks 
The disciplines of mechanical engineering and E/E systems have developed separately despite being 
intimately connected. The literature on mechatronic systems is concerned with the interface 
between the two technologies and how to achieve the overall desired performance. Its scope does 
not include the already established practices for the implementation of the different technologies. 
This means that there is a lack of the holistic approach necessary for a convincing safety argument 
for the mechatronic system. While the lack of such a holistic approach may not have had a serious 
impact on the deployment of mechatronic systems to date, as has been noted, the systems are 
becoming more complex and are being used more and more for safety-related applications. The 
question arises of whether current practice will be sufficient, going forward. This thesis has laid 
some of the foundations for a holistic approach that are necessary for a complete safety argument 
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of a mechatronic system. The generic nature of the Pars approach means it may have the potential 
for wider application, but this is yet to be established. 
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 DFMEA Exposition 
A.1 Origins of Failure Mode Effects Analysis 
The first standard for Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) was issued in 1949 by the US Armed 
Forces, MIL P 1629 Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis, 
[205]. Over the course of the next three decades other industrial sectors adopted the use of FMEA. 
These included NASA in 1963, [174], and civil aircraft design in 1967, [206]. The Ford Motor 
Company started to use FMEA in the late 1970s, [207], as did many other automotive companies. 
In 1994, SAE published J1739, [208], which was jointly developed by Chrysler Corporation, Ford 
Motor Company and General Motors Corporation. The most recent edition of this was published in 
2009, [159]. The use of J1739 was required by QS9000, [142], which until 2006, was widely used 
as the automotive version of ISO 9000. In 2006 QS9000 was replaced by ISO/TS 16949, [138], 
which also requires the use of J1739. In 2016 ISO withdrew TS 16949 but it continues to be 
published by IATF (International Automotive Task Force) as IATF 16949:2016, [143], and it 
remains the universally used quality standard in the automotive industry. Other FMEA standards 
are also published, for example the one by VDA, [172], used widely in the automotive industry, 
and IEC 60812, [160]. 
All of the FMEA standards mentioned above describe the process in a number of steps and these 
are common to all descriptions of the technique, for example one book, [209], describes performing 
an FMEA in 10 steps, see Table 34. 
Step Description 
1 Review the Process or Product 
2 Brainstorm Potential failure Modes 
3 List Potential Effects for Each Failure Mode 
4 Assign a Severity Ranking for each Effect 
5 Assign an Occurrence Ranking for each Failure Mode 
6 Assign a Detection Ranking for each Failure Mode 
7 Calculate the Risk Priority Number for each Failure Mode 
8 Prioritise the Failure Modes for action 
9 Take action to eliminate or reduce the high-risk Failure Modes 
10 Calculate the resulting RPN as the failure modes are reduced 
Table 34: 10 Steps of FMEA [209] 
A.2 Types of FMEA 
The FMEA technique can be used to analyse different types of artefact, e.g. a system concept, a 
design, a manufacturing process. This gives rise to commonly used terms of Concept FMEA 
(CFMEA), Design FMEA (DFMEA) and Process FMEA (PFMEA), [210]. The use of the FMEA 
technique to analyse software is also widespread. The description given here applies equally to the 
CFMEA and the DFMEA. 
The 1980 version of Mil 1629, [13], is structured around two tasks. Task 101 is referred to as an 
FMEA and its purpose is “to study the results or effects of item failure on system operation and, to 
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classify each potential failure according to its severity”. Task 102 is referred to as Criticality 
Analysis and its purpose is “to rank each potential failure mode identified in the FMEA Task, 
according to the combined influence of severity classification and its probability of occurrence 
based upon the best available data”. The combination of both tasks is often referred to as Failure 
Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) but is also very common for the term FMEA to be 
used even though the criticality analysis is also being performed. 
A.3 FMEA Terms 
A number of commons terms are used in the literature on FMEA, these and the relationships 
between them, are shown in Figure 79 as a SysML Block Diagram. 
 
Figure 79: Ontology of FMEA Terms 
A.4 Subject of analysis 
This has to be defined. In J1739 this is referred to as the item while in the VDA document it is 
referred to as the inspected product. The content of the definition will depend on the level of 
abstraction at which the analysis is being performed and on the scope of analysis. The definition 
has to support the fact that a function will be analysed in terms of what failure modes it has and 
what the cause and effect of each failure mode is; this requires that the definition includes a 
decomposed structure that can be interpreted in terms of cause and effect. The functions may be 
defined quantitatively of qualitatively. 
If the subject of analysis is the design of a physical object, then there will be a representation of a 
physical structure with each element of the structure having one or more functions. This is the 
approach taken explicitly in the VDA document. If the subject of analysis is a logical design, then 
it will only be a functional decomposition. 
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The scope of the analysis has to define where the consideration of effects in the cause-effect chain 
ends; this is usually represented by a boundary diagram. This shows functions at the boundary, 
which are within the scope of the analysis, and the interfaces to the environment, including the user, 
or other components or systems outside of the boundary. The scope also has to define where the 
consideration of causes in the cause-effect chain ends. 
A.5 Failure Mode 
Each function of the subject of analysis has one or more failure modes; these are identified by 
considering how a function may fail. J1739 states that as a minimum the analysis should consider 
loss of function, partial function, intermittent function, degradation function and unintended 
function. The VDA document gives examples as non-conformities from specified target states, 
limited function, unintentional function and exceeding a function. While IEC 60218 gives examples 
as failure during operation, failure to operate at a prescribed time, failure to cease operation at a 
prescribed time and premature operation. 
A.6 Effect 
The effect of a failure at the boundary of the subject of analysis is determined by an inductive 
analysis of the decomposed structure. The accuracy of this analysis is dependent on the detail and 
correctness of the defined decomposed structure. J1739 and IEC 60812 also recommend that the 
effect on the final product and/or the end customer be considered. If this involves understanding 
effects on components or systems outside the boundary diagram, then the necessary understanding 
is not included in the definition of the subject of analysis and has to be sought by consulting the 
relevant FMEAs or knowledgeable staff. 
A.7 Severity Ranking 
The severity of the effect is assessed qualitatively using an ordinal scale of 1 to 10. The effect is 
assessed for its impact on the environment or user. This may be because the effect has been traced 
through the decomposed structure to something that is outside the boundary or it may be an effect 
within the boundary which is directly perceived by the user, e.g. noise. 
With the exception of severity rankings 9 and 10, the scale is not an absolute scale, but is calibrated 
relative to the subject of analysis. A severity ranking value of 10 is assigned if the effect impedes 
the safety operation of the vehicle. The value may be reduced to 9 if the driver is warned of the 
effect or failure and it is deemed that they have time to act to prevent harm from occurring. Table 
35 shows the guidance for severity rankings given by J17399 and the VDA document. 
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A.8 Cause 
The cause of a failure is determined by a deductive analysis of the decomposed structure. The 
difference between random and systematic causes of a failure is not explicitly mentioned. Again, 
the accuracy of this analysis is dependent on the detail and correctness of the defined decomposed 
structure. If traced to a physical component, then the cause will be expressed in terms of physical 
properties such as dimensions and tolerances, surface finish or material wear. The cause may be an 
input from outside the boundary. J1739 gives examples of typical causes as: 
 Incorrect design for functional performance 
 System interactions 
 Changes over time 
 Unanticipated external environment conditions 
 Unanticipated customer use cycles  
 Piece to piece variation  
 Incorrect design for manufacturing 
Failure causes may also be determined from analysis of field failures or failures in test units. When 
the design is new and without precedent, failure causes the analysis to rely on the opinion of experts. 
 J1739:2009 VDA:2006 
10 Potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation 
and/or involves noncompliance with government 
regulation without warning. 
Extremely severe failure that affects the safety and/or 
violates the compliance to legal regulations. 
Existence-endangering risk to the company 
9 Potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation 
and/or involves noncompliance with government 
regulation with warning. 
8 Loss of primary function 
(vehicle inoperable, does not affect safe vehicle 
operation) 
Operability of the vehicle heavily limited and/or loss 
of functions that are necessary for normal driving. 
Immediate stay in the garage is imperatively 
7 Degradation of primary function 
(vehicle operable, but at reduced level of performance) 
6 Loss of secondary function 
(vehicle operable, but comfort / convenience functions 
inoperable) 
Operability of the vehicle limited, immediate stay in 
the garage is not necessary. Loss of important service 
and comfort systems. 
5 Degradation of secondary function 
(vehicle operable, but comfort / convenience functions 
at reduced level of performance) 
4 Appearance or Audible Noise, vehicle operable, item 
does not conform. 
Defect noticed by most customers (> 75%) 
3 Appearance or Audible Noise, vehicle operable, item 
does not conform. 
Defect noticed by many customers (50%) 
Low function impairment of the vehicle, limitation of 
function of important service and comfort systems 
2 Appearance or Audible Noise, vehicle operable, item 
does not conform. 
Defect noticed by discriminating customers (< 25%) 
1 No discernible effect. Very low function impairment, only identifiable by 
qualified personnel 
Table 35: Guidance for FMEA Severity Rankings 
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A.9 Occurrence Ranking 
The occurrence of the cause, failure mode or effect can be assessed qualitatively or quantitatively. 
The norm in the automotive domain is for it to be assessed qualitatively using an ordinal scale of 1 
to 10. The assessment takes into account the prevention design controls that have been specified. 
SAE 1739 describes a prevention design control, referred to as a preventative action in the VDA 
document, as a means to prevent a cause, failure mode or effect and gives examples as: 
 Published design standard for thread class 
 Heat treat specification on drawing 
 Redundant design includes sensor shield 
 Corporate best practice standard design 
 System detection and driver notification for service 
 System detection and operational status displayed to driver 
SAE J1739 also recognises that prevention design controls can include means to detect and manage 
causes or failure modes during normal operation. 
It is common practice to reassess the occurrence ranking after new prevention design controls have 
been specified. The occurrence scale is not an absolute scale but is calibrated relative to the subject 
of analysis. Table 2 shows the guidance for occurrence rankings given by J17399 and the VDA 
document. 
 J1739:2009 VDA:2006 
10 New technology/new design with no history. New development of systems/components without 
operating experience and/or under unexplained 
operating conditions. Known system with problems. 
9 Failure is inevitable with new design, new application, 
or change in duty cycle/operating conditions. 
8 Failure is likely with new design, new application, or 
change in duty cycle/operating conditions. 
New development of systems/components using new 
technologies and/or use of previously problematic 
technologies. Known system with problems. 7 Failure is uncertain with new design, new application, or 
change in duty cycle/operating conditions 
6 Frequent failures associated with similar designs or in 
design simulation and testing. 
New development of systems/components with 
operating experience and/or detail changes to previous 
development under comparable operating conditions. 
Mature systems/components with long, failure-free 
series production experience under altered operating 
conditions. 
5 Occasional failures associated with similar designs or in 
design simulation and testing. 
4 Isolated failures associated with similar design or in 
design simulation and testing. 
3 Only isolated failures associated with almost identical 
design or in design simulation and testing. 
New development of systems/components with 
positively completed proof procedure. Detail changes 
to mature systems/components with long failure free 
series production experience under comparable 
operating conditions. 
2 No observed failures associated with almost identical 
design or in design simulation and testing 
1 Failure is eliminated through preventative control New development and/or mature systems/components 
with operating experience under comparable 
(differentiation to 3-2 necessary!) operating conditions 
with positively completed proof procedure. Mature 
systems/components with long, failure-free series 
production experience under comparable operating 
conditions. 
Table 36: FMEA Guidance for Occurrence Rankings 
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A.10 Detection Ranking 
As well as prevention design controls, detection design controls can also be specified. J1739 
describes a detection design controls, referred to as detective action in the VDA document, as a 
means to detect a cause and/or failure mode, either by analytical or physical methods, before the 
item is released to production, and gives examples as: 
 Finite Element Analysis (FEA) 
 CAE analytics 
 Tolerance stack analysis 
 Validation testing (fatigue, water intrusion, vibration, ride and handling, etc.) 
It is common practice to reassess the detection ranking after new detection design controls have 
been specified. 
The effectiveness of the detection design controls specified is assessed qualitatively using an 
ordinal scale of 1 to 10. The detection scale is not an absolute scale but is calibrated relative to the 
subject of analysis. Table 37 shows the guidance for detection rankings given by J17399 and the 
VDA document. 
 J1739:2009 VDA:2006 
10 No current design control; Cannot detect or is not analyzed Failure with a very low detection potential, 
since a proof procedure is not known and/or 
has not been established 
9 Design analysis/detection controls have a weak detection 
capability; Virtual Analysis (e.g. CAE, FEA, etc.) is not 
correlated to expected actual operating conditions. 
8 Product verification/validation after design freeze and prior to 
launch with pass/fail testing (Sub-system or system testing with 
acceptance criteria e.g. Ride & handling, shipping evaluation, 
etc.) 
Failure with a low detection potential, since 
the proof procedure is uncertain and/or there is 
no experience with the established proof 
procedure 
7 Product verification/validation after design freeze and prior to 
launch with test to failure testing (Sub-system or system testing 
until failure occurs, testing of system interactions, etc.) 
6 Product verification/validation after design freeze and prior to 
launch with degradation testing (Sub-system or system testing 
after durability test e.g. Function check) 
Failure with a moderate detection potential. 
Mature proof procedure from comparable 
products under new usage/boundary 
conditions 5 Product validation (reliability testing, development or validation 
tests) prior to design freeze using pass/fail testing (e.g. 
acceptance criteria for performance, function checks, etc.) 
4 Product validation (reliability testing, development or validation 
tests) prior to design freeze using test to failure (e.g. until leaks, 
yields, cracks, etc.) 
3 Product validation (reliability testing, development or validation 
tests) prior to design freeze using degradation testing (e.g. data 
trends, before/after values, etc.) 
Failure with a high detection potential due to 
mature proof procedure. The effectiveness of 
the detection action has been demonstrated for 
this product. 2 Design analysis/detection controls have a strong detection 
capability. Virtual Analysis (e.g. CAE, FEA, etc.) is highly 
correlated with actual and/or expected operating conditions 
prior to design freeze. 
1 Failure cause or failure mode cannot occur because it is fully 
prevented through design solutions (e.g. Proven design 
standard/best practice or common material, etc.) 
Failure with a very high detection potential 
due to mature proof procedure of previous 
generation. The effectiveness of the detection 
action has been demonstrated for this product. 
Table 37: FMEA Guidance for Detection Rankings 
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A.11 Criticality Analysis 
The significance of the identified failure modes, effects and causes can be assessed based on the 
rankings for severity, occurrence and detection have been assigned. Different approaches can be 
taken. One approach is to just assess significance based on the severity ranking, with a ranking of 
9 or 10 being designated as critical. Another approach is to assess the severity and occurrence 
rankings together and designating a defined combination of rankings as being significant. Such 
classifications can be used to assign special characteristics to particular failure modes or causes to 
signify that they can have an impact on factors such as safety or compliance to regulations. Special 
characteristics are defined by each organisation. Alternatively, or as well as, the three values may 
be multiplied together to produce a Risk Priority Number (RPN). This last approach has been 
criticised by several authors, [173], [174]; the latter on the basis that the scales are ordinal and that 
an interval scale is required in order for the multiplication operation to be valid. 
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 ISO 26262 Exposition 
B.1 Introduction 
ISO 26262, Road vehicles - Functional safety, [13], is an adaptation of the generic functional safety 
standard IEC 61508, [12], to meet the specific needs of electrical and/or electronic (E/E) systems 
within road vehicles. An E/E system is defined as a system that consists of electrical and/or 
electronic elements, including programmable electronic elements, while an element is defined as a 
system or part of a system including components, hardware, software, hardware parts and software 
units. A system is defined as a set of elements that relates at least a sensor, a controller and an 
actuator with one another. 
Its requirements cover all activities during the safety lifecycle, Figure 80, of safety-related systems 
comprised of electrical, electronic and software components. The purpose of the standard is to 
provide guidelines for how to avoid unreasonable residual risk associated with an E/E system. 
Unreasonable risk is defined as “risk judged to be unacceptable in a certain context according to 
valid societal moral concepts”. 
 
Figure 80: ISO 26262 Safety Lifecycle 
The scope of the risk addressed is limited to failure, or unintended behaviour, of an item with respect 
to its design intent. The term item is defined as a system, or an array of systems, to implement a 
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function at the vehicle level, to which ISO 26262 is applied. The standard does not address hazards 
related to electric shock, fire, smoke, heat, radiation, toxicity, flammability, reactivity, corrosion, 
release of energy and similar hazards, unless directly caused by malfunctioning behaviour of E/E 
safety-related systems. Also, the standard does not address the nominal performance of E/E systems. 
Like IEC 61508, ISO 26262 is based around a safety life cycle that starts with identifying hazards 
and covers development, manufacture, service and disposal. The standard is published in ten parts: 
 Part 1: Vocabulary 
 Part 2: Management of functional safety 
 Part 3: Concept phase 
 Part 4: Product development at the system level 
 Part 5: Product development at the hardware level 
 Part 6: Product development at the software level 
 Part 7: Production and operation 
 Part 8: Supporting processes 
 Part 9: Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL)-oriented and safety-oriented analyses 
 Part 10: Guideline on ISO 26262 
The first edition was published in 2011. While not a legal requirement, i.e. it is not part of any 
regulations that must be met to sell the vehicle, it is viewed by the industry as a statement of best 
practice which would form the basis of any defence in a product liability case. A second edition is 
due to be published in 2018 which will have an additional two parts: 
 Part 11: Guideline on application of ISO 26262 to semiconductors 
 Part 12: Adaptation for motorcycles 
The standard can be summarised by the following objectives: 
 To have an appropriate organisation 
 To perform appropriate planning and project management 
 To derive and specify appropriate functional safety requirements at the functional, 
technical, hardware and software levels such that unreasonable risk is avoided 
 To ensure that functional safety requirements are not violated by faults and failures; 
achieved by analysing the design to identify faults and failures and then mitigating them by 
defining additional functional safety requirements 
 To produce a design that fulfils the functional safety requirements 
 To verify that the design meets the functional safety requirements 
 To validate that unreasonable risk has been avoided 
 To achieve all of the above by using a systematic rigorous process that conforms with the 
current understanding of best practice 
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In this exposition we consider risk assessment, safety requirements, integrity and functional safety 
assessment. Organisation, project management, production and operation are not described. 
B.2 Risk Assessment 
The risk assessment is based on the item definition; in the body of the standard this term is used to 
refer to the target of the development. An item is defined as a system, or an array of systems, to 
implement a function at the vehicle level, to which ISO 26262 is applied. The standard requires that 
the item be documented in a work-product called the Item Definition. The purpose of this work-
product is to define and describe the item, its dependencies on, and interaction with, the environment 
and other items, in order to support activities in subsequent phases.  
Consistent with its scope, ISO 26262 requires that the risk of a malfunctioning E/E system be 
determined by considering the effects of the malfunction; such a malfunction is termed a hazard if 
it has the potential to cause harm. Malfunctions are identified based on the description given in the 
Item Definition; this includes the capabilities of the actuators, as this information is necessary 
assessing the values of severity and controllability. 
The risk assessment considers the probability that an accident will be the outcome of a hazard and 
also the most likely severity of the accident. The risk assessment is described in Chapter 6 using the 
general conditional probability risk model; here we replace faulty-machine-behaviour with hazard: 
Pharm = Pfault * P[hazard | fault] * P[harm | hazard] 
The ISO 26262 requirement for risk assessment is to evaluate P[harm | hazard] assuming that 
Pfault * P[hazard | fault] has a value of 1. P[harm | hazard] is the probability that an accident will 
be the outcome of a hazard because the harm is a consequence of the accident.  A hazard is always 
defined at a vehicle level in terms of what the driver would experience, or a third party observe, in 
the event of a malfunction of the item. Hazards may be determined by considering the consequences 
of the item’s functions, as defined in the Item Definition, not being performed as intended and also 
by considering what an actuator has the capability to produce, e.g. maximum force exerted. 
The harm that may result from a hazard depends on the operational situation that the vehicle is in 
at the time, as this determines the accident sequence The assessment includes both those situations 
when the vehicle is used correctly and those when it is used is incorrectly, in a foreseeable way. 
The combination of a hazard and an operational situation is referred to as a hazardous event and it 
is for each of the latter that P[harm | hazard] is assessed . The assessment estimates the probability 
that the vehicle enters the operational situation. This is expressed as value of exposure, and the 
probability that human actions can avoid the harm associated with the consequence; this is 
expressed as a value of controllability.  
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The values, and their descriptions, used to express exposure are: 
 E0 - incredible 
 E1 - very low probability 
 E2 - low probability 
 E3 - medium probability 
 E4 - high probability 
The values are not given any further definition, but informative examples are provided and the 
standard expects there to be an order of magnitude difference in probability between adjacent 
values. Exposure can be estimated by considering the duration of time spent in the operational 
situation or the frequency with which the operational situation is encountered. If the estimated 
value is E0, then the risk assessment is not completed. 
The values, and their descriptions, used to express controllability are: 
 C0 - controllable in general 
 C1 - simply controllable 
 C2 - normally controllable 
 C3 - difficult to control or uncontrollable 
The values are not given any further definition, but informative examples are provided and the 
standard expects there to be an order of magnitude difference in probability between adjacent 
values. The estimation of the value takes into account the potential actions of all people who could 
influence the outcome, including third parties who may not be directly involved.  If the estimated 
value is C0, then the risk assessment is not completed. 
The probability that an accident will result, given the presence of a hazard, can be expressed as the 
combination of four values of exposure and three values of controllability, i.e. twelve in total. The 
estimate of the severity of the harm caused by the accident is expressed as a value of severity. The 
values, and their descriptions, used to express severity are: 
 S0 - no injuries 
 S1 - light and moderate injuries 
 S2 - severe and life-threatening injuries (survival probable) 
 S3 - life-threatening injuries (survival uncertain), fatal injuries 
The values are not given any further definition, but informative examples are provided. The 
estimation considers all those who could potentially be injured including the vehicle driver and 
passengers, cyclists, pedestrians and the occupants of other vehicles. The estimation may be based 
on a combination of injuries.  If the estimated value is S0, then the risk assessment is not completed. 
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The outcome of the risk assessment is denoted by the terms QM, ASILA, ASILB, ASILC and ASILD5 
which are labels for sets of combinations of exposure, controllability and severity values, Table 38. 
Result of Risk 
Assessment 
Combination of exposure, controllability and severity 
QM ((E1, C1), S1), ((E1, C2), S1), ((E1, C3), S1), ((E2, C1), S1), ((E2, C2), S1), ((E2, C3), S1),  
((E3, C1), S1), ((E3, C2), S1), ((E4, C1), S1), 
((E1, C1), S2), ((E1, C2), S2), ((E1, C3), S2), ((E2, C1), S2), ((E2, C2), S2), ((E3, C1), S2), 
((E1, C1), S3), ((E1, C2), S3), ((E2, C1), S3) 
ASILA ((E3, C3), S1), ((E4, C2), S1), 
((E3, C2), S2), ((E2, C3), S2), ((E3, C2), S2), 
((E4, C1), S3), ((E2, C2), S3), ((E3, C1), S3) 
ASILB ((E4, C3), S1), 
((E3, C3), S2), ((E4, C2), S2), 
((E2, C3), S3), ((E3, C2), S3), ((E4, C1), S3) 
ASILC ((E4, C3), S2), ((E3, C3), S3), ((E4, C2), S3) 
ASILD ((E4, C3), S3) 
Table 38: ISO 26262 Risk Assessment Outcomes 
The risk analysis is based on the definition of the item without taking account of the specification 
or implementation of any safety requirements. In this thesis, this is referred as an assessment of the 
unmitigated risk. Risk mitigation is associated with deriving safety requirements as described in 
section B.3. The labels that are used to denote the unmitigated risk are also used to indicate the 
integrity with which safety requirements are to be implemented as described in section B.4. 
B.3 Safety Requirements 
B.3.1 Safety Goals 
The derivation of the safety requirements begins with the specification of safety goals. A safety 
goal is a top-level safety requirement, phrased in terms of a functional objective, related to the 
prevention or mitigation of hazardous events, such that unreasonable risk is avoided. For each 
hazardous event one or more safety goals are defined. A safety goal can be related to more than one 
hazardous event. 
The standard recognises the concept of residual risk which it defines as the risk remaining after the 
deployment of safety measures6 and safety mechanisms7. The implication is that for the standard to 
be met, the residual risk should be less than or equal to unreasonable risk. The standard does not 
                                                     
5 QM stands for Quality Management, ASIL stands for Automotive Integrity Level 
6 A safety measure is an activity, or technical solution, to avoid, or control, systematic failures and to detect, 
or control, random hardware failures or mitigate their harmful effects. They include safety mechanisms. 
7 A safety mechanism is technical solution to detect faults or control failures in order to achieve or maintain 
a safe state as defined in the functional safety concept. 
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give any guidance on how to decide if a safety goal will result in a residual risk less than or equal 
to unreasonable risk. 
MISRA, [200], advocates the following interpretation. Having defined one or more safety goals for 
a hazardous event it is necessary to determine what the residual risk would be if the goals are met. 
There is only one risk assessment scheme given in the standard, as described above, so to determine 
the residual risk it is necessary to use this scheme to determine the risk of the hazardous event, 
assuming that the safety goal(s) has been met. As the determination of risk is based around the 
estimation of severity, exposure and controllability, the meeting of a safety goal would reduce one 
or more of these three factors. As the lowest value of risk that be denoted is QM, MISRA takes the 
view that an adequate safety goal is one which, if met, would result in a residual risk of QM. 
If the safety goal is formulated in the style of “the hazard shall not occur”, as is the case with the 
4CAS example, then it is not useful to assess the residual risk assuming the goal is met. In these 
cases, the residual risk has to be assessed based on the functional safety concept being achieved. 
Safety goals are validated for the item integrated in a representative vehicle to demonstrate that they 
are fully achieved at the vehicle level. 
B.3.2 Functional Safety Concept 
A functional safety concept (FSC) is defined as the specification of the functional safety 
requirements, with associated information, their allocation to architectural elements, and their 
interaction necessary to achieve the safety goals. The FSC can take account of external measures 
which are defined as a measure that is separate and distinct from the item which reduces or mitigates 
the risks. The FSC can also take account of other technologies, which are defined as technologies 
different from E/E technologies within the scope of ISO 26262. The FSC is defined in functional 
terms only and is implementation-free.  
The functional safety concept is verified to show that it is consistent with, and compliant with, the 
safety goal, and that it has the ability to mitigate or avoid the hazardous events. 
B.3.3 Technical Safety Concept 
A technical safety concept (TSC) is defined as a specification of the technical safety requirements 
and their allocation to system elements for implementation by the system design. The technical 
safety requirements are derived from the implementation-free functional safety requirements and 
allocated to the actual implementation represented by the system design. The system design 
specifies the requirements for the hardware and software that ultimately constitute the E/E system8. 
                                                     
8 The four levels of design, FSC, TSC, hardware and software are used by the standard for explanatory 
purposes, in practice, depending on the definition of the E/E system, all of these four levels can have 
subdivisions and it is up to the user of the standard to apply the concepts to their particular development. 
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The standard uses a model for both hardware and software whereby requirements are allocated to 
an architecture which consists of components, which may be hierarchical assembles of other 
components, before terminating in hardware parts and software units. The software units are 
compiled into object-code and contained within a hardware part. The standard also requires that a 
hardware-software interface specification be created to specify the hardware and software 
interaction, e.g. hardware devices that are controlled by software and hardware resources that 
support the execution of software. 
The system design is analysed to identify the causes and effects of systematic faults, and actions 
are taken to eliminate the causes or mitigate the effects. The system design is verified for 
compliance and completeness with regard to the TSC. Also, the following integration testing is also 
performed: 
 hardware-software integration testing 
 system integration and testing 
 vehicle integration and testing 
B.3.4 Hardware Safety Requirements 
The hardware safety requirements are derived from the technical safety requirements, and the 
hardware-software interface specification, and allocated to elements of the hardware design. 
The hardware design is evaluated for robustness against random hardware faults that could result 
in the violation of a safety goal. Three metrics are used: 
 single-point fault metric 
 latent-fault metric 
 evaluation of safety goal violations due to random hardware failures 
Single-point fault metric and latent-fault metric 
The purpose of these metrics is to guide the hardware design and show that it complies with the 
safety goals. The target values may be derived from the hardware architectural metrics calculation 
applied on similar well-trusted design principles or derived from some indicative values given in 
the standard. 
The assessment of the hardware design against these targets may be based on meeting the target 
value for the whole hardware design, or else justifying that meeting a target at the hardware element 
level is sufficient to comply meeting the target value for whole hardware design. Additionally, the 
assessment of the latent-fault metric target value may be based on meeting the target values for the 
diagnostic coverage for each hardware element with faults that can lead to the unavailability of a 
safety mechanism. 
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Evaluation of safety goal violations due to random hardware failures 
The purpose of this evaluation is to “make available criteria that can be used in a rationale that the 
residual risk of a safety goal violation, due to random hardware failures of the item, is sufficiently 
low.” This may be achieved by either meeting the Probabilistic Metric for Random Hardware 
Failures (PMHF) or by performing an evaluation of each cause of safety goal violation. 
A target value for the PMHF may be derived from field data from similar well-trusted design 
principles, derived from quantitative analysis techniques applied to similar well-trusted design 
principles, or derived from some indicative values given in the standard. The target values do not 
have any absolute significance and are only useful to compare a new design with existing ones. The 
assessment of the hardware design against these targets involves calculating the total failure rate 
based on the failure rates of all components. 
An alternative method for evaluating safety goal violations due to random hardware failures is also 
given, based on improving the diagnostics coverage. 
The hardware design is verified for compliance and completeness with respect to the hardware 
safety requirements. 
B.3.5 Software Safety Requirements 
The software safety requirements are derived from the technical safety requirements, and the 
hardware-software interface specification, and allocated to elements of the software architecture. 
The software architecture is analysed to identify safety-related parts of the software and support the 
specification of safety mechanisms associated with random hardware failures and systematic 
software faults. If the implementation of software safety requirements relies on freedom from 
interference, or sufficient independence between software components, then an analysis is 
performed to establish that the requirements for freedom from interference and independence have 
been met 
The software architecture is verified for compliance with the software safety requirements, 
compatibility with the target hardware and adherence to design guidelines. 
B.4 Integrity 
As mentioned above, the standard uses the terms, safety measures and safety mechanisms. It does 
not prescribe the safety mechanisms as these are particular to each E/E system developed. The 
standard does prescribe the use of particular safety measures, excluding the safety mechanisms, as 
these are common to all developments. The prescription is achieved by reusing the labels that denote 
the unmitigated risk to indicate the integrity with which safety requirements are to be implemented. 
To this end, all safety requirements, i.e. safety goals, functional safety requirements, technical 
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safety requirements, hardware safety requirements and software safety requirements, are assigned 
a label which can take values of ASILA, ASILB, ASILC or ASILD. The label takes its value from the 
one that denotes the unmitigated risk of the hazardous event from which the safety requirements 
are derived. The values may be reduced using a process referred to as requirements decomposition 
with respect to ASIL tailoring (aka ASIL decomposition) which requires that the intent of a safety 
requirement be achieved by two independent means. 
In the parts 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8 of ISO 26262, the clauses, or sub-clauses, of the standard are stated as 
being applicable to safety requirements, or activities related to them, depending on their associated 
integrity value. The standard indicates the applicability as ASILA, ASIL(A), ASILB, ASIL(B), ASILC, 
or ASILD. These occur in the following combinations: 
 ASILA, ASILB, ASILC, ASILD (often indicated by the word “all”) 
 ASILB, ASILC, ASILD 
 ASILC, ASILD 
 ASILB 
 ASILC 
 ASILD 
 ASIL(A), ASILB, ASILC, ASILD 
 ASIL(A), ASIL(B), ASILC, ASILD 
 ASIL(A), ASIL(B), ASIL(C), ASILD 
 ASIL(B), ASILC, ASILD 
An ASIL value given in parentheses indicates that the corresponding clause, or sub-clause, is only 
a recommendation. The clauses, or sub-clauses, whose applicability depends on the ASIL value, 
are related to analysis methods, design properties, verification methods, hardware metrics targets, 
software modelling/coding guidelines, notations for software design and software design principles. 
The safety requirements are deemed to be implemented with the required integrity if the 
corresponding clauses, or sub-clauses are complied with. 
B.5 Functional Safety Assessment 
The standard requires a number of confirmation measures to be performed. The independence of 
the staff performing these measures is determined by the ASIL value associated with the item. These 
measures are: 
 Confirmation review of designated work-products to evaluate their compliance 
corresponding clauses, or sub-clauses of ISO 26262 
 Functional safety audit of the activities performed against those specified in the safety plan 
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 Functional safety assessment of the item described in the item definition by examination of 
the work-products required by the safety plan, the implementation of the required processes 
and a review of the implemented safety measures 
The standard also calls for a safety case to be developed which it defines as argument that the safety 
requirements for an item are complete and satisfied by evidence compiled from work-products of 
the safety activities performed during development. 
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 Mechatronic Safety Argument 
In Chapter 4 we showed how the 4CAS design material related to the generic blocks of the ontology 
as an example of how a mechatronic system could be divided into a set of Partes. In this Appendix 
we show how the material can support the 4CAS safety argument. We start with a single hazardous 
event identified by the 4CAS analysis and show how the argument can be constructed from the 
mechatronic pattern given in Chapter 4. In constructing the argument, we bring in other data from 
the 4CAS development, or discuss what the data could have been. The scope of this example 
argument is Pars 1, Pars 2 and Pars 3. It is restricted to only three Partes for practical reasons, as 
the volume of material referenced by the argument increases significantly after Pars 3. 
In Pars 1, we are arguing over a specific hazardous event and then a safety goal which addresses 
several hazardous events. In Pars 2, we are arguing over a mechatronic functional safety concept 
that addresses the safety goal from Pars 1. In the Pars 3, we are arguing over a mechatronic 
technical safety concept which addresses all mechatronic functional safety concepts, so it is no 
longer specific to the starting hazardous event. 
The skeleton of the whole argument for Pars 1, Pars 2 and Pars 3 is shown in Figure 81, using 
the GSN notation. The argument structure closely follows the mechatronic one given in Chapter 
4. Here, we have not included the cascading of material from one Partes to another and instead 
have shown the connection by using a common context. The identifiers in the symbols are 
explained in the text that follows for each Pars. The naming convention is that the same 
identifiers are used as for the mechatronic argument pattern given in Chapter 4, but prefixed with 
the letter “E”.
  
 
 
Figure 81: Whole 4CAS Safety Argument 
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C.1 Pars 1: Mechatronic Item Definition and Hazard & Risk Assessment 
The Pars 1 argument structure is shown in Figure 82, it is based on Figure 48. The symbols are 
defined in Table 39 which shows the mechatronic pattern text and the 4CAS example. 
 
Figure 82: Pars 1 Argument Structure 
 
Identifier Symbol Mechatronic Pattern Text 4CAS Example Text 
EP1G1 Claim The Mechatronic HARA Documentation 
meets its ISO 26262 requirements 
4CAS HARA documentation meets 
ISO 26262 requirements 
EP1C1 Context Reference to initial system material used to 
create the Mechatronic Item Definition 
Section 4.1 4CAS description (Design 
artefact) 
EP1G2 Claim All Hazardous Events meet their ISO 26262 
requirements 
All 4CAS Hazardous Events meet their 
ISO 26262 requirements 
EP1C2 Context P2B2: Hazardous Events Different to Expected Oversteer in 
bend (Design artefact) 
EP1G3 Claim All properties required of the Hazardous 
Events have been achieved 
All properties of the 4CAS Hazardous 
Event Properties have been achieved 
EP1C3 Context Hazardous Event Properties ASIL classification 
EP1G4 Claim All Hazardous Events have been defined in 
compliance with ISO 26262 
All 4CAS Hazardous Events have been 
defined in compliance with ISO 26262 
EP1G5 Claim All Mechatronic Safety Goals meet their ISO 
26262 requirements 
All 4CAS Safety Goals meet their ISO 
26262 requirements 
EP1C4 Context Mechatronic Safety Goals 4CAS SG2: The vehicle users, and 
other road users, shall not be exposed 
to unacceptable risk due to gross height 
or pressure errors at the 4 corners, 
ASIL B. (Design artefact) 
EP1G6 Claim All properties required of the Mechatronic 
Safety Goal have been achieved. 
All properties required of the 4CAS 
Safety Goal have been achieved. 
EP1C5 Context Mechatronic Safety Goal Properties If met, the Safety Goal must avoid 
unreasonable risk 
EP1G7 Claim All Mechatronic Safety Goals have been 
defined in compliance with ISO 26262 
All 4CAS Safety Goals have been 
defined in compliance with ISO 26262 
Table 39: Pars 1 Symbols 
EP1G1EP1C1
EP1G2EP1C2
EP1G3 EP1G4EP1C3
EP1G5 EP1C4
EP1G6 EP1G7EP1C5
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C.1.1 EP1G1 
Claim EP1G1: 4CAS HARA documentation meets ISO 26262 requirements is the start of the whole 
argument structure. ISO 26262 states what the item definition should contain, but does not require 
it to have verification reviews, so the question of whether it is complete and correct is not addressed. 
The MISRA framework seeks to address this with an argument that links the completeness of the 
hazardous events with the completeness of the item definition. These issues were not formally 
addressed in the 4CAS development; the completeness and correctness were assured by virtue of a 
small team of experts working closely together. 
For the purposes of the example, the initial material, EP1C1, is that given in Chapter 4, section 4.1 
4CAS description. In our model, this context represents a design artefact. 
C.1.2 EP1G2 
For claim EP1G2: All 4CAS Hazardous Events meet their ISO 26262 requirements we are using 
just the single hazardous event given in context EP1C2 as Different to Expected Oversteer in bend9. 
This is a combination of hazard - Different to Expected Oversteer, and the operational situation -
negotiating a bend of moderate curvature at a speed greater than 50 mph. In our model, this context 
represents a design artefact. 
The properties of a hazardous event, context EP1C3, as adapted from ISO 26262, is that it has the 
correct ASIL value classification. In this example the claim EPG3 is met by the hazardous event - 
Different to Expected Oversteer in bend being classified as ASILB. 
The claim EP1G4: All Hazardous Events have been defined in compliance with ISO 26262 could 
be developed using claims related to process, review and audit. The MISRA Safety Case Guidelines 
makes many suggestions for means and organisational environment claims along these lines. 
C.1.3 EP1G5 
For claim EP1G5: All 4CAS Safety Goals meet their ISO 26262 requirements there is a single safety 
goal, EP1C4: SG2: The vehicle users, and other road users, shall not be exposed to unacceptable 
risk due to gross height or pressure errors at the 4 corners, (ASIL B). This safety goal addresses a 
group of hazardous events including Different to Expected Oversteer in bend. In our model this 
context represents a design artefact. 
The properties of a mechatronic safety goal, context EP1C5, as adapted from ISO 26262, is that 
meeting the mechatronic safety goal avoids unreasonable risk. In this example, the claim EP1G6 is 
met by the following rationale: 
 
                                                     
9 This 4CAS hazardous event is only indicative 
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 Oversteer is caused by height or pressure errors at the four corners 
o There is analysis which provides evidence to support this statement 
 The mechatronic safety goal is defined as requiring unreasonable risk to be avoided 
The claim EP1G7: All Mechatronic Safety Goals have been defined in compliance with ISO 26262 
could be developed using claims related to process, review and audit. The MISRA Safety Case 
Guidelines makes many suggestions for means and organisational environment claims along these 
lines. Note that the safety goal has inherited the ASIL value in accordance with ISO 26262. 
C.2 Pars 2: Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept 
The Pars 2 argument structure is shown in Figure 83, it is based on Figure 57. The symbols are 
defined in Table 40, which shows the mechatronic pattern text and the 4CAS example. 
 
Figure 83: Pars 2 Argument Structure 
Identifier Symbol Mechatronic Pattern Text 4CAS Example Text 
EP2G1 Claim The Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept 
meets its ISO 26262 requirements 
4CAS Mechatronic Functional Safety 
Concept meets its ISO 26262 
requirements (Design artefact) 
EP2C1 Context Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept 4CAS Mechatronic Functional Safety 
Concept 
EP2G2 Claim The Documentation that the Mechatronic 
Functional Safety Concept is based on is 
complete and correct 
4CAS Safety Goals are complete and 
correct 
EP1C4 Context Mechatronic Safety Goals 4CAS Safety Goals 
EP2G3 Claim Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept 
meets its ISO 26262 requirements 
4CAS Mechatronic Functional Safety 
Concept meets its ISO 26262 
requirements 
EP2G4 Claim All properties required of the Mechatronic 
Functional Safety Concept have been 
achieved. 
All properties required of the 4CAS 
Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept 
have been achieved. 
EP2C2 Context Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept 
Properties 
4CAS Mechatronic Functional Safety 
Concept Properties 
EP2G5 Claim Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept has 
been defined in compliance with ISO 26262 
4CAS Mechatronic Functional Safety 
Concept has been defined in 
compliance with ISO 26262 
Table 40: Pars 2 Symbols 
EP1C4
EP2G1
EP2G2 EP2G3
EP2G4 EP2G5EP2C2
EP2C1
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C.2.1 EP2G2 
The mechatronic functional safety concept is based on the mechatronic safety goals which were 
derived in Pars 1; their completeness and correctness was argued there, EP1G6 and EP1G7. The 
claim EP2G2: The Documentation that the Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept is based on is 
complete and correct is effectively a repeat of this claim. If the mechatronic functional safety 
concept is created in the same work package, e.g. the same staff in the same organisation, then the 
claim would be based on the local change control and version management systems and the 
governance of these. If mechatronic functional safety concept was not created in this way, then the 
argument would be based on the information provided by the organisation responsible for deriving 
the mechatronic safety goals. 
C.2.2 EP2G3 
The claim EP2G3: 4CAS Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept meets its ISO 26262 
requirements relates to the design artefact that defines the concept as referenced in EP2C1. In the 
4CAS example this was contained the design artefact 4CAS Functional Safety Concept@1_7.pdf. 
Its content included: 
 Assumptions concerning the roll stability at different heights and the effects on roll stability 
of the brakes Dynamic Stability Control function 
 Nominal behaviour safety requirements stating required behaviour during fault-free 
operation; these are also shown in the activity diagrams of  Figure 58 and Figure 59 
 Fault management safety requirements stating what system failures shall be detected and 
the 4CAS system response to those failures; these are also shown in the activity diagrams 
of Figure 60, Figure 61 and Figure 62. 
The properties of a mechatronic functional safety concept, context EP2C1, as adapted from 
ISO 26262, is that it achieves all its associated mechatronic safety goals. However, given the 
formulation of the safety goal in this case, the property that must be established is that normally 
associated with the mechatronic safety goal, namely that a correctly implemented mechatronic 
functional safety concept avoids unreasonable risk. In our example a rationale, based on the stated 
assumption and safety requirements, is given in the design artefact 4CAS Functional Safety 
Concept@1_7.pdf. 
 The claim EP2G5: 4CAS Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept has been defined in compliance 
with ISO 26262 could be developed using claims related to process, review and audit. The MISRA 
Safety Case Guidelines makes many suggestions for means and organisational environment claims 
along these lines. 
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C.3 Pars 3: Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept 
The Pars 3 argument structure is shown in Figure 84, it is based on Figure 61. The symbols are 
defined in Table 41 which shows the mechatronic pattern text and the 4CAS example. 
 
Figure 84: Pars 3 Argument Structure 
C.3.1 EP3G2 
The mechatronic technical safety concept is based on the mechatronic functional safety concept 
which was derived in Pars 2; its completeness and correctness was argued there, EP2G4 and 
EP2G5. The claim EP3G2: The Documentation that the Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept is 
based on is complete and correct is effectively a repeat of this claim. If the mechatronic technical 
safety concept is created in the same work package, e.g. the same staff in the same organisation, 
then the claim would be based on the local change control and version management systems and 
the governance of these. If mechatronic technical safety concept was not created in this way, then 
the argument would be based on the information provided by the organisation responsible for 
deriving the mechatronic functional safety concept. 
C.3.1 EP3G3 
The claim EP3G3: All 4CAS Mechatronic Technical Safety Requirements achieves all their 
required properties relates to the design artefact that specifies the requirements as referenced in 
EP3C2. In the 4CAS example the E/E system requirements were recorded in a proprietary electronic 
database, eLog. Those related to the mechanical design were managed by the Chassis department 
and are not available. There was no requirement for a single mechatronic technical safety 
requirements document. 
EP2C1
EP3G1
EP3G2
EP3G3EP3C2
EP3G4EP3C3 EP3G5 EP3C4
EP3G6 EP3G9EP3C5
EP3G7EP3C6 EP3G8 EP3C7
EP3C8
EP3C9
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Identifier Symbol Mechatronic Pattern Text 4CAS Example Text 
EP3G1 Claim All Mechatronic Technical Safety Concept 
artefacts achieve their required properties 
All 4CAS Mechatronic Technical Safety 
Concept artefacts achieve their required 
properties (Design artefact) 
EP2C1 Context Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept 4CAS Mechatronic Functional Safety 
Concept 
EP3G2 Claim The Documentation that the Mechatronic 
Technical Safety Concept is based on is 
complete and correct 
4CAS Mechatronic Functional Safety 
Concept is complete and correct 
EP3C2 Context Mechatronic Technical Safety 
Requirements 
4CAS Mechatronic Safety Technical 
Requirements 
EP3G3 Claim All Mechatronic Technical Safety 
Requirements achieves all their required 
properties 
All 4CAS Mechatronic Technical Safety 
Requirements achieves all their required 
properties 
EP3C3 Context Mechatronic Technical Safety Requirement 
Properties 
4CAS Mechatronic Technical Safety 
Requirement Properties 
EP3G4 Claim All properties required of the Mechatronic 
Technical Safety Requirements have been 
achieved. 
All properties required of the 4CAS 
Mechatronic Technical Safety 
Requirements have been achieved. 
EP3C4 Context Mechatronic Technical Safety Requirement 
Process 
4CAS Mechatronic Technical Safety 
Requirement Process 
EP3G5 Claim All Mechatronic Technical Safety 
Requirements have been defined in 
compliance with the process 
All 4CAS Mechatronic Technical Safety 
Requirements have been defined in 
compliance with the process 
EP3C5 Context Mechatronic System Design 4CAS example diagrams from Chapter 4 
Would be other documentation as well, 
not shown here 
EP3G6 Claim The Mechatronic System Design achieves 
all its required properties 
The 4CAS Mechatronic System Design 
achieves all its required properties 
EP3C6 Context Mechatronic System Design Properties 4CAS Mechatronic System Design 
Properties 
EP3G7 Claim All properties required of the Mechatronic 
System Design have been achieved. 
All properties required of the 4CAS 
Mechatronic System Design have been 
achieved. 
EP3C7 Context Mechatronic System Design Process 4CAS Mechatronic System Design 
Process 
EP3G8 Claim The Mechatronic System Design has been 
defined in compliance with the process 
The 4CAS Mechatronic System Design 
has been defined in compliance with the 
process 
EP3C8 Context Physically Realised Mechatronic System 4CAS Mechatronic System 
EP3C9 Context Physically Realised Mechatronic System 
Properties 
4CAS Mechatronic System Properties 
EP3G9 Claim Physically Realised Mechatronic System 
achieves all its required properties 
4CAS Mechatronic System achieves all 
its required properties 
Table 41: Pars 3 Symbols 
The properties of the mechatronic technical safety requirements, context EP3C3, as adapted from 
ISO 26262, are that the requirements are:  
 compliant and consistent with the mechatronic functional safety concept  
 compliant with the mechatronic system design 
 compliant with the rules of ASIL decomposition 
4CAS evidence is not available to support these claims as the contemporaneous reports were not 
created according to this Pars structure. 
The claim EP3G5: All 4CAS Mechatronic Technical Safety Requirements have been defined in 
compliance with the process is in relation to the context EP3C4. In the case of 4CAS, the work was 
developed under a QMS based on a process for producing an E/E system. The process did include 
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interfacing with other departments, so this claim is partially addressed. The evidence to support the 
claim consists of internal audit reports and external audit reports produced because the QMS was 
externally certified to ISO 9004 under the TickIT scheme (now discontinued). 
C.3.2 EP3G6 
The claim EP3G6: The 4CAS Mechatronic System Design achieves all its required properties 
relates to the design artefact that specifies the system design as referenced in EP3C5. Examples of 
the 4CAS design documentation were shown in Figure 59 and Figure 60. Other documentation was 
produced at the time, but this is not shown here.  
The properties of the mechatronic system design, context EP3C6, as adapted from ISO 26262, are 
that the design is:  
 compliant and complete with regard to the mechatronic technical safety concept 
 robust against the causes of systematic failures and the effects of systematic faults 
4CAS evidence is not available to support these claims as the contemporaneous reports were not 
created according to this Pars structure. 
The claim EP3G8: The 4CAS Mechatronic System Design has been defined in compliance with the 
process is in relation to the context EP3C7. In the case of 4CAS, the work was developed under a 
QMS based on a process for producing an E/E system. The process did include interfacing with 
other departments, so this claim is partially addressed. The evidence to support the claim are internal 
audit reports and external audit reports produced because the QMS was externally certified to ISO 
9004 under the TickIT scheme (now discontinued). 
C.3.3 EP3G9 
The claim EP3G9: 4CAS Mechatronic System achieves all its required properties relates to the 
physical implementation of the system design as referenced in EP3C8. For the 4CAS system this is 
the pneumatic system, and its ECU, fitted to a vehicle. 
The properties of the physically realised mechatronic system, context EP3C9, as adapted from 
ISO 26262, are that it: 
 is compliant with mechanical-E/E system interface specification  
 correctly implements the mechatronic functional safety requirements, (EP2C1) 
 correctly implements the mechatronic technical safety requirements, (EP3C2) 
 achieves the mechatronic safety goals, (EP1C4) when operating as an item in a vehicle in 
the context of the electrical architecture with other controllers. 
A wide variety of tests were performed with each having a test specification and producing a test 
report, all of which provide evidence to support the claim. The details of these are not shown here. 
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 Case Study 2: Pars Approach Practicality 
D.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this case study was to evaluate the Pars approach to dividing up an engineering 
development in the context of a mechatronic development. The case study provided an evaluation 
of contribution 1, presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. The case study sought to ascertain: 
 What potential does the approach have for accurately capturing all the information? 
 What potential does the approach have to increase overall understanding of the system? 
 How practical is the approach? 
The case study is based on 4CAS, described in Chapter 4. A qualitative technique of semi-structured 
interviews was used as the data collection instrument. General questions were asked to get an 
understanding of what the practitioners thought of the approach. The sample size is small as it is 
necessarily restricted to staff still in the company who had worked on the project. 
D.2 Case Study Design 
The case study looked at a single development within one company. The structure of the case study 
is based on Yin’s Case Study Research methodology [195]. According to Yin’s classification, the 
proposed study is a Type 2: Single-case embedded design. It is a single-case design because it is 
capturing “… the circumstances and conditions of an everyday situation”. It is an embedded design 
because there are multiple units of analysis; in this case, each person interviewed is a different unit 
of analysis. 
The set of Partes used for the case study was a simplified version of that described in Chapter 4 so 
as to be more closely aligned with actual practice. It was decided to take this approach to make it 
easier for the participants to relate to a new way of thinking about the system. The set of Partes 
used was: 
 4CAS Mechatronic System 
 4CAS E/E System 
 4CAS Mechanical System 
A briefing sheet was written. This initially used Figure 29 from Chapter 3 and Figure 43 from 
Chapter 4; it also included an activity diagram for each Pars that showed the inputs and outputs 
from the Pars. The activity diagram was based on the generic Pars ontology. It was decided to use 
the activity diagram, rather than a direct presentation of the ontology, because most of the 
participants were unfamiliar with the modelling technique. This was then reviewed by a colleague, 
who was not part of the case study, to assess how understandable it was. This review led to some 
simplifications. These included the removal of the figures from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 and the 
creation of a single drawing that included the activity diagram for each Pars, and showed the 
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cascade of design information from one Pars to another, Figure 85. The Pars terminology was also 
removed as it was seen as unnecessary complication 
The questions were divided into three groups. The first group concerned Figure 85 in its entirety, 
questioning how easy it was to understand and whether it accounted for all the documentation. The 
second group of questions concerned each individual Pars, questioning the details of the 
documentation and the handling of it in terms of decisions, properties, verification and its physical 
realisation. The third group of questions were general in nature, questioning the overall usefulness 
and practicality of the approach. The questions are shown in Appendix E. 
D.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
As mentioned above, the unit of analysis is the individual participant and a total of five participants 
were interviewed. They were selected by virtue of them having worked on the project. Between 
them the participants were involved in all of the Partes defined for this case study, Table 42. 
ID Role in 4CAS Development Experience in Role 
P1 System Owner 22 years 
P2 Mechatronic Technical Specialist 30 years 
P3 Control Engineer 15 years 
P4 Software Engineer 30 years 
P5 Functional Safety Engineer 15 years 
Table 42: Case study 2 participants 
The study had approval from the Physical Sciences Ethics Committee at the University of York. 
The participants were given a briefing sheet to read. This explained: the purpose of the work to 
extend the functional safety process to include the mechanical system; the division of the subject 
matter into different Partes, with each Pars having the same underlying design process and 
functional safety argument; the purpose of the case study. The participants were also shown the 
diagram in Figure 85, and this was referred to throughout the interview. 
Each person was interviewed separately and the interview lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. The 
answers given were recorded by hand and transferred to electronic media, i.e. a spreadsheet, within 
48 hours of the interview. When transferring the results, errors in grammar and punctuation in the 
handwritten notes were corrected. The interviews were conducted over a two-week period in March 
2018. 
The answers from all participants were combined in a single sheet, and for each question positive 
and negative responses were recorded and key quotes noted. These were then collated under the 
themes given in the next section. 
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Figure 85: Description of Partes for case study 2 
act Pars Process[4CAS Mechatronic System]
Concept
Custom Physical Parts: [0..*]
Standard Physical Parts:[0..*]
Mechatronic System Design
Standards:[0..*] Regulations:[0..*] Design Patterns:[0..*] Technologies:[0..*]
act Pars Process[4CAS E/E System]
Custom Physical Parts: [0..*]
Standard Physical Parts:[0..*]
Hardware Safety Requirements
Standards:[0..*] Regulations:[0..*] Design Patterns:[0..*] Technologies:[0..*]
act Pars Process[4CAS Mechanical System]
Custom Physical Parts: [0..*]
Standard Physical Parts:[0..*]
Pars Specifications out:[0..*]
Standards:[0..*] Regulations:[0..*] Design Patterns:[0..*] Technologies:[0..*]
Mechatronic System Design
E/E System
Technical Safety Requirements
Mechatronic System Design
Software Safety Requirements
Mechanical System
Technical Safety Requirements
Mechanical System
Technical Safety Requirements
E/E System
Technical Safety Requirements
E/E System
Architecture Assumptions
Mechanical
Preliminary Architecture
Design
Functional Safety
Mechatronic Safety Goals
Mechatronic Safety Concept
Hardware Requirements
Software Requirements
E/E System Design
Mechanical-E/E System interface
Hardware-software interface
Mechanical-E/E System interface
Mechanical-E/E System interface
  
D.4 Case Study Results 
The results are presented under the themes of: 
 Pars Division 
 Documentation 
 Practicality 
Pars Division 
The representation of the project as a set of Partes with information flowing between them was 
seen as being representative of the 4CAS development by all of the participants. Showing the link 
between the E/E system and the mechanical system highlighted that the system is more than just the 
software and that the mechanical aspects also contribute to safety. For example, the safe state 
involves both the E/E system and the mechanical system. This could help improve the safety 
argument. It also highlighted the fact that software requirements are often defined by mechanical 
component constraints; examples include, the need to manage the temperature of the compressor 
and the fact that the pressure measurement is dependent on the design of both the E/E system and 
the mechanical system.  
There were some criticisms of the diagram used for the case study. One participant would prefer 
the systems engineering requirements flow to also be visible so that it was possible to show that 
each element of a system lifecycle is covered. Also, the diagram does not show the feedback 
between the E/E system and the mechanical system; this often leads to changes in requirements and 
specifications. 
Documentation 
The activity diagrams included information that corresponded to the blocks of the generic ontology 
and the participants were able to associate design material in a variety of formats to all of these. 
One participant commented that it was useful to include the mechanical documentation on the 
diagram. 
The introduction of a Mechatronic Functional Safety Concept was seen as being a beneficial 
addition, as hazards are caused by both failures of the mechanical system as well as those of the 
E/E system. In practice, the hazard analysis of the 4CAS system had been conducted at a 
mechatronic level and had consequently produced some new safety requirements for the mechanical 
design which had not been previously considered. 
It was noted that some information was missing from the diagram, for example: calibration, service 
and manufacturing requirements, problem reports, the electrical network, and the location of 
physical components. 
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Practicality 
In practice, the mechatronic Pars was less formally documented than shown in the diagram and not 
all of the documentation shown in the diagram was produced. It was also noted that some of the 
information is the responsibility of the suppliers who historically have not been willing to reveal all 
their internal information. 
Also, the development of the mechatronic system and the development of the mechanical system 
are very closely linked; this is not expressed well in the diagram. 
When asked about how the process and the evidence produced may be affected by the integrity 
requirements, one participant was of the opinion that mitigating the risk was more about getting the 
correct requirements for the interaction between the mechanical system and the E/E system. 
D.5 Discussion 
The overall result is positive, and an explicit representation of the development as a mechatronic 
system was seen as an improvement over current practice. The participants were able to engage with 
the material and readily provide answers to questions. They could relate what had happened during 
the development, and the material that was produced, to the diagram. This was helped by the fact 
that the diagram is pitched at a high level of abstraction. 
There were some practical concerns about the availability of the documents and the fact that the 
interplay between the different development streams is not explicitly shown on the diagram. A large 
amount of mechanical design work was effectively done at the mechatronic level to determine the 
specification of the mechanical components; this included prototyping. 
The cascading of a specification from one Pars to another for refinement is perhaps a little artificial, 
especially as it may well be the same staff who produce both the initial version of the specification 
and also the final one. Also, requirements often change as a result of feedback between the Partes. 
Some of these criticisms are of the diagram rather than the approach. The diagram was only created 
for the purpose of the case study and if carried forward could be improved to address these issues. 
To bridge the two worlds of E/E system design and mechanical system design the approach needs 
the approval of both sides; it has to be something that both can assent to technically and also 
something that is not too onerous. The case study shows that the proposed approach has not violated 
this requirement. 
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 Case Study 2 Questions 
Name: 
Participant’s Background 
Q1 What was your role in the development of the 4CAS System? 
Q2 What aspects of 4CAS development were you involved in? 
Q3 What previous experience do you have of these types of systems, e.g. number of system, number of years? 
4CAS Partes diagram 
Q4 Does the 4CAS Partes diagram make sense? 
Q5 Can you relate the project documentation to the generic documents used here? 
Q6 Is there documentation that does not fit into this scheme? 
Q7 Are there any major pieces of documentation missing from the diagram? 
4CAS Pars 
Q8 What format did, or could, the documents take? 
Q9 How was the completeness of the input documentation assessed? 
Q10 What design properties of the input documentation were assessed? 
What analysis of the input documentation was, or could have been, performed? 
Q11 Is it fair to say that the Hazardous Events were derived from the mechatronic inputs? 
Q12 What design decisions were made at this point? 
Standard components 
Standard design patterns 
Q13 Choices: 
How were these made? 
Who made them, who approved them? 
How did the team know that they were the correct decisions? 
Q14 Design properties: 
What design properties were established at this point? 
How was it decided that these design properties were right / correct / appropriate / acceptable? 
How could it have been decided? 
Q15 Safety properties 
What safety properties were established at this point? 
How was it decided that these safety properties were right / correct / appropriate / acceptable? 
How could it have been decided? 
Q16 What design verification, if any, was performed against this level of design? 
Q17 Is there any verification that was performed that does not fit in the scheme? 
Q18 How was the final design documented? 
4CAS system diagram 
Pneumatic design assumptions 
Mechatronic modelling, actuators, sensors, BDDs, IBDs 
Q19 What does the Mechatronic Safety Concept mean to you? 
Q20 How was the completeness of the design documentation with respect to the input documentation and design choices assessed? 
Q21 What physical parts were selected or specified at this point? 
Q22 How was it established that the physical parts selected or specified would meet the requirements? 
Q23 If physical parts were procured or prototyped at this point, how was it established that they met their specification and 
functional requirements? 
Q24 What physical mechanical fitment checks were performed at this point? 
General 
Q25 In what way does the partitioning of the material make it easier to comprehend the whole system? 
Q26 In what way does the documentation prompt you to think of things that are not as well documented as they should be? 
Q27 In terms of a safety argument, does this help? 
Q28 Are there artefacts that I have assumed are available which in practice are not available? 
Q29 How would you moderate the amount of evidence generated – what would be enough, cf ASIL? 
Q30 How would the choice of evidence necessary be affected by the FMEA results? 
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 DFMEA Usage Case Study Questions 
Q1.1 What products or circumstances will you draw on, in answering these questions? 
Q1.2 What company procedure(s) do you use? 
Q1.3 How many FMEA do you perform a year? 
Q1.4a How many FMEA do you support a year? 
Q1.4b What is the nature of your support? 
  
Q2.1 What is the purpose of FMEA? 
Q2.2 How strongly do you agree with the statement: One purpose of an FMEA is to improve the component 
being analysed by addressing it most pressing issues? 
[Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neither Agree or Disagree | Agree | Strongly Agree] 
Q2.3 How strongly do you agree with the statement: One purpose of an FMEA is to prevent the product from 
causing harm? 
[Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neither Agree or Disagree | Agree | Strongly Agree] 
Q2.4 What terms do you prefer to use when discussing issues relating to the product injuring people, e.g. risk, 
severity, criticality? 
Q2.5 What are your completion criteria based on? 
[Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neither Agree or Disagree | Agree | Strongly Agree] 
Q2.5a Judgement 
Q2.5b Finance/warranty 
Q2.5c Other measure 
Q2.6 What is the outcome if it is not done properly? 
[Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neither Agree or Disagree | Agree | Strongly Agree] 
Q2.6a Warranty 
Q2.6b Critical concerns 
Q2.6c Other 
Q2.6d Examples 
Q2.7 How effective do you think this is in achieving its purpose? 
[Not at all Effective | Not Very Effective | Partly Effective | Effective | Very Effective] 
Q2.8a How do you know how effective it is? 
Q2.8b What evidence could you produce to support this? 
Q2.9a How do you decide on the level of confidence you have in the FMEA results? 
Q2.9b What evidence could you produce to support this? E.g. based on experience, level of review, access to 
design/testing results, etc. 
Q2.10 How often is something missed which should have been found? 
[Very Frequently | Frequently | Not very Often | Occasionally | Rarely] 
Q2.11 What examples can you give of problems that should they have been, but were not, prevented, by the use 
of the FMEA? 
Q2.12 How do you decide what to investigate and how much to investigate when considering root causes? 
Q2.13a Do you agree that the concept of risk associated with the product causing harm to someone is common 
across all engineering disciplines, e.g. mechanical, electronic hardware, software? 
Q2.13b Give your rationale for the answer? 
Q2.14a How strongly do you agree with the statement: The effort expended on understanding risk, mitigating 
risk and gaining confidence in risk mitigation depends on the magnitude of the risk or the criticality of 
the product failure? 
[Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neither Agree or Disagree | Agree | Strongly Agree] 
Q2.14b Give your rationale for the answer? 
  
Q3.1 On what basis do you decide the severity score of an effect? 
Q3.2 On what basis do you decide the prevention score of an effect? 
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Q3.3 On what basis do you decide the occurrence score of an effect? 
Q3.4 Are actions only for potential effects labelled as YC (critical)? 
Q3.5 What happens to potential effects with severity scores of 1 to 8? 
Q3.6 What happens if a potential effect labelled YC cannot be eliminated? 
Q3.7a Have you ever, and if so under what circumstances, decided that although a cause is designated with a 
YC, there is sufficient evidence that it is fully prevented by good countermeasures and detection events?  
Q3.7b What was the evidence? 
Q3.8 Of the 5 types of failure modes (No Function, Partial – Over/Under Function, Degraded Over Time, 
Intermittent Function, Unintended Function), which in your experience: 
Q3.8a Are most often the most appropriate? 
Q3.8b The most difficult to determine? 
Q3.9 How do you decide when sufficient countermeasures based on Severity have been identified? 
Q3.10 How do you decide when sufficient countermeasures based on Prevention have been identified? 
Q3.11 How are the answers to Q3.9 & Q3.10 affected when the effect has been labelled YC? 
Q3.12 How often do you find that you have to perform root cause analysis? 
[Very Frequently | Frequently | Not very Often | Occasionally | Rarely] 
Q3.13 What are the most common root causes? 
Q3.14 When and why are FMEA reviews held? 
Q3.15a How often do you use DMAIC? 
[Very Frequently | Frequently | Not very Often | Occasionally | Rarely] 
Q3.15b Comment 
Q3.16a How often do you use DFSS/DCOV? 
[Very Frequently | Frequently | Not very Often | Occasionally | Rarely] 
Q3.16b Comment 
Q3.17 Do you have any examples where an FMEA was performed but there were subsequently issues, e.g. large 
warranty bill, campaigns, white alerts? 
Q3.18 Is there anyone else that you think I should talk to? 
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List of Abbreviations 
4CAS Four Corner Air Suspension 
ADAS Advanced Driver Assistance System 
ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practical 
ASIL Automotive Safety Integrity Level 
BDD Block Definition Diagram 
CAA Civil Aviation Authority 
CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation 
CFMEA Concept Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
CPRD Clinical Practice Research Datalink 
DAL Development Assurance Level  
DFMEA Design Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
DFSS Design for Six Sigma 
DGAC Direction Générale de l’Aviation Civile (France) 
DMAIC Define, Measure, Analyse, Improve, Control 
DSC Dynamic Stability Control 
ECU Electronic Control Unit 
E/E Electrical/Electronics  
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level 
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency 
EEC European Economic Community 
EMC Electro Magnetic Compatibility 
ENSREG European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group 
ERA European Railway Agency 
EU European Union 
FAA Federal Aviation Authority (USA) 
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations (USA) 
FDAL Function Design Assurance Level 
FMA Failure Mode Avoidance 
FMEA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
FMECA Failure Mode Effects Criticality Analysis 
FSC Functional Safety Concept 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
HARA Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment  
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IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
IATF International Automotive Task Force 
IBD Internal Block Diagram  
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation 
IDAL Item Design Assurance Level 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
INCOSE International Council on Systems Engineering 
ISO International Standards Organisation 
KSI Killed or Seriously Injured 
MHRA Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency 
MISRA Motor Industry Software Reliability Association 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NHTSA National Highways Traffic Safety Administration 
NRV National Reference Value 
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer 
OMG Object Modelling Group 
ONR Office for Nuclear Regulation 
OW Operating Window 
PFMEA Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
PMHF Probabilistic Metric for Random Hardware Failures 
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
QM Quality Management 
QMS Quality Management System 
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment 
RAMS Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety 
RPN Risk Priority Number  
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers 
SAPs Assessment Principles for Nuclear Facilities 
SIL Safety Integrity Level 
SysML Systems Modelling Language 
TAGs Technical Assessment Guides 
TQM Total Quality Management 
TSC Technical Safety Concept 
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UK United Kingdom  
UML Unified Modelling Language 
US United States 
VCA Vehicle Certification Agency 
VDI The Association of German Engineers 
VLSI Very Large-Scale Integration 
WENRA Western Nuclear Regulators Association 
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